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“There are sadistic scientists who hurry to hunt down errors instead of         
establishing the truth.”
Maria Curie Skłodowska (1867-1934)
“I do not know what I may appear to the world, but to myself I seem to have 
been only a boy playing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself in now and then 
finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean 
of truth lay all undiscovered before me.”
Isaac Newton (1643-1727)
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents a systematic empirical study of the Polish 
parliamentary elections in 1997, 2001 and 2005. The analyses are performed in 
the framework of behavioralism and rational choice.  Under these two broad 
academic schools of thought various theories of voting behavior have been 
developed over last 50 years.  I demonstrate the main theoretical elements of 
sociological, socio-psychological, economic, and issue-based models of voting, 
examine the relative weight of the major variables in each model, and test their 
statistical significance. 
xiv
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Determining the reasons behind voters’ choice at the ballot box is of 
fundamental importance to democracy.  Understanding ‘why people vote the way 
they do’ is also the chief concern of this project.  In this project I test a number 
of competing theories and models of voting behavior developed in the U.S. and 
Western Europe, among them: the socio-psychological model, the sociological 
model, spatial models, and the economic model.  Each of these models offers a 
different and compelling explanation of the social and attitudinal factors that 
determine voter choice. We know that voters in developed democracies cast 
ballots for or against political parties and candidates for a variety of reasons – 
cleavages, party affiliations, group interest, personal characteristics and 
perceptions of the candidates themselves, the economy, and policy issues. We 
know that diverse political settings and institutions may cause voters to behave 
differently.  What we are not absolutely certain of is what accounts for a 
particular vote.  This study seeks to examine what factors might influence the 
electoral choice of the Polish voter.
1
1.  Significance of the Study
This project focuses on finding an explanation of voting behavior in the 
complicated and still-emerging democratic setting of Poland, a country that 
began its democratic experience just over a decade ago.  Some of the models 
discussed in this work have not yet been tested in the Polish context or were 
tested only on one or two election periods.  The field of scholarship dedicated to 
electoral politics in present-day Poland is still very much in its infancy.  Perhaps 
most importantly, the explanation of voting behavior in Poland is complicated by 
a lack of consistent findings and the absence of theories explicitly applicable to 
the studies of Eastern Europe that can guide the researcher in an appropriate 
direction.
I regard this research as a sort of remedy. This work starts with an 
ambition to find syntheses from elements of existing theories of voting behavior 
and to seek novel theoretical underpinnings that apply explicitly to Poland and 
perhaps more broadly to other East-Central European countries.  It extends from 
theories of voting behavior well known to scholars who study this subject in 
developed democracies, which are used to frame my research questions and direct 
my search for answers.  In this study, the case of Poland becomes a subject for 
testing the chief hypotheses of voting behavior to the aim of presenting tough or 
critical tests for these hypotheses.  Perhaps, the study of post-communist states 
in general and Poland in particular should not be limited to the application of 
2
theories from elsewhere.  It is also possible that this study will reveal that the 
existing theories of voting behavior are well suited for Poland.  This research is 
driven by the recognition that to examine the puzzles of voting behavior and 
perhaps to propose amendments and alternatives can move the study of voting 
behavior in Poland forward. I believe that this project is an important 
contribution to the field of comparative/post-communist politics in general and 
Poland in particular, because it incorporates a systematic analysis of competing 
models of voting utilized by scholars in the study of  developed democracies.  To 
the best of my knowledge, no study of Poland or any other post-communist 
country has been conducted in the manner proposed here.
2.  Research Question and Scope of Analyses
This study asks ‘What has determined the results of parliamentary 
elections in Poland?’  In other words, what are the major and most probable 
factors underlying the voting decisions of Polish voters? What motivates voters to 
choose a political party?  How has the voting behavior of Polish citizens changed 
during the democratic transition?  How can we predict and explain voter choice? 
Different schools of thought approach the subject differently.  This study draws 
3
on two broad theories of behavioralism and rational choice.1  Within the tradition 
of behavioralism there are two variant perspectives, the Michigan school of voting 
and Columbia school of voting, both of which focus on non-policy factors. 
Rational choice theory includes spatial models of voting and economic models 
that focus primarily on policy factors. This research tests several models of voting 
behavior associated with these theoretical traditions.  The challenge is to 
elucidate the voters’ choices using existing models of voting behavior that may or 
may not have the full explanatory and predictive power in the new setting of 
democratic transitions. 
This research focuses on three recent parliamentary elections: 1997, 2001, 
and 2005.  The reason why the first set of post-communist elections has been 
omitted in this analysis is two-fold.2   First, it is widely believed that the first 
election of 1989 was not completely free since the communist party Polska 
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (PZPR) set up an agreement with the opposition 
that only 30% of seats in lower house of Parliament will be contested in that 
election.  Further, the voting behavior in the 1989 election can be mostly 
perceived as voting for a change of the political system.  Second, the elections of 
4
1It is important to distinguish between these two approaches as scholars in 
political science often place rational choice into the camp of behavioralism; see 
Terence Ball, "From Paradigms to Research Programs: Toward a Post-Kuhnian 
Political Science," American Journal of Political Science 20, no. 1 (1976).
2The data for 2007 elections is not yet available.
1991 and 1993 might be viewed in large part as the contest for or against 
emerging democracy and free market economy.  Their meaning is much more 
complex due to lack of full crystallization of political parties and their ideologies 
(parties emerged and disappeared “over night”) as well as voters’ confusion about 
the entire democratic process.  In the same vein, it would be very difficult for a 
researcher to compare results of voting behavior from early stages of democratic 
transition with the later ones because the first set of elections were driven by 
unique factors specific for the post-communist transitions. Last, but not least, the 
first series of elections has been studied extensively, while the more recent ones 
have not received sufficient attention in the scholarly work.
3.  Theory and Various Models
3.1 Behavioralism: Sociological and Socio-psychological Models of 
Voting
Behavioralism is derived mainly from psychology and to some extent 
sociology and deals with surveys of public opinion and analyses of voters' 
predispositions and attitudes.3  The theory posits that political outcomes are 
determined by the psychological make-up of individuals. Voters select candidates 
because they identify with them and their political parties.  In general, the 
behavioralist approach stresses that voters are motivated by their own party 
5
3David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science, 2nd 
ed., Political Analysis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 45-64.
identification and socio-demographic characteristics (age, race, religion, class, 
etc.). Two models of voting fall under the umbrella of behavioralism: the 
sociological school (Columbia School) and socio-psychological school of voting 
(Michigan School). 
The Columbia school of voting looks at a range of social indicators such as 
age, gender, occupation, religion, class, and ethnicity, seeking to determine how 
social structure and cleavages affect voting.4   The Columbia model bypasses the 
party identification mediation and looks at the direct effects of social context on 
voting behavior.5 As argued by Pippa Norris, “religious and class identities orient 
citizens toward the political system and provide a simple, low-cost guide to 
voting, enabling information shortcuts that allowed people to decide which 
politicians and policies to support over successive contests.”6   To test the 
sociological approach to voting, this research explores the links between social 
6
4Martin Harrop and William Lockley Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative 
Introduction (New York: New Amsterdam Books, 1987). James Adams, Samuel 
Merrill, and Bernard Grofman, A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-
National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). Jocelyn Evans, Voters & Voting: An 
Introduction (London: Sage Publications, Ltd, 2004).
5Harrop and Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction.
6Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 102. 
structure and voting behavior in parliamentary elections in Poland since 1997 
using individual (surveys) level data. 
Assuming that voters are likely to vote for parties supporting policies 
congruent with their class interest, this study will first investigate the association 
of class and vote.7 Class voting can be studied by means of ecological inference as 
well as direct information on the voter’s social class taken from public opinion 
surveys.  This research utilizes only the second approach.  Beside the analyses of 
class voting, this project also focuses on religious voting as well as rural-urban 
cleavage as a part of sociological approach to study voting behavior. It is 
expected that cleavages are rather reliable predictors of the vote.8
In the socio-psychological model, the socialization process (group 
membership and family) and individuals’ social context provide the psychological 
7
7For arguments that class voting is still significant factor to explain voting 
behavior in Eastern Europe see Geoffrey Evans, "The Continued Significance of 
Class Voting," Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000), Geoffrey Evans, The 
End of Class Politics?: Class Voting in Comparative Context (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), Geoffrey Evans, "The Social Bases of Political Divisions 
in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," Annual Review of Sociology 32 (2006).  
8This prediction is based on discussion of Eastern European countries in Evans 
(2006).
predisposition that aligns one with a certain political party9.  In other words, 
socialization and experience with group members of a particular political 
persuasion helps voters to develop stereotypes, assumptions, or beliefs about 
parties that inform their political choices. Party identification helps to shape and 
orient one’s perspective in a complex political world through simplification, and 
through this simplification the voting choice proceeds.  Yet, voters may think 
outside these stereotypes, filtering and reforming their views against newly 
acquired information.  An experiment conducted by Wendy Rahn revealed that if 
people can use stereotypes they will, but if they are exposed to new information, 
their political choices may become more data driven.10   Although the Michigan 
model considers party ID to be the best single advance predictor of the vote, it 
8
9Good explanation of Michigan model of voting can be found (among others) in 
the following works: Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: 
Wiley, 1960). Harrop and Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative 
Introduction. Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman, A Unified Theory of Voting: 
Directional and Proximity Spatial Models (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). Larry M. Bartels, "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996," 
American Journal of Political Science 44, no. 1 (2000). Russell J. Dalton, Citizen 
Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 
4th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006). 
10Wendy M. Rahn, "The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing 
About Political Candidates," American Journal of Political Science 37, no. 2 
(1993). 
also realizes that not everyone always votes according party lines and that voters 
may deviate from their historical party identifications due to short term 
intervening factors such as issue opinions and candidate image.  These short term 
factors directly influence voting decision, but they are themselves partly 
determined by party identification, i.e., they are not based exclusively on an 
individual’s self-interested calculation as rational choice theory would argue.
This project asks how, if at all, partisanship in Poland influences voting 
behavior. The analysis start with simple correlations between party 
identifications, voting behavior, and demographic characteristics of voters and 
moves to the more complex analysis to predict the votes based on partisanship 
attachment as well as attachment to the party family, such as post-communist, 
post-solidarity, social conservatives, liberal conservatives and social democrats. 
Informed by the existing literature, it is expected that the socio-psychological 
model that emphasizes party ID as the most accurate indicator of the vote will 
be the least explanatory.
3.2 Rational Choice Theory: Economic and Issue Voting
Rational Choice, also called an ‘economic’ approach to the study of 
politics, focuses on the expected utility model of decision-making: actors make 
choices on the basis of their calculations of the payoffs they expect to receive in 
the future, as a consequence of the outcome generated by their choices, in such a 
9
way as to maximize their payoff or utility.11 This research investigates the validity 
of the assumption that Polish voters are utility maximizers by asking if voters 
weigh gains and losses equally.  Perhaps Polish voters learn from past experience 
and make choices on a trial-and-error basis as opposed to future rewards and 
they are not able to carry out complex calculations routinely assumed in game 
theory.
Rational choice as a research tradition of its own is associated with the 
spatial models of voting and economic models of voting. Spatial models (e.g. 
directional and proximity models); based on Anthony Downs’ Economic Theory 
of Democracy, concentrate on voter decisions in terms of policy outcomes or voter 
preference for the party whose position most closely aligns to their own 
position.12  The theory of economic voting goes back to the 1960s and 1970s and 
10
11Great dissuasions of assumptions as well as debates on rational choice theory 
can be found in Eric S. Dickson, "Rational Choice Epistemology and Belief 
Formation in Mass Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics 18, no. 4 (2006). 
Andrew Hindmoor, Rational Choice, Political Analysis (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006). D. Landa, "Rational Choices as Social Norms," Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 18, no. 4 (2006). A. Wuffle, "Credo of a Reasonable Choice 
Modeler," Journal of Theoretical Politics 11, no. 2 (1999).  Robert E. Goodin and 
Hans-Dieter Klingemann, A New Handbook of Political Science (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996).
12Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1957).
includes two basic ideas.  First, voters are rational.  Because of this they are 
capable of making logical, informed judgments based on past conditions or 
events.  Second, these rational voters are knowledgeable about the performance of 
the economy.  The issue of economic voting was vitalized and improved by the 
numerous scholars interested in this subject in the mid-1980s.13  The main 
argument is that national economic performance (measured by macroeconomic 
indicators) may be used to predict electorate support for the government in 
power. 
Rational choice theory has been criticized by political sociologists and 
political psychologists.14 Political sociologists often claim that individual behavior 
is largely a function of social structures.  They argue that Down’s approach is 
inferior to an account of voting that considers the individual’s position in the 
social structure. Social class, geographic location, gender, patterns of 
consumption and production, and religion, among other variables, all have known 
correlations of some degree with voting behavior.  Psychologists typically argue 
11
13See for instance Heinz Eulau and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Economic Conditions 
and Electoral Outcomes: The United States and Western Europe (New York: 
Agathon Press, 1985), Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The 
Major Western Democracies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988).
14Marsh and Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science, 74-84. 
that individuals’ motives need not reflect self-interest and that empirical evidence 
suggests that they frequently act altruistically in political life.15
Of late, rational choice scholars have begun to apply the concept of 
economic voting to the post-communist countries in general and to Poland in 
particular.16   Even though supporters of the theory of economic voting use the 
same analysis for all countries, there are sufficient reasons to believe that voters 
in Central and Eastern Europe behaved differently (at least in first post-
communist elections) than those from Western developed countries.  What may 
account for this behavioral difference is that the economic decline during the 
initial stages of the post-communist economic transition cannot be directly 
attributed to the government in office at the time as such a decline was a result 
12
15Ibid., 79.
16J. A. Tucker, "Economic Conditions and the Vote for Incumbent Parties in 
Russia, Poland, Hungry, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic from 1990 to 1996," 
Post-Soviet Affairs 17, no. 4 (2001). Nikolai Mikhailov, Richard G. Niemi, and 
David L. Weimer, "Application of Theil Group Logit Methods to District-Level 
Vote Shares: Tests of Prospective and Retrospective Voting in the 1991, 1993, 
and 1997 Polish Elections," Electoral Studies 21, no. 4 (2002). Jan Fidrmuc, 
"Economics of Voting in Post-Communist Countries," Electoral Studies 19, no. 2/3 
(2000), Jan Fidrmuc, "Political Support for Reforms: Economics of Voting in 
Transition Countries," European Economic Review 44, no. 8 (2000).
of historical as opposed to political factors.17  Other reasons would include voter 
confusion due to economic turmoil and voter inexperience with the political 
processes and institutions naturally associated with democracy.18   These reasons 
lead us to question whether voters of post-communist Poland are appropriately 
perceived as rational voters that fit in the western model of economic voting.
When testing the theory of economic voting, scholars analyze either the 
intended vote based on surveys prior to an election, or the actual vote based on 
surveys conducted short after elections.19   Using individual level data it is 
possible to examine at least two relationships.  First, the relationship between 
voters’ perception of national economic conditions and the intended or actual 
vote is referred to as sociotropic economic voting.  Second, the association 
between voters’ evaluations of personal circumstances and the intended or actual 
vote referred to as egotropic economic voting.  This project examines both 
relationships.
13
17Fidrmuc, "Economics of Voting in Post-Communist Countries.", Fidrmuc, 
"Political Support for Reforms: Economics of Voting in Transition Countries."
18Fidrmuc, "Economics of Voting in Post-Communist Countries," 200. 
19Sometime scholars regard vote and governmental popularity as essentially 
interchangeable; see Evans, Voters & Voting: An Introduction. Further, besides 
the analysis of surveys scholars utilize the actual vote on the regional or national 
level to test economic voting in the cross-regional or cross-national context. 
In addition to the voters’ evaluations of economic well-being and the state 
of their own finances, survey data collected after each parliamentary election 
permit examination of causal relationships in relation to time.  The analysis of 
future perceptions of national economy and pocketbook economy (“How do you 
think economy/your own finances will go in the next year”) is called the 
prospective model of economic voting. The voters’ evaluations of past economic 
performance and their past finances allow to analyze the retrospective model of 
economic voting. To test the prospective and retrospective egotropic and 
sociotropic hypotheses, this research employs the actual vote.  This study also 
examines economic voting on the regional level by utilizing the macroeconomic 
indicators.
The vast empirical findings on mature democracies hold that a voter’s 
choice of party depends largely on its position on specific issues. These studies 
help fuel a major debate about whether voters prefer parties whose platforms are 
most similar to their own preferences or parties whose platforms are more 
extreme than their own. Proponents of the proximity model argue that voters 
prefer parties that are ideologically similar to their own views on issues. 
Supporters of the directional model argue that voters prefer parties that are 
14
ideologically in the same direction as, but are more intense than, their own views 
on the relevant issues.20 
In the context of rational choice theory, the task of this study is to 
compare the relative contributions of directional and proximity models, both of 
specific issue preferences and left–right ideological positions, on political party 
preferences in the Polish electorate. The scholarly literature on the relative 
adequacy of these two spatial models shows that both models have some 
empirical support but that the relationships are influenced by additional factors 
15
20George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine Macdonald, "A Directional Theory of 
Issue Voting," The American Political Science Review 83, no. 1 (1989).  Stuart 
Elaine Macdonald, Ola Listhaug, and George Rabinowitz, "Issues and Party 
Support in Multiparty Systems," American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 
(1991). Stuart Elaine Macdonald, George Rabinowitz, and Ola Listhaug, 
"Sophistry Versus Science: On Further Efforts to Rehabilitate the Proximity 
Model," Journal of Politics 63, no. 2 (2001).
such as the extremeness of a party or its political sophistication.21   However, 
previous comparisons of directional and proximity models have been basically 
limited to the western democracies.  In the context of post-communist 
democracies, Poland in particular, it is important to first examine whether issues 
influence party preferences at all. Given the relatively short period of time that 
Polish voters have been exposed to the parties, compared to established 
democracies, and considering that the party system is still in the process of 
stabilization and ideological crystallization, it would not be surprising if voters 
had difficulty recognizing the precise positions of parties on different issue 
dimensions.  Therefore, voters can be expected to be more susceptible to 
symbolic politics, i.e. to opt for a more directional approach in developing their 
party preferences. In addition, the relative contribution of specific issues versus 
16
21Despite the conviction of scholars within each camp, numerous studies 
comparing the explanatory power of the two models in western democracies find 
mixed evidence. See for instance Sungdai Cho and James W. Endersby, "Issues, 
the Spatial Theory of Voting, and British General Elections: A Comparison of 
Proximity and Directional Models," Public Choice 114 (2003). Roy Pierce, 
"Directional Versus Proximity Models: Verisimilitude as the Criterion," Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 9, no. 1 (1997). For the argument that proximity model of 
voting fits better multiparty system, see Jeffrey A. Karp and Susan A. Banducci, 
"Issues and Party Competition under Alternative Electoral Systems," Party 
Politics 8, no. 1 (2002). Jeffrey B. Lewis and Gary King, "No Evidence on 
Directional Vs. Proximity Voting," Political Analysis 8, no. 1 (1999).Ibid.
the general left–right ideological dimension will be assessed. To test the predictive 
power of issue voting models (proximity and directional) in Polish realm, I utilize 
conditional logit estimation. 
4.  Data
As already mentioned, this project uses individual level data and aggregate 
level data.  The individual level electoral data that is used as a main source for 
the analyses performed in this study is taken from the Polish National Election 
Study also known as the Polish General Social Survey (1997, 2001, and 2005). 
Interviews for these surveys were carried out shortly after each of the 1997, 2001, 
and 2005 parliamentary elections.  In these three surveys, a unit of analysis is 
individual. The non-response rate of selected individuals was in 1997 28.6%, in 
2001 44.6% and in 2005 44.08%.22  These surveys are based on the three-level 
sampling procedure where the following stratification processes were used: 
administrative regions, address of the residence, and selection of the individual 
from the household (in case of multi-person household). The weights were 
17
22"Polskie Generalne Studium Wyborcze 1997,"  (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów 
Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1997), 3. "Polskie Generalne Studium 
Wyborcze 2001,"  (Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii 
Nauk, 2001), 3. "Polskie Generalne Studium Wyborcze 2005,"  (Warszawa: 
Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2005), 1. Such a low 
response rate might raise a question regarding the quality of the data, but still 
this is best available data. 
constructed based on the demographic and socio-economic factors, such as sex, 
age, education, place of residence, and economic activity.  Further, as pointed out 
in the documentation about these surveys, “because of the probability of selection 
insides the household are inversely proportional to the number of adults in the 
household another procedure was implemented to correct such unequal 
probabilities by weighting the results by the number of adults in the 
household.”23  Since the 1997 and 2005 surveys data report only sampling weights 
and first stage cluster, it is impossible to take into account the complexity of the 
surveys from these years. The survey data from 2001 provides the population 
weights, but the indicator for the secondary sampling unit is unclear.  Therefore, 
all estimations performed in this work are conducted by utilizing sampling 
weights. 
Other individual level datasets employed for the complementary analysis 
include the Polish Public Opinion Research Center (various surveys dated from 
1997 to 2006), the World Value Surveys (1995, 2000, 2005), and the European 
Social Surveys (2002, 2004, 2006). The aggregate level electoral data for 
geographic/administrative regions is taken from the Polish National Election 
Commission.  The economic data, performance assessments and economic policy 
information are drawn from the Polish Statistical Office, Ministry of Finance 
18
23The same description is given in the documentation for surveys in 2001 and 
2005. The entire survey documentation is available upon request. 
materials, and official documents of various regional administrations. Finally, the 
data on regional income inequality and poverty measures is taken from the 
Luxembourg Income Study.24
5.  Methodology
As described in previous sections, several statistical methods will be used 
in this study.  It starts with descriptive statistics for each particular election and 
goes through more sophisticated analysis of data.  Specifically, to estimate 
cleavage voting, this study utilizes multinomial logit.  The socio-psychological 
model of voting is tested empirically by utilizing probit as well as multinomial 
logit. To examine the economic voting on the regional level I employ the fixed 
effects estimator that fits panel data;  to estimate the parameters for egotropic 
and sociotropic economic voting I utilize multinomial logit.  Fixed effects logit, 
also known as conditional logit, is applied in testing the issue-based models of 
voting.  After performing the statistical estimations, a series of post-estimation 
procedures are utilized to test the predictability of each model, particularly, the 
marginal effects as well as the simulated and predicted probabilities. 
19
24The Luxembourg Income Study collects the data on Poland from the Polish 
Central Statistical Office (Household Budget Survey).
6.  Literature Review
What has been done on individual voting behavior in Poland?25 
Surprisingly, there are only nine articles written exclusively on the case of Poland 
in the last fifteen years which try to explain the voter’s choice in parliamentary 
and presidential election; five of these focus on broadly defined sociological model 
of voting, three on economic voting, and one article builds on the socio-
psychological model.26  To the best of my knowledge, no one has applied the 
spatial or directional models to explain voter choice in Poland.
20
25Tucker (2002) observed that there were seventeen articles written on Polish 
electoral politics, compared to three scholarly articles written on Hungary by 
2002. He listed three reasons why scholars write exclusively on Poland. All those 
reasons are related to the data availability: (1) good survey data; (2) availability 
of regional level data; (3) there were more elections in Poland then in any other 
post-communist countries. Surprisingly, the data availability produced mostly 
research on party competitions, turnout, and economic voting, putting aside 
other models of voting proposed in this research. Compare Joshua A. Tucker, 
"The First Decade of Post-Communist Elections and Voting: What Have We 
Studied, and How Have We Studied It?," Annual Review of Political Science 5 
(2002).
26 There is also one book that focuses on cleavages in Poland between 1989 and 
1995; see Hubert Tworzecki, Parties and Politics in Post 1989 Poland (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996).
6.1 Sociological Model of Voting Applied to Poland
Scholars who employ some form of sociological model of voting to analyze 
Polish elections perceive voters as those who are still ‘recovering’ from the 
electoral politics of totalitarianism, when the vote was nothing more than an act 
of mass mobilization demanded by the communist regime.  They argue that the 
voting behavior currently exhibited by the Polish citizenry is shaped by their 
prior experiences with communism and their manner of interpreting those 
experiences (most still strongly distrust governmental organizations).27  This 
corresponds to what Richard Rose et al. calls a “lifetime learning model,” linking 
together socialization and institutional performance theories, where “support for 
the regime is initially shaped by early socialization and then evolves continuously 
throughout adult life as initial beliefs are reinforced or challenged by latter 
experiences.”28 
21
27See Giuseppe Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-
Cultural Change in Eastern Europe," World Politics 44, no. 1 (1991).  Barbara 
Heyns and Ireneusz Bialecki, "Solidarność: Reluctant Vanguard or Makeshift 
Coalition?," The American Political Science Review 85, no. 2 (1991). See also 
Evans, "The Social Bases of Political Divisions in Post-Communist Eastern 
Europe."
28Richard Rose, William Mishler, and C. Haerpfer, Democracy and Its 
Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University, 1998), 118. 
What unifies research on voting behavior in Poland from the sociological 
approach is that scholars acknowledge that political cleavages are an important 
influence on voter choice.  Most of the studies explained voter choices based on 
geographical and state-church cleavages;29 the others justified electoral choices in 
terms of income, education, and occupation.30  Nearly all utilized surveys 
conducted before the elections of 1991, 1993, and 1997, but none used ecological 
inference to study class voting.31 What distinguishes these studies is methodology. 
Two articles use descriptive statistics,32  two others employed the ordinary-least-
22
29Using factor analysis, Tworzecki analyzed the presidential and parliamentary 
elections between 1991 and 1995 and showed that voting behavior tended to vary 
by region and its history; his analysis conformed strong urban/rural and church/
state cleavages. See Tworzecki, Parties and Politics in Post 1989 Poland.
30Larry L. Wade, Peter Lavelle, and Alexander J. Groth, "Searching for Voting 
Patterns in Post-Communist Poland's Sejm Elections," Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 28, no. 4 (1995).
31Frances Millard, "The Polish Parliamentary Election of September, 1993," 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 27, no. 3 (1994). Larry L. Wade, 
Alexander J. Groth, and Peter Lavelle, "Estimating Participation and Party 
Voting in Poland: The 1991 Parliamentary Elections," East European Politics and 
Societies 8, no. 1 (1993), Wade, Lavelle, and Groth, "Searching for Voting 
Patterns in Post-Communist Poland's Sejm Elections."
32Aleks Szczerbiak, "Interests and Values: Polish Parties and Their Electorates," 
Europe-Asia Studies 51, no. 8 (1999). Millard, "The Polish Parliamentary Election 
of September, 1993." 
squared regression33  and only one article used multinomial logit to explain the 
pattern of sociological voting behavior.34  Finding similar results through different 
methods of estimation confirms that the sociological approach to voting behavior 
is appropriate for the case of Poland.  What is deficient in applications of the 
sociological model is a lack of research on the most recent elections.  The 
question thus becomes whether cleavage/class voting increases as Poland 
continues in the uneasy transition from communist command economy to free-
market democracy.  
6.2 Socio-psychological Model of Voting Applied to Poland
As previously mentioned, there is only one article that utilized the socio-
psychological model of voting.  In it Shabad and Slomczynski tested to see if 
party preferences correlate with age, sex, education, occupation, region, religion, 
as well as with former membership in the Communist Party of Solidarity.35  This 
study used panel data collected between 1989 and 1993 covering three 
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33Wade, Lavelle, and Groth, "Searching for Voting Patterns in Post-Communist 
Poland's Sejm Elections." See also Heyns and Bialecki, "Solidarność: Reluctant 
Vanguard or Makeshift Coalition?."
34John E. Jackson, Jacek Klich, and Krystyna Poznanska, "Economic Transition 
and Elections in Poland," Economics of Transition 11, no. 1 (2003). 
35Goldie Shabad and Kazimierz Slomczynski, "Political Identities in the Initial 
Phase of Systemic Transformation in Poland: A Test of the Tabula Rasa 
Hypothesis," Comparative Political Studies 32, no. 6 (1999).
parliamentary elections.  The authors employed descriptive statistics to show the 
distribution of party identity among voters and logistic regression to analyze the 
distribution of electoral choices. They showed that social cleavages, prior political 
divisions, and socio-demographic characteristics all influenced the formation of 
new political identities in the post-Communist period.36  These political identities 
are expressed in the form of an attachment to a family of political parties and are 
manifest in voting preferences.  They concluded that since voters’ political 
identities are formed through time during consecutive elections, scholars can 
expect to find party attachment as a strong predictor of voting tendencies in 
future elections.37 
6.3 Economic Model of Voting Applied to Poland
Why have scholars focused on the economic model of voting?  The answer 
might be easily associated with the common perception that economic conditions 
always factor into a voter’s choice and that a concern for material values will be 
even more evident in transition countries such as Poland than for any developed 
country. Voters want to have a decent standard of living so they continue to 
search for the government that will provide them with the most comfortable 
margin of economic security. This corresponds to the logic of Maslow’s value 
hierarchy to political issues as well as to recent work by Inglehart on material 
24
36Ibid.: 708.
37Ibid.: 716.
and post-material values change.38 More specifically, after the economic transition 
from commanding to free market economy is accomplished, post-material issues 
(e.g. environment) begin to attract greater numbers of voters (as is presently 
happening in Western Europe).  Since the economic standard of living in Poland 
has not yet reached a sufficient level, the economic performance and position-
based judgment of incumbent and future governments would be for some 
researchers the best indicator of voting.  
Past research on economic voting in Poland focused on the 1990 and 1995 
parliamentary and presidential elections and utilized either aggregate or 
individual level data to test retrospective or prospective hypothesis.  Utilizing the 
district-level data, Gibson and Cielecka found that neither lower unemployment 
before the 1993 election nor economic growth influenced a majority of Polish 
citizens to vote for incumbent parties/coalition.39  They conclude (surprisingly?) 
that their model tested by OLS regression is underestimated due to non-linear 
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38Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, 
and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1997).  Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, 
and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). Abraham H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 1st ed. 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1954).
39John Gibson and Anna Cielecka, "Economic Influences on the Political Support 
from Market Reform in Postcommunist Transitions - Some Evidence from the 
1993 Polish Parliamentary Elections," Europe-Asia Studies 47, no. 5 (1995).
relationship between economic variables and voter support for incumbent 
government. 
Jenice Bell, on the other hand, set up the retrospective hypotheses in the 
framework of rational choice theory utilizing the regional (voivodship/province) 
data for 1990 and 1995 presidential elections and 1991 and 1993 parliamentary 
elections.40  Employing the OLS regression for each presidential election, Bell 
found that the effect of provincial unemployment rates and per capita monthly 
income on election outcomes varied from one presidential candidate to the other. 
In other words, the effect of economic indicators on the level of support for 
presidential candidates turned out to be significant for some and insignificant for 
others.  Similar findings are offered for parliamentary elections with emphasis 
that unemployment is “undoubtedly the most significant factor” that explains 
voting behavior.41 
Power and Cox used survey data to test if voters’ satisfaction with 
economic reforms had any influence on voting in the 1993 parliamentary election. 
Utilizing the structural equation model, which takes into account endogenous 
variables (voter blame of communist system, blame of first-wave reformers, and 
change on living conditions) and exogenous variables (income and occupation), 
26
40Janice Bell, "Unemployment Matters: Voting Patterns During the Economic 
Transition in Poland, 1990–1995," Europe-Asia Studies 49, no. 7 (1997).
41Ibid.: 1282.
they found that the impact of economic reforms on voter choice is not as large as 
one might expect. They conclude that “the ascendancy of post-communist parties 
is not so easily explained by economic dissatisfaction and punishment of 
incumbents.”42  If individual economic circumstances did not play a large role in 
voter choice, then what did?  The importance of blame attributions became 
relevant in their explanation of voting behavior.  Voters either felt that first-wave 
reformers or the communist system is responsible for Poland’s problems.  Further, 
the authors suggest that noneconomic issues such as church-state issue and 
lustration as well as the fragmentation of post-Solidarity parties could explain 
why voters punished the post-Solidarity camp and voted for post-communist 
parties in 1993 parliamentary election.43  
 It is evident that researchers have not reached a consensus on what 
economic factors influence voting behavior in Poland.  If the relationship between 
economic performance and voting are robust the findings should not diverge so 
much in their substantive conclusions, even when employing different statistical 
methods.  Perhaps analyzing the post-communist elections of 1990 and 1991 is 
inappropriate, because they took place shortly after the process of economic 
reforms started.  It might be argued that the first free elections in Poland focused 
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42Denise V. Powers and James H. Cox, "Echoes from the Past: The Relationship 
between Satisfaction with Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland," 
American Political Science Review 91, no. 3 (1997): 628.
43Ibid.
on fully removing the communist regimes rather then improving economic 
conditions.  Therefore, the analysis of the later years of elections proposed in this 
study might play a considerable role in finding if Polish voter can be called homo 
economicus.
7.  Conclusion
The main focus of this work is to explain individual voting behavior in 
Polish parliamentary elections between 1997 and 2005. This comprehensive 
analysis is conducted within the framework of various theories and models 
proposed by the scholars in the U.S. and Western Europe.  There are several 
scholarly advantages of such a project.  First, we will learn about voters’ choice 
during the second phase of democratic consolidation. Second, this research 
proposes to test existing models and assess their validity in a post-communist 
setting.  These systematic and critical tests of various models of voting should 
move the existing research on comparative electoral politics in Poland and 
Eastern Europe forward.  Third, the contribution to the scholarship of voting 
behavior will be significant, even if some of these models turn out to have less 
explanatory and predictive power than expected.  Furthermore, perhaps the most 
significant contribution of this dissertation to the field of comparative voting 
behavior is the application of issue-based models.  Finally, the structure of this 
work is well suited to search for explanation of patterns in voting behavior during 
the second phase of democratic transition in Poland and to bring the contribution 
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to the comparative electoral politics of East-Central Europe in general and 
Poland in particular by utilizing and evaluating the competing models of voting.
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CHAPTER TWO
ELECTIONS IN POST-COMMUNIST POLAND: WHAT HAPPENED
IN LAST 15 YEARS?
The aim of this chapter is to familiarize the reader with Poland’s political 
history starting with the parliamentary elections prior to 1997 and going through 
elections of 1997, 2001 and 2005.  Although this project is dedicated to test the 
statistical models of voting behavior, it is essential to understand the formation 
of new political system, its institutions, processes and prominent issues during 
political campaigns. It is also vital to highlight the most important actors on 
political arena, not only political parties but also the Catholic Church, which has 
played a significant role in formation of Polish democracy. 
1.  Elections prior to 1997
The turning point in politics for central and East European States 
appeared after Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power, who in 1987 and 1988 began to 
encourage the communist leaders of Warsaw Pact to experiment the new socialist 
reforms.  Such suggestions received from Moscow were understood by Polish 
Communist party as backing against their own hardliners and pursued cautious 
policies of liberalization.  Therefore, the window of opportunity for opposition 
and  a  dissatisfied  society  was  opened.  Further, the  economic crises, the food 
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shortages, the falling living standards were the primary causes of the economic 
shortages, the falling living standards were the primary causes of the economic 
and political bankruptcy within the communistic regime system.
In Poland, the communist government was forced to open negotiations 
with Solidarity after series of strikes, which took place in spring and summer of 
1988.  The formal negotiations began in January 1989 between leader of 
communist party Rakowski and Lech Walesa. This face to face meeting was the 
beginning of further negotiations ended by the “Round Table” when communist 
and the Solidarity officials discussed the shape of the future political and 
economic issues in Poland. It also inaugurated the transition of political actions 
to democracy. The outcome of this effort was the “contract” about the future 
parliament which became a forum for program and party formation, which were 
supposed to have roots in solidarity. The 1989 “Round Table” agreement was 
intended by the communists to ensure their continuous control over the key levels 
of the state power.  According to this electoral contract 65% of the 460 seats in 
the forthcoming elections to the lower house (the Sejm) were allocated in advance 
to the communistic Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) and their allies, the 
United Peasant Party (ZSL) and Procommunist Catholic groupings.44   The 
remaining 35% were subject to an open contest. In addition, it was agreed that 
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44In 1990 the communist elites of ZSL formed new agrarian party the PSL 
(Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe).
the Senate would be elected in a free election. The 1989 election and the 
“contract” parliament opened the gates to the political competition. The June 
1989 election in Poland played an outstanding role in Central and Eastern 
Europe. In this election solidarity won all the seats in the Senate. 
The Parliament of 1989 was dominated by the people from the old regime. 
Therefore, there was a weak chance for those representatives to be elected again, 
specifically having in mind that at that time a majority of citizens supported the 
emergence of democracy.  At the last minute of governance in 1991, the new 
electoral law was adopted.  In general, the post communist majority in the Sejm, 
together with some post-Solidarity groups were in favor of proportional 
representation while others such as President Lech Walesa and the major 
Solidarity party advocated mixed electoral systems.45  Finally, a proportional 
representation system was adopted. The political dichotomy (old regime versus 
solidarity-new regime) of 1991 was replaced by highly fragmented polity with 112 
parties.  
The majority of parties and groups that were elected in 1991 belonged to 
the former opposition camp. The strongest party in the parliament, the 
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45Krzysztof Jasiewicz, "Citizenship in Post-Communist Poland: Between Civil 
Society and Das Volk?," in Citizenship, East and West, ed. André Liebich, Daniel 
Warner, and Jasna Dragovic-Soso (London Kegan Paul International, 1995).
Democratic Union (UD), controlled only 13.5% of the seats.46  The UD was 
associated with moderate Christian – liberals.  This post-solidarity party might 
be summarized in the words of “rational and intellectual, self consciously anti-
demagogic and anti-populist.”47  In the second place (11.98%) was the former 
communist party and the successor to the Communist Worker Party (PZPR) - 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) which together with the Polish Peasant Party 
(PSL), created the parliamentary opposition in 1991.48  The other post-solidarity 
parties received less than 10% votes. They are Catholic Electoral Action (KAW), 
Center Citizens’ Alliance (PC), Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), 
Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD), and Solidarity Trade Union.  The extreme 
diversity in parliament gave little possibility to create major coalition containing 
fewer then 5 parties.  This Parliament produced three Prime Ministers, two 
governments as well as its own yearly departure in 1993.
The ‘war’ among the solidarity elites explains such diversity among 
political parties in the 1991 elections as well as voting behavior among the 
confused society. In 1990, after Lech Walesa was elected as the president of 
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46 Wyniki Wyborów Parlamentarnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej - 1991, 1993, 1997, 
(Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza, 2003 [cited May 2, 2003]); available from http://
www.pkw.gov.pl.
47"Sympatia Dla Politykow," Gazeta Wyborcza, June 22-23 1991.
48In 1990 the communist elites of ZSL formed new agrarian party the PSL 
(Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe).
Poland, there was trouble considering the agreement between the presidential 
cabinet and the government. President Walesa publicly accused the Solidarity 
Prime Minister Mazowiecki of slow speed of reforms, of tolerating corruption and 
being soft on communists.49  This was the first step in the breakup of Solidarity 
between the government’s supporters and president’s supporters. However, some 
of the main figures maintained the importance of united Solidarity.50  Thus, the 
lack of agreement between people within Solidarity caused the formation of new 
post-solidarity parties: the Citizens’ Movement – Democratic Action (ROAD), 
the Democratic Union (UD), the Citizen’s Committee (KO) and the Center 
Citizens’ Alliance (PC).51  The above listed parties were created by the key 
leaders of Solidarity. Some of the leaders were Prime Ministers in the period of 
time from 1991 to 1993.  For instance the PC was an ancestor of the Law and 
Justice (PiS).
In May 1993 President Walesa, having a choice between dismissing the 
weak government and dissolving the Parliament, chose the latter.  Among the 
Parliament’s last bills were amendments concerning electoral law.  They were 
designed to limit the fragmentation that occurred during elections of 1991 by 
eliminating weaker parties. Specifically, three changes were put in place: 1. A 
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49Adam Michnik, "The Devil of Our Time," Krytyka 37 (1991): 15.
50Ibid.: 16.
51Inka Slodkowska, ed., Programy Partii I Ugrupowan Politycznych: Wybory 1991 
(Warszawa: Instytut Studiow Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2001).
threshold of 5 % for parties and 8% for coalitions; 2. An increase in the number 
of districts from 37 to 52, expanding districts magnitude to 3 of 17 seats; 3. 
Implementation of the D’Hondt formula advantages to stronger parties, for 
allocation for all seats.52 This reformulated electoral system brought the expected 
results. Only the strong parties and electoral coalitions were awarded the 
parliamentary seats and the weak parties had been eliminated from the 
parliament. 
The fragmentation of the political arena in 1991, ‘the war on the top’ as 
well as very slow economic changes and corruption were the causes of dissolution 
of parliament in 1991.  A realignment in the 1993 elections took place: the first 
free elected parliament of 1991 with a majority of post-Solidarity groups and 
parties was replaced by a majority of post-Communist representatives in 1993. 
The puzzle is whether or not voters desired to restore the communist regime or 
they were consumed by high unemployment and inflation as well as the ongoing 
promises of post-solidarity elite about the “heavenly” future. 53   The “left shift” 
in the Polish electoral politics is well expressed by Wiatr. “We are a disillusioned 
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52Krzysztof Jasiewicz, "The Polish Voter: Ten Years after August 1980," in From 
the Polish Underground: Selections from Krytyka, 1978-1993, ed. Michael H. 
Bernhard, Henryk Szlajfer, and Maria Chmielewska-Szlajfer (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University, 1995).
53For more discussion on this issue see Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism: An 
Introduction (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997).
and for that reason a deeply frustrated society… [most people] feel estranged and 
helpless in the present situation, they sense that the ground is slipping out from 
under their feet, that they are losing their bearings and confidence in the future. 
Even many of those who are not directly affected by social ills like unemployment 
express a lack of hope and confidence in the future.  They are not predisposed to 
trust the rulers because reality is different from their promises.  They feel 
abandoned because they believed that the ruling elite together with the Catholic 
Church is less concerned with the public interest than with its own interests.”54 
This overview of Polish situation truthfully justifies the voters’ choice of former 
communist parties during 1993 election.  Ordinary citizens felt cheated by the 
great ideas of Solidarity leaders as well as by Church’s authorities.  Therefore, the 
slogans ‘things do not have to be like this’ and ‘let reforms serve the people’ 
offered by the old regime parties drove the electorate away from the post-
solidarity parties.  
The survey conducted in 1993, shows that 64% of respondents agreed that 
the past four years of Solidarity rule had run the country into poverty and 
chaos.55  On the contrary, while in 1991 65% of respondents agreed that forty five 
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54Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Social Conflict and Democratic Stability," in The Politics of 
Democratic Transformation: Poland after 1989, ed. Jerzy J. Wiatr (Warszawa: 
Scholar Agency, 1993), 10-11.
55CBOS, "Popular Political Preferences: Three Weeks before the Election," in 
CBOS Biuletin (Warszawa: Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej, 1993), 3.
years of communist rule ruined the country and drove people into poverty, by 
1993 only 47% agreed with this statement.56
After the 1993 election the relatively stable coalition government between 
SLD and PSL was formed and ended one month before 1997 election with the 
dispute between incumbent parties about subsidies for agriculture.
2.  The Catholic Church and Polish Electoral Politics
The Catholic Church was likely to be one of the most important ways in 
which political preferences were shaped.  Chapter 3 of this project discusses how 
the participation in religious services influences voter choice, and what kind of 
direction the voting behavior may take under the influence of Church.  There is 
no doubt that the Catholic Church played a role in Polish Politics.  In the 1980’s 
the Church became closely associated with the solidarity movement, playing the 
role of legitimate social and religious authority. Whatever the Church claimed as 
the undeniable truth it was used by the Polish opposition for dismantle the 
communist ideological monopoly. During the period of the Roundtable Accord 
the Catholic Church stood on the side of Solidarity.  
The change of the regime was absolutely beneficial to the Catholic Church 
– the Church supported Solidarity during the old regime, subsequently Solidarity 
trade union and the political parties associated with this movement supported 
the Church. The Catholic Church was pushing for the restoration of Catholicism 
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as the official state religion of Poland, tightening of the divorce laws, guarantees 
of Christian values as the values of the Roman Catholic Church not to be 
offended by mass media. After the June 1989 elections the Church requested the 
introduction of Catholic Education classes in the public schools and for several 
administrative restrictions of abortion rights.  By August 1989 the return of 
properties confiscated from the Church had began and by the end of March of 
1994 the Church obtained the return of some 45000 acres of agricultural land.57 
Under such circumstances the electorate was unsatisfied and exhausted because 
the Church was present in every political, economic, social and individual 
dimension of human life.  In addition, people attending church, heard from the 
pulpits whole sets of political instructions they should undertake.  For instance, 
before 1991, the Catholic Church engaged itself in political campaign, naming the 
parties people should vote for.
The Church’s theocratic tendencies seem to contribute to the polarization 
of the Polish society.  One of the Polish newspapers warned in 1995, “now we 
have to protect democratic values from powerful authoritarian church. The 
church, which before had been the defender of the people, has become the new 
obstacle to self-expression.”58  Therefore, public opinion toward the Church 
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57Dobroslaw Karol Pater, "Grandiose Visions: Changes in the Catholic Church in 
Poland after 1989," Religion in Eastern Europe 15, no. 4 (1995): 3.
58"W Obcegach," Gazeta Wyborcza, August 9 1994, 10.
actions changed dramatically from undeniable authority to questionable political 
- religious institution in the period from martial law to the year 1992. The efforts 
of the Catholic Church and Catholic Parties to reaffirm the role of religion and 
religious values in social life gave people fears of possible “re- ideolgization” of 
life, with another set of strict rules replacing those in force during the 
communists years.  And as Sabrina Ramet argues “the Catholic Church’s 
legislative advance in Poland has been made against the expressed wishes of most 
Poles.”59 
As indicated by various surveys from the CBOS, citizens began to trust 
the Church again in 1997. It happened because, unlike 1991, the Catholic Church 
did not engage itself much in the campaign process choosing instead simply to 
remind the faithful of their civic duty to vote. Although the Church has not 
become as politically powerful as it was in the beginning of 1990s, its sponsorship 
helped the AWS to unite in 1996 and win elections in 1997. The Church’s 
influence over the Concordat as well as the elections of 2001 and 2005 were also 
significant, nevertheless it took different form. The growing popularity of Radio 
Maryja, the voice of Catholic fundamentalism, gave power to some clergy to 
influence the public opinion during the time of elections.  For instance, the 
39
59Sabrina P. Ramet, Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion, and the Doctrine 
of Collective Rights in Post-1989 Eastern Europe (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 134.
extreme right party League of Polish Families (LPR) as well as the right-of-center 
Law and Justice were strongly supported by Radio Maryja in 2001 and 2005 
electoral campaigns.  
3.  Elections of 1997 
3.1 Overview
The largest right-wing party, the Solidarity Electoral Action, Akcja 
Wyborcza Solidarnosc (AWS), won the elections in 1997 receiving a majority of 
seats in Lower House (see Table 1). Its rival, former communist party Democratic 
Left Alliance, received second place.  The Solidarity Election Action was an 
“alliance of the Solidarity trade union with multifarious parties, proto-parties, 
and groups.”60   Its constituent parties and groups differ in various ways, but 
“united in one conviction – no more ex-communist rule.”61  Similarly to the AWS, 
the SLD was also an alliance.  Supporters and members of the SLD included 
former communist cadres, social democrats, and former communist trade 
unionists, OPZZ.  Other  parties  that  gained  seats  in the parliamentary
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Table 1. Parliamentary (Sejm) Elections Results, 1997-2005.  
Elections 1997 Elections 2001 Elections 2005
Vote Share 
(%)
Seats Vote Share 
(%)
Seats Vote Share 
(%)
Seats
ROP 5.56 6 - - - -
AWS 33.83 201 - - - -
UW 13.37 60 - - - -
SLD 27.13 164 41.04 216 11.31 55
PSL 7.31 27 8.98 42 6.96 25
SRP - - 10.20 53 11.41 56
PO - - 12.68 65 24.11 133
PiS - - 9.50 44 26.99 155
LPR - - 7.87 38 7.97 34
OTHERS 12.8 2 9.73 2 11.22 2
TOTAL 100 460 100 460 100 460
election of 1997 were the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and the Movement of 
Reconstruction of Poland (ROP). The Polish Peasant Party, a former satellite of 
communist party PZPR during the old regime, most likely sustained its existence 
in the political arena thanks to its rural constituency and the huge party 
membership.  The ROP, on the other hand, was a rightist post-solidarity 
formation that was founded in 1995 by the former Prime Minister Jan 
Olechowski.  The ROP leader did not join AWS while more then 20 other right-
wing parties did it in 1996.  As pointed by Ka-Lok Chan, “ROP’s development 
was stalled by the emergence of the AWS.”62  The Freedom Union (Unia 
Wolnosci), a centre party with Solidarity background and a successor of 
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Democratic Union (UD) and the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD), was 
perceived as a party of intelligentsia gaining the third place in electoral race of 
1997. 
 The new government was set up after the post-solidarity party the 
Freedom Union (UW), joined the coalition with the AWS.  This coalition lasted 
almost half of the term and the AWS ended up running the minority government. 
At least last two years of AWS governance were marked with divisions between 
and within government ministries. Several months before the 2001 elections 
Prime Minister Buzek dismissed four ministers and some ministers resigned. 
Further, the financial position of the state budget was dramatic. The AWS, or 
rather Buzek’s government, was accused of failing to reform health sector, 
pensions, local governments, and education.63  Also the increase in unemployment 
level (from 10.3% in 1997 to almost 17% in 2001) did not promise a bright future 
for AWS.64   Public opinion polls were clearly showing that the AWS would not 
reach again a passing electoral threshold (e.g. CBOS).65 Therefore, new political 
parties emerged as a product of electoral calculations and analysis of probabilities 
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to be elected to parliament in 2001.  Sure enough, the future prospects of the 
incumbent party was not promising.
3.2 Issues in the Elections of 1997
It might be surprising, but the real party programs appeared for the first 
time in a meaningful way during the campaign preceding the parliamentary 
elections in September 1997.  The party competition as well as citizen’s 
deliberation started to evolve around important political and social issues. 
Nevertheless parties’ declarations and manifestos did not fluctuate a lot – they 
had similar content and a lot of convergence; often they even looked the same. 
The common project for all parties running in the 1997 elections was to 
fundamentally reform the state and build strong local governments.  Further, to 
improve the economy, political parties promise to obey the rules of open markets 
as well as legislation establishing stable economic and financial laws.  All the 
parties promised a better financial system that would allow citizens to take credit 
for purchasing real estate and open up new enterprises.  They advocated less 
unemployment, better wages and salaries, lower taxes, and strengthen the social 
insurance and social assistance.  All parties supported reforms of public health 
institutions.  In terms of agriculture innovations, most of the parties (not only 
the agrarian party PSL) focused on modernization of agriculture by giving 
subsidies to farmers as well as fighting with the improper agricultural 
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competition form abroad.66
Looking at the surveys before the election of 1997 several issues stand out 
as the most important for voters irrespective of their electoral choice.  The 
following are in descending order and refer to the most important issues for the 
state and democracy: 1. Security of citizens’ welfare; 2. State securing health and 
education services; 3. Rule of law; 4. Good parliament and good legislation. 
Analyzing the responses about the importance of specific issues the following are 
prominent: 1. Government taking care of citizen’s welfare (63.46%); 2. Crime 
(61.12%); 3. Unemployment (54. 53%); 4. Tax policy (37.2%).67  All the above 
were identified as a priority issues and were asked in the separate questions.  The 
responses for the other issues are more or less equally distributed and might be 
considered as falling under a normal distribution curve.   
Since the parties’ stands on political, social and economic issues generally 
did not differ, it will be interesting to see in the following chapters what factors 
caused the distribution of votes in 1997 elections.   Before conducting statistical 
analysis it essential to point out at least one factor that divided political parties 
and voters. It is the ideological factor that constitutes the symbolic 
presuppositions of social standing as well as voting behavior.  There are at least 
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three basic dimensions of this ideological factor.  First, the position of voters and 
political parties toward the communist system and its legacy played an important 
role in voting behavior.  The main arguments here concerned the deliberation 
around who has contributed to the independence of Poland in 1989 from the 
communist regime and rebirth of democracy in the country.  Second, the problem 
of decommunization and lustration as well as re-privatization was obviously a 
part of this ideological factor.  The main arguments were about how to deal with 
former communist functionaries – should former communist be allowed to hold 
public positions, or going even further, should they be punished?  Third, beliefs 
about natural law, abortion, the role of the Catholic Church in society and the 
preservation of Catholic values in public life were highly deliberated during public 
discourses and evident in political parties’ programs.
For instance, the manifesto of Solidarity Election Action (AWS) 
emphasizes “a modern, fair and sovereign state that is based on patriotic and 
Christian values.”68 According to AWS, a basis for legal and social order should 
be natural law, including the right to life of every human being from conception 
to natural death.  Further, AWS as a post-Solidarity party advocated lustration 
and decommunization, joining NATO and EU, and re-privatization that would 
lead to redistribution of communist property to entire society.  
In the manifesto of Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), we find reference to 
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“the best traditions of the Polish Left, and European social-democracy.”69  The 
SLD also called attention to the fact that “no one can deny women's 
opportunities for self-regulation and the fate of their rights to responsible 
maternity.”70  Further, the SLD as a party of old regime, supported secular state 
and “building a solid foundation of material existence.”71  SLD, similar to AWS, 
emphasized that Poland should join the European Union.  In contrast to AWS, 
SLD rejected decommunization, lustration and re-privatization.      
The Freedom Union party (UW) stressed that they are a group of people 
that goes back to the roots of Solidarity in August 1980. “Heritage of our 
struggle for human rights in the years 1980-1989, the contribution of Poland in 
toppling the communist system, and success in the introduction of democracy are 
of great moral standing of political elite drawn from this trend. This is also a 
tradition of the Freedom Union.”72   Further in their manifesto we read “the 
Freedom Union opposes both a race to create atheistic state, as well as religious 
state” and therefore all citizens and political parties should pursue the friendly 
separation between church and state and cooperation of those two institutions for 
the common good.73  As previously mentioned political parties, UW also 
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supported membership in NATO and the European Union.
4.  Elections of 2001
4.1 Overview
Elections of 2001 brought several major surprises to scholars of voting 
behavior.  First, the AWS and the UW, in the past very important parties, 
disappeared from the political spectrum by not getting enough votes.  The 
Freedom Union (UW) did not receive enough votes to get seats in parliament, 
possibly because some liberal wing leaders left the party 8 months before election 
to form new political party Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO). As 
pointed out by Millard, “PO also attracted the core of the leadership of the 
Conservative-People’s Party (SKL), the most pro-market wing of AWS.”74  The 
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) weakened by the abandon by many of its 
constituent parties and individual leaders, failed to meet its threshold and found 
itself with no seats.  Two new parties emerged from the AWS coalition: the Law 
and Justice (PiS) and the League of Polish Families (LPR).  The PiS was not 
entirely new on political spectrum, “it relied on the hard-core supporters of a 
defunct party, the Centre Accord (Porozumienie Centrum, PC), established in 
1990.”75 Besides attracting politicians who had previously been members of AWS, 
the League of Polish Families “was [also] drawn from discontented and failed 
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politicians of some ten clerical nationalist formations under the patronage of 
Radio Maryja.”76 As pointed out by Castle, the failure of AWS and the relative 
success of PiS and the LPR suggested that the right’s future might lie with more 
ideologically coherent parties (the PiS was united by its law and order concerns, 
while the LPR was composed of devoutly Catholic Euroskeptics).”77  Castle’s 
prophecy came through in 2005 elections.  
Thus, four out of six parties/coalitions winning parliamentary seats were 
new to the parliament; only the coalition SLD-UP (Democratic Left Alliance-
Labor Union) and PSL returned to their old offices.  The absolute victory went 
to the leftist coalition led by the former communist party SLD, which won over 
41% of votes.  This was the first time in the history of Polish democracy that a 
single political coalition/party received so many votes. As pointed by Castle et 
al., “if there was one clear tendency, it was the exponential growth of the SLD 
electorate from election to election – even in 1997 when the government was 
formed by coalition of AWS and UW.”78 The Polish rightist parties were defeated 
for the second time within less then ten 10 years of democracy.
It is also worth noting that the Self-Defense (Samoobrona), a populist 
movement established in 1991 by streetwise Andrzej Lepper, become a national 
48
76Ibid.
77Marjorie Castle and Ray Taras, Democracy in Poland, 2 ed. (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2002), 135.
78Ibid., 170.
party for the first time in 2001 elections and received 10% support from the 
voters.  Self-Defense (SRP) claimed to be a representative of the dispossessed. 
Interestingly, the Self-Defense’s agrarian foundation and populist rhetoric 
appealed not only farmers but also to many discontented citizens from small 
towns.  The SRP, similarly to LPR, represented Euroskeptic voters.       
After elections the government was formed by SLD-UP and PSL; yet this 
coalition government survived only 16 months and SLD-UP ended up as a 
minority government until 2005.  The entire period of SLD-UP governance was 
marked by accusations of members of the SLD-UP for corruption, which has 
contributed to the creation of three parliamentarian investigation commissions. 
Pubic opinion started to change after the commissions reveled some of the 
scandals and frauds within the SLD-UP.  In the beginning of 2004 there was a 
clear indication from surveys that the Leftist coalition is loosing the public 
support.  Some public opinion polls indicated that SLD-UP might not even meet 
the 5 percent threshold in 2005 elections (e.g. CBOS).
4.2 Issues in the Elections of 2001 
The main issue in electoral campaign of 2001 was unemployment.  It was 
dictated by the fact that unemployment rate increased from 10.3% in 1997 to 
15.8% in 2001.79  Voters did not doubt that every political party wanted to 
decrease the number of unemployed, yet they could easily perceived various 
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solutions offered by differences between parties.  The SLD wanted to expand the 
Social Found to help unemployed, the PO proposed to lower the tax on 
enterprises so they could hire more people, PSL wished for a loan from the World 
Bank to start a new infrastructure program that could give jobs to many, and 
PiS wanted to restructure education so it fits the employment sector.  Besides 
unemployment, the political parties deliberated other issues (e.g. tax policy, 
finances, and the European integration) offering not necessarily very distinctive 
solutions to voters. Did the electoral campaign of 2001 reflect voters’ social and 
political concerns? According to Polish General Electoral Studies (PGSW) survey 
taken right before elections, 83 percent of voters identified unemployment as a 
priority issue that needs to be taken care of be the government.  The voters’ 
responses on the importance of other issues were more equally distributed.
The aim of the electoral coalition of SLD-UP was to gain a majority of 
seats in parliament. The electoral campaign of SLD-UP was built on two pillars: 
a program for the future and criticism of the political parties on the right, 
specifically AWS.  SLD-UP wanted to be perceived by voters as a party that is 
sensitive to citizen’s needs, socially fair, free of corruption, honest, competent and 
prepared to govern.  The main programmatic issues referred to important social 
problems: unemployment, poverty, modernization of agriculture, development of 
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local governance, and improvement of education system.80
The Civic Platform (PO) wanted to make an impression on voters as a 
competent and modern political party.  The PO postulates were rather specific 
and definitely more liberal compared to those of the SLD-UP. They advocated to 
lower taxes and imposition of flat-rate tax, reform and reduce bureaucracy, and 
to stop founding of political parties from central government budget.  They also 
pointed toward the emerging young business circles supporting the opportunity 
for new enterprises. 
The advantage that the PiS possessed in the political arena in 2001 was 
dictated by the fact that its leader Kaczynski resigned from his ministerial 
position (the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs) at AWS government with 
the appearance of a politician who really cares about the rule of law.  Besides the 
PiS surely had one of the most apparent programs related to broadly defined 
aspect of security. The PiS program was really clear that there is a need to take 
vigorous anti-corruption measures as well as fight with other forms of social 
injustice.  There was no doubt in every message of the PiS political campaign 
that law and justice could be really part of Polish social and political life. And 
the Catholic tradition should be a guideline how to make Poland a better place. 
As pointed by Millard, “PiS had made its mark as a strong law and order, anti-
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corruption party, unabashedly etatist, stressing the need for a strong, centralized 
state based on traditional moral values.”81
In the 2001 political campaign, voters received very specific offers from 
two radical political parties: the extreme right League of Polish Families (LPR) 
and the radical left-populist Self-Defense (SRP). The common feature of both 
parties was their aversion toward the state as well as a wish to change the entire 
socio-political system. The LPR presented ideology rather than a genuine 
program that could lead to constructive public policies in opposition to the 
“communist-liberalism” of SLD, PO and UW.82  The League of Polish Families 
wanted to appeal and represent “hard core” Catholics with nationalistic 
tendencies.  The main political issue that distinguished LPR from other parties 
was its revulsion toward the enlargement of European Union. As noted by 
Migalski, “the anti-European appeal built the political power of the LPR since 
other parties did not even talk about it.”83  
The rhetoric of Self-Defense (SRP) was to convince the voter that the 
surrounding reality can be perceived only in black and white and political parties 
that are running in 2001 elections are not going to change anything in the society. 
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The criticism of the incumbent party as well as political elites that used to be in 
government and parliament in last 10 years for not being sufficiently democratic 
in listening to the voice of common people gave the SRP the opportunity to 
attract have-not voters dissatisfied with current economic and political situation. 
The party manifesto stresses out the importance of unemployment as well as 
subsidies for agricultural production, specifically for small farmers.84  The issue of 
subsidies was also common for the PSL.  There were two main additions to the 
PSL program in 2001 compared to 1997. First, the leaders stressed out the role of 
tradition and family.  Second, they were in favor of passing a the bill that would 
prohibit foreigners from buying farming land in Poland.  The last issue developed 
after 2001 elections into Euroskepticism.
5.  Elections of 2005
5.1 Overview
The opinions of citizens regarding the socio-economic situation in Poland in the 
mid-2005 were rather unsatisfactory.  According to the public opinion polls 65% 
of Poles believed that Poland was going in wrong direction and only 23% thought 
otherwise.85   The polls also indicated the declining popularity the incumbent 
party (SLD) due to corruption scandals.  Therefore, it was no surprise that the 
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SLD did not win in 2005 elections. The party’s aspirations “were not to win but 
emerge as a strong ideologically secular left-wing opposition to the right.”86   Two 
other parties that were already present in the parliament since 2001 benefited 
from this decline, namely the Law and Justice (PiS) and the Civic Platform (PO) 
receiving 26.99% and 24.11.1% of votes respectively.  It is imperative to note that 
the same political parties were elected to parliament in 2005 as in 2001.  This is 
not to say that there was no party split before elections.  There was only one 
split (not many as in the past), but the divide was, as usual, within the 
incumbent party. The leaders that formed the new Polish Social Democracy out 
of SLD did not meet the 5% threshold.  
     After the elections it was assumed by many voters and analysts that the PiS 
and the PO would form a coalition government as they had promised for two 
years.  This did not happen because both parties “quarreled over the allocation of 
ministries and failed to resolve their programmatic issues.”87  Therefore the PiS 
formed a minority government with the support of the LPR and the SRP.  In the 
spring of 2006 the PiS formed a coalition with the LPR and the SRP after the 
agreement that these two radical parties would be able to propose and hopefully 
implement the list of laws mostly related to agriculture (for the SRP) and 
education (for the LPR).  There is no doubt that getting ministerial positions by 
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the SRP and the LPR drove these parties into coalition with the PiS.  In terms of 
ideology it could be argued that these three political parties have had similar 
nationalistic tendencies. While the LPR and the SRP were definitely 
Euroskeptics, the PiS wanted a strong Poland within the European Union which 
later on led to isolation of the country from the EU.  The main political goal that 
connected these parties ideologically was their stand against the corrupted elites 
of the old regime.  The PiS-LPR-SRP coalition lasted for over a year and then 
the parliament decided to dissolve itself and new elections took place in the fall of 
2007.  
5.2 Issues in the Elections of 2005 
Parties’ manifestos did not change much from those of 2001.  All political 
parties, as in the past, stressed the need to fight with unemployment which rose 
to about 20% in some administrative regions.  Not surprisingly, pre-election 
surveys revealed that unemployment was a priority issue for 81.87% respondents. 
Further, all parties marked in their programs the importance to fight corruption 
and crimes.  Yet they differ in what they mean by these two terms and how to 
fight them. 
The PiS stands out here.  For the Kaczynski brothers fighting corruption 
and crime meant building a the Fourth Republic of Poland that would be free 
form the ‘old political arrangements’ led by the communist descendants and 
liberals after 1989.  These old political arrangements, according to the PiS, were 
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responsible for social and political injustice in Poland.  Therefore, PiS proposed 
re-opening the process of decommunization and lustration.  The cleansing of the 
state would also take institutional form by establishing the new Anti-Corruption 
Agency. The LPR and the SRP also favored an end to the rule of corrupt elites of 
the Third Republic.  There was a new rhetoric of the Self-Defense about the 
‘theft’ of national property by SLD leaders in 2005.  Further, the SRP’s leader 
Andrzej Lepper claimed during political campaign that since “the old left was 
bankrupt […] SRP was the ‘new’ left”88  The PiS idea to built strong rule of law 
in the Fourth Republic free of the old regime functionaries distinguish them 
greatly not only from the leftist post-communist SLD but also from the liberal 
post-solidarity Civic Platform.
Other issues emphasized during the 2005 election campaign were related to 
the public health programs.  Again, all parties called attention to reform of 
public health services, but they differ in their solutions.  For instance, both the 
SLD and the PiS proposed to spend more money from the governmental budget 
on public health, while the PO offered an almost completely new idea for Polish 
citizens: private health insurance.  The PO also brought out their old ideas of 
lowering taxes, the imposition of flat-rate tax (15%), and cutting bureaucracy. 
The new aspect of their program included the suggestion to remove the minimum 
wage.  The SLD and PiS absolutely opposed this concept, arguing for strong 
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welfare state; for the SLD it was explicitly reducing poverty and income 
inequality while for the PiS implementation of pro-family public policies based on 
the Christian values of social justice.  The Catholic values, tradition and pro-
family policies were also manifested by the LPR.  The SLD accused the entire 
right wing of being intolerant by their conformity with Christian values and 
pronounced its stand for a secular state that promotes social tolerance for all. 
Both the LPR and the SRP supported independence from foreign capital and 
reform of the National Central Bank.  Finally, while the LPR and the SRP were 
Euroskeptics, the SLD and the PO called for more integration with the EU.89  
The political system after the 2005 elections was defined around two 
political camps: “the social-solidarity camp” represented by the PiS and “the 
liberal camp” represented by the PO.90 The post-communist left was marginalized 
with the scattered electorate.  The extreme right and populist parties (LPR and 
SRP) gained power in the government in 2006, yet they disappeared from 
parliament after 2007 elections.
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6.  Conclusion
 This chapter described the development of Polish electoral politics, 
highlighting the major political players and issues they advocated during the 
political campaigns.  It is apparent that the stabilization of party system in 
Poland has been a lengthy process.  This stabilization process is the product of 
both electoral design and improved elite behavior.91 The analysis of the process of 
party evolution and party differentiation points to the more significant options 
for the electorate in each subsequent election.  The emergence of political parties 
capable of facilitating political choice based on the important social and political 
issues only prove that democratic consolidation is advancing.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SOCIOLOGICAL MODEL OF VOTING
Chapter 1 of this project described a debate around the different schools of 
thought on how to examine voter’s choice in democratic elections and which 
model of voting behavior best explains/predicts the winner in elections.  This 
chapter is set up around this debate and contributes to it by testing one of the 
models, namely the sociological model of voting.  The test of the sociological 
model of voting behavior is associated with the theoretical tradition of 
behavioralism, but also draws from rational choice theory.  This research takes an 
unusual path to investigate the validity of utility assumption in the context of 
sociological model of voting, by employing the utility function used by rational 
choice researchers.  In other words, it is assumed that voters make rational 
electoral decisions based on their social status.  It also asks how the voting 
behavior of Polish citizens has changed during the democratic transition. The 
main task is to test whether the Polish voters cast ballots for or against political 
parties based on the broadly defined cleavages. The challenge is to explain the 
voters’ choices using the existing sociological model of voting behavior that may 
or  may  not have  large explanatory and predictive power  when  applied  to  
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Polish electoral politics in late 1990s and first half of the decade in twenty first 
century.
1. Sociological Approaches to Voting Behavior
Assuming that voters are likely to vote for parties supporting policies 
congruent with their class interest, this study will first investigate the association 
of class and vote.  Class voting can be studied by means of ecological inference as 
well as direct information on the voter’s social class taken from public opinion 
surveys.92  This research utilizes only the second approach. 
When analyzing the social class (cleavage) model of voting from individual 
level data, scholars have proposed different ways of measuring the relationship 
between social position and party choice.  One of the methods to measure relative 
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cleavage voting was proposed in 1985 by Heath.93  This methodology is based on 
the odds of a member of one class voting for one party rather then another.94 The 
odd ratio (standardized) is illustrated by the following formula:
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p
mr
/ p
ml
  
where R is an odds ratio for group n that are voting for party r rather than party 
l divided by the odds for group m that are voting for party r rather then party l. 
This analysis employs odd ratios to explore the voting behavior of voters 
belonging to the core groups along the most central cleavages: class, religion, and 
rural-urban.95 
It is expected that religious voting occurs at a higher level than class 
voting all through the period beginning with the democratic transition, even 
61
93The Alford index is another measure for relative cleavage voting.  It subtracts 
the proportion of deviant cases from the proportion of correct cases. It is sensitive 
to the changes in the size of the class or of the party electorate. See Robert R. 
Alford, "Class Voting in Anglo-American Political Systems," in Party Systems and 
Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and 
Stein Rokkan (York: Free Press, 1967), Robert R. Alford, Party and Society; the 
Anglo-American Democracies, Rand Mcnally Sociology Series (Chicago: Rand 
McNally, 1963). A. F. Heath, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice, How Britain Votes, 
1st ed. (Oxford [Oxfordshire]; New York: Pergamon Press, 1985).
94Ibid.
95The calculation procedure and explanations are provided in the later section. 
though religious voting is expected to decline through time.  It is also expected 
that the last two Polish parliamentary elections (2001 and 2005) brought rise to 
an old rural-urban cleavage due to the European Union enlargement in May 2004. 
The analysis of the sociological model of voting is expected to show that cleavage 
voting in Poland is not declining and cleavages are rather reliable predictors of 
the vote.96  Finally, this project analyzes the effect of social characteristics of 
voters, such as gender, age, education, and occupation on their electoral choice by 
employing multinomial logit. 
As it was already pointed out in Chapter 1, researchers that focus on the 
sociological factors to explain voting behavior in Poland point out to the fact 
that the Polish citizens were shaped by the communist system and this 
socialization process is reflected in the behavior of electors, at least during the 
first democratic elections.97  While time passes, voters are socialized by new 
political and societal settings and what they learned from communism is most 
likely to disappear. Therefore, new forms of cleavages are most likely to emerge 
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96As already mentioned in chapter 1, this prediction is based on discussion of 
Eastern European countries in Evans, "The Social Bases of Political Divisions in 
Post-Communist Eastern Europe."
97Di Palma, "Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural 
Change in Eastern Europe." Heyns and Bialecki, "Solidarność: Reluctant 
Vanguard or Makeshift Coalition?." Evans, "The Social Bases of Political 
Divisions in Post-Communist Eastern Europe." 
since the initial beliefs are challenged by latter social, political and economic 
experiences. 
There is a consensus among researchers who study the voting behavior in 
Poland from the sociological perspective that political cleavages have influence on 
voter’s choice.  As already mentioned in Chapter 1, some scholars examined voter 
choices based on geographical and state-church cleavages;98  the others tried to 
explain the electoral choices in terms of income, education, and occupation.99 The 
utilization of different types of methodologies, such as descriptive statistics,100 the 
ordinary-least-squared regression,101 and the multinomial logit102 to examine the 
influence of sociological factor on voting behavior in Poland and obtaining similar 
results through different methods of estimation only confirms that the social 
structure influenced the Polish electors at least in first set of elections.  What is 
deficient in applications of sociological model is a lack of research on the most 
recent elections.  This chapter investigates whether or not cleavages are still good 
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98Tworzecki, Parties and Politics in Post 1989 Poland.
99Wade, Lavelle, and Groth, "Searching for Voting Patterns in Post-Communist 
Poland's Sejm Elections."
100Szczerbiak, "Interests and Values: Polish Parties and Their Electorates." 
Millard, "The Polish Parliamentary Election of September, 1993." 
101Wade, Lavelle, and Groth, "Searching for Voting Patterns in Post-Communist 
Poland's Sejm Elections." Heyns and Bialecki, "Solidarność: Reluctant Vanguard 
or Makeshift Coalition?."
102Jackson, Klich, and Poznanska, "Economic Transition and Elections in Poland."
predictors of vote as well as which cleavages are important as Poland continues in 
the process of democratic consolidation.
2.  Variables and Method
2.1 Dependent Variable: Party Sympathy versus Party Choice
When studying voting behavior, scholars have an option to choose as a 
dependent variable either party sympathy or party choice.  It is often argued that 
it is easier for a (potential) voter to express the degree of sympathy on some 
rating scale rather than simultaneously compare all competing parties and make 
a rational decision for which political party to cast the vote.  In other words, 
those who vote must compare the utilities of different parties while the party 
sympathy is associated with indicating the utility of one particular party.103  It is 
not definite that voters who express a strong sympathy for a particular party will 
vote for this party.  To put it simply, while studying voting behavior a researcher 
should not substitute the actual party choice with the party sympathy scores 
64
103See discussion on this issue in Cees Van der Eijk et al., "Rethinking the 
Dependent Variable in Voting Behavior: On the Measurement and Analysis of 
Electoral Utilities," Electoral Studies 25, no. 3 (2006).
when the former is available.104   The correlation of the actual party choice and 
party sympathy does not disclose a perfect association between these two 
variables and usually varies between 0.6 and 0.8.  
Researchers who study voting behavior sometimes use party sympathy for 
a simple reason: it is easier methodologically to analyze a voter’s choice when a 
scholar is presented with a point scale that can be treated as continuous 
dependent variable.  In those situations ordinary least-squared regression (OLS) 
is utilized to estimate regression parameters.105  Of course there is nothing wrong 
with using OLS method in this data setting, but putting a fairly simple 
estimation method over an explanation of voting behavior does not seem to be 
right choice.
65
104Utilization of party sympathy instead of party choice in the study of economic 
voting in Poland can be found in Joshua A. Tucker and Andrew Owen, "It’s 
Multifaceted Economic Effect, Stupid! Conventional Vs. Transitional Economic 
Voting in Poland, 1997-2005," in Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago: 
2007).
105Perfect example of such approach is in Krzysztof Jasiewicz, "Pocketbook or 
Rosary? Economic and Identity Voting in 2000-2001 Elections in Poland," in 
Studies in Public Policy (No. 379) (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde: Centre for 
the Study of Public Policy, 2003), 18.
2.2 Independent Variables
In testing the sociological model of voting, I utilize data from Polish 
National Election Study (PGSW) from 1997, 2001 and 2005.106   Following the 
standard convention of using several cleavages first described by Lipset and 
Rokkan107  and re-visited by Harrop and Miller, 108  I operationalized the rural/
urban cleavage by employing two different variables that measures where the 
respondent lives.  The first corresponds to those who live in villages, the second 
corresponds to towns with the population below and above 20 thousand 
inhabitants. The second cleavage is associated with religion.  In all three surveys 
questions asked respondents to identify the frequency of church attendance that is 
ranging between ‘never attend church’ to ‘attend church several times a week.’ 
For the purpose of this study a dummy variable was created to distinguish 
between those who attend church more then twice a month and those who attend 
less or never.  
The third cleavage is associated with social class to which a voter belongs 
to. As noted by Harrop and Miller, the traditional class stereotype is represented 
by those who have “minimum education, living in rented house, working in heavy 
66
106Note that only ‘first wave’ of PGSW 2005 survey is used in this analysis.
107Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives International Yearbook of Political 
Behavior Research (New York,: Free Press, 1967).
108Harrop and Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction.
industry and surrounded by friends and relations who themselves possess these 
attributes.”109 Therefore, this project makes use of an education variable that is 
measured in two categories: those who possess uncompleted secondary education 
and below and those who hold gymnasium/technical diploma or higher education 
degree.  I also include the variables that measure housing and divide it into two 
categories: those who own the house/flat or live in cooperative flat and those who 
rent house/flat or live with families. This research also employs two classifications 
of occupation: manual and white-collar workers as well as division between those 
who are owners of any business and those who are not.  The next cleavage is 
closely related to the vertical division of social class, namely the cleavage that 
addresses the impact of the state on a particular voter, is associated with the 
divisions between those who are supported by the state in terms of 
unemployment benefits and those who are not.  This category also includes those 
who retired (there is basically no other alternative to Polish citizens than a 
pension from the state).  The fifth cleavage (apparently linked with previous 
cleavage of class) is the membership in trade unions.  Here the distinction is 
made between those who belong to Solidarity trade union and those who are 
members of OPZZ trade union (a former communist union).  This research does 
not include household income of the voters as a predictor of voting behavior due 
67
109 Ibid., 188.
to the amount of missing data.110  The final social bases of voting are expressed 
by employing age and gender of the respondents.   
2.3 Method
This study utilizes the multinomial logit, a statistical model that offers an 
interesting opportunity to study party choice as the dependent variable. This 
opportunity has not yet been fully exploited by scholars who have analyzed 
Polish national elections, although the rather large Polish elections surveys since 
middle of the 1990s have included questions about party choice, social status and 
demographics of a voter.  This paper explores multinomial logit for party choice 
conditioned on all these mentioned aspects. The sociological model of voting 
proposed in this paper is represented by multinomial logit model
   
 
p
ij
=
e
Uij
1 +eUi1 +eUi 2 + ...+eUim
   
where  
 
U
ij
= β
j
X
i
+ ε
ij
and  
 
β
j
is a coefficient,  Xi indicates specific characteristics 
of a voter to choose party j and 
 
ε
ij
is voter specific error for each political  party. 
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110The method of multinomial logit employed in this analysis is estimating the 
coefficients and standard errors based on the number of cases (respondents/
voters) for each category (political party). With the missing data on the 
household income, the estimation of some coefficients would be based only on the 
handful number of cases posing a danger of biasness and inefficiency. The 
household’s disposable income is utilized in the chapter on economic voting.
Using the random utility model borrowed from rational choice theory, it is 
assumed that a voter is presented with a choice of several parties.  Estimation in 
this context is undertaken by means of generalization of the multinomial logit. 
The probability that a particular voter will choose a particular party is given by 
the probability that the utility of that party to that voter is greater than the 
utility to that voter of all other parties.  Using multinomial logit, the utility of 
choosing one of the alternative parties by a voter during election time is specified 
as a linear function of voter’s social/individual characteristics with a different set 
of parameters for each alternative party.  The intercept in multinomial model 
captures options that affect utility, but does not depend on voters’ social/
individual characteristics such as age, gender, the trade union membership, etc. 
Utilizing multinomial logit, we are presented with slope coefficients for each 
characteristic of a voter estimated for each of the alternative parties except one 
party that serves as a base for comparison.111   The multinomial logit estimation 
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111Instead of using one of the alternative political parties as a base, it is also 
possible to take advantage of nonvoters’ category as a base. Since these research 
is concerned only with voters, such estimation is not provided here, but available 
upon request. Further, the best practice, while utilizing multinomial logit, is to 
examine the effects of covariates on dependent variable using every political party 
as a base category. This requires from researcher to rerun multinomial logit with 
different base categories to be able to compare all pairs of alternatives (we must 
remember that although the estimated parameters in each model are different, 
they are only different parameterizations that provide
reports coefficients for the effect of each independent variable on each political 
party relative to the political party that is chosen to be a base category. 
Utilizing multinomial logit, we are presented with slope coefficients for each 
characteristic of a voter estimated for each of the alternative parties except one 
party that serves as a base for comparison.  The multinomial logit estimation 
reports coefficients for the effect of each independent variable on each political 
party relative to the political party that is chosen to be a base category.
To deal with the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) common in 
estimating multinomial logit, I excluded from the analysis political parties that 
ran for parliamentary elections, but whose role was really insignificant (their 
support was marginal).  In other words, the voter’s choice of major political 
parties was unaffected by the presence of these irrelevant alternative parties; the 
Hausman test and Small-Hsiao test that evaluate the significance of estimators 
with and without excluded political parties confirmed my decision.  This is the 
70
the same predicted probabilities, see J. Scott  Long and Jeremy  Freese, 
Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata (College 
Station, TX: Stata Press, 2006), 228.  This might generate much output as well 
as confusion how to interpret the coefficients of estimation that are different for 
each rerun.  Nevertheless, I believe that to accurately interpret the result, 
researchers need to carry out such a task.  The multinomial logit estimations that 
account for different bases are available upon request.
best way of dealing with IIA beside of estimating the model with multinomial 
probit or conducting multilevel binary logit estimations.114 
The interpretation of multinomial logit might be challenging due to the 
number of alternative parties in the model. To make the analysis easier, I utilize 
Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King’s program clarify.115  The 
advantage of using this program is that interpretation and presentation of 
statistical results for multinomial logit becomes fairly easy even for those who are 
not familiar with this estimation technique.  Clarify simulates parameters from 
multinomial logit parameters and converts those simulated ones into 
substantively interesting summary of simulated probabilities.  For instance, 
clarify allows the researcher to present and interpret the probability that voters 
with a specific set of characteristics choose party j (in formal notation: Pr(Y=j) 
for all j).  In other words, a researcher might be interested in the probability that 
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114Peter Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics, 5th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2003), 259-80. See also Jay K. Dow and James W. Endersby, "Multinomial 
Probit and Multinomial Logit: A Comparison of Choice Models for Voting 
Research," Electoral Studies 23, no. 1 (2004). 
115See Michael Tomz, Jason  Wittenberg, and Gary King, "Clarify: Software for 
Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.1.," in Available at 
http://gking.harvard.edu (Stanford University, University of Wisconsin, and 
Harvard University, 2003), Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King, 
"Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results," Journal of 
Statistical Software 8, no. 1 (2003).
voters who are retired, uneducated, and former members of solidarity movement 
will vote for one of the post-solidarity party in 2005 election.  In short, this 
program allows researchers to calculate quantities that shed light on many 
particular problems associated with interpretation of multinomial logit. 
3. Analyses
Before we turn to the discussion of results from multinomial logit 
estimation, it is possible to examine the odds ratios as proposed by Heath (Table 
2). Using the standardized odds ratio formula presented above and not even 
employing maximum likelihood estimation, we can calculate the relative risk 
ratios for each category (party) j.116  For instance referring to Table 2 that 
demonstrates voters’ church attendance in 1997, we can calculate that among 
voters who attend church the odds favoring the AWS over the SLD are
  P(AWS)/P(SLD) = (333/668)/(133/668) = 2.504
In similar way we can calculate odds for those who do not attend church 
regularly.
P(AWS)/P(SLD) = (59/265)/(134/265) = 0.4402
72
116It is necessary to point out that these relative risk ratios are similar to those 
estimated by multinomial logit, but they are not the same. Therefore, it is not 
redundant to present them in the analysis but rather these relative risk ratios are 
complementary to the analysis of cleavage voting estimated by the multinomial 
logit. 
Thus, the odds favoring the AWS over the SLD in 1997 elections are 5.688 times 
higher (2.504/0.4402=5.6883) for churchgoers then for others. Looking at the 
next two elections (2001 and 2005) and the church attendance we can similarly 
calculate the relative risk ratios.  Therefore, in 2001 (calculations based on figures 
in Table 2)  the  odds  favoring  the  LPR  (the extreme right party created from 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics: Cross-Tabulation of Church Attendance and 
Party Choice.
Question: which party 
respondent voted for?
1997 Elections 2001 Elections 2005 Elections
Church Attendance Church Attendance Church Attendance
No Yes No Yes No Yes
ROP 13
(25%)
39
(75%)
- - - -
AWS 59
(15.1%)
333
(84.9%)
- - - -
UW 46
(32.2%)
97
(67.8%)
- - - -
SLD 134
(50.2%)
133
(49.8%)
168
(40.2%)
250
(59.8%)
18
(46.2%)
21
(53.8%)
PSL 13
(16.5%)
66
(83.5%)
19
(22.4%)
66
(77.6%)
2
(6.9%)
27
(93.1%)
SRP - - 27
(25%)
81
(75%)
16
(26.7%)
44
(73.3%)
PO - - 31
(25%)
93
(75%)
54
(37.8%)
89
(62.2%)
PiS - - 18
(20%)
72
(80%)
42
(20.7%)
161
(79.3%)
LPR - - 5
(7.8%)
59
(92.2%)
4
(10.3%)
35
(89.7%)
Total 265
(28.4%)
668
(71.6%)
268
(30.2%)
621
(69.8%)
136
(26.5%)
377
(73.5%)
Statistics Pearson χ² 103.51 44.96 31.56
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000
right wing of AWS and supported by Radio Maryja) over the SLD are around 5.9 
times higher for those who attended the Church often then for others.  The data 
from 2005 indicates similar results. Analyzing the same political parties, the 
73
calculations show that the odds favoring the LPR over the SLD are 7.9 times 
higher for the churchgoers then for others.  The odd ratios from multinomial logit 
estimation illustrates a similar pattern.  For instance, Table 3 demonstrates the 
relative risk ratio of 6.23 for the AWS (variable “church attendance”) comparing 
to the SLD.  It means that the odds favoring the AWS over the SLD are 6.23 
times higher for those who attend often than for others.  It needs to be stressed 
that drawing the definite conclusions about the religious voting from these simple 
analysis of odd ratios is sort of shallow. We need to look more deeply by 
estimating the multinomial logit.
 When examining the statistical results of multinomial logit, it should first 
be noted that the proposed sociological model of voting for all election periods is 
statistically significant at the level of 0.000 when the multinomial logit is 
employed (see Tables 3-5).  On the other hand, the overall explanatory power of 
the model is very weak. The coefficient of determination pseudo-R² ranges 
between 0.1075 and 0.1146 depending on the election year.  In other words, the 
regressors in the model(s) explain approximately between 10% and 11% of the 
variation in the party choice.  The pseudo-R² slightly increases from 1997 to 2005, 
which indicates that cleavage voting is somewhat increasing as democratic 
consolidation is advancing.  Further, only some intercepts are significant at 0.05 
or below. Notably, analyzing the cleavage that addresses the impact of domestic 
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governmental expenditure such as unemployment benefits, there is evidence that 
unemployed voters support the SRP if compared to the PSL only in the 2001 
elections, but not any other alternative party across other elections. This might 
disprove the argument that apathy, abstention and withdrawal political system is 
present among those who become losers in the transition from state commended 
to free market economy.  In addition, retirement does not appear to have any 
influence over the party choice across time and space. Voters’ level of education 
also does not seem to have impact on party choice in any of the elections except 
in 1997 were educated persons voted for the UW. This indicates that there are 
other factors that affect voters’ utility, but are not associated with their social/
individual characteristics. These factors might include economy or desire to 
change the incumbent party due to corruption (issue voting). What is evident 
from this research is that religion plays an important role in voter’s decision. 
This confirms what has been found in analysis of 2001 Polish National Election 
Study conducted by Krzysztof Jasiewicz.117  His findings substantiate that “When 
wants to predict how a Pole will vote, one should ask him not ‘Howthick is your 
pocketbook?’ but ‘How often do you say your rosary.’”118
 Table 6 shows the  simulated  probabilities  that voter i will cast a ballot
78
117Jasiewicz, "Pocketbook or Rosary? Economic and Identity Voting in 2000-2001 
Elections in Poland."
118Ibid., 24.
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for party j for all examined elections.  To assess religious voting in 1997, we need 
to look at the probabilities of voting for political parties that are considered to be 
secular or associated with the Catholic Church, specifically the Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD) and the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS).  In particular, a post-
opposition party AWS, relied in their electoral slogans (not necessarily the 
economic policies, for details see chapters 2 and 5) on a fundamental 
interpretation of Catholic teaching, as well as specifically Polish traditions. On 
the other hand, the communist successor party, the Democratic Left Alliance 
(SLD), has been viewed as secular or even anti-clerical. These two major electoral 
blocs in the 1997 election represented a roughly similar and wide range of opinion 
on economic policy.  Even more, they scarcely touched upon economic problems 
in their campaigns. Yet in their propaganda and practice the SLD and the AWS 
has been remarkably moderate in economic policies; they have pledged not to 
abandon the ongoing neo-liberal economic reforms, but instead to carry them out 
better and to take care of those hurt worst by the economic transition.
 What divided these two political parties was the role of the church in the 
state and decommunization. This divide, based on these two cultural and 
historical issues, was even strengthen by the external sponsorship for the AWS, 
namely the Solidarity trade union and the Catholic Church.  These two nonparty 
entities were huge source of support, to whom the AWS kept looking for 
legitimacy and aid.  As the simulated probabilities of voting for the AWS and the 
80
SLD indicate a voter who attends the Catholic Church more then twice a month 
is likely to vote for the AWS.  This probability lies between 40 and 48 percent 
depending on the voters characteristics (see description below Tables 6). 
Moreover, it really does not matter that much if a voter is rich or poor, lives in 
village or large city, is employed or unemployed, young or old – the factor that is 
standing out is the church attendance.  On the other hand, those who do not 
attend church tend to vote for SLD. Specifically, the probability that a 
nonreligious voter casts ballot for SLD ranges between 46.85 and 51.49 percent.119
 Looking at simulated probabilities from the 2001 elections we notice a 
puzzle in respect to votes for the left-wing coalition SLD-UP.  Table 6 indicates 
that the probability of voting for this coalition ranges between 22.78% and 
63.75% irrespective of the regular church attendance or its lack. In other words, 
the retired as well as the unemployed and uneducated manual workers who reside 
in the multifamily homes in villages are predicted to vote for the SLD-UP 
irrespectively of their passion for the religious practices (probability over 40%). 
The losers of the economic and democratic transition who are also ‘non-
churchgoers abstainers’ would rather vote for SLD-UP (63.75% probability) then 
81
119It needs to be emphasized here that the conclusion that the religious voting 
occurred during the election of 1997 was reached not only by analyzing the 
coefficients estimated by the multinomial logit, but going into deeper analysis of 
simulated probabilities calculated thanks to clarify.
any other political party.  This might be the indication of class voting, the puzzle 
that is discussed later.
 Another group of citizens likely to vote for the SLD is the non-religious 
educated business faction (probability around 43.39%) that could be associated 
with the business elites that emerged from former communist elites in the 
beginning of the 1990s (see Table 6). Yet this is just a supposition rather than 
certainty.  On the other hand, the division within the business faction appears 
clearly by looking at Table 6.  The business community who attend church are 
predicted to vote for the PiS (probability of 39.08%) and the PO (probability of 
27.48%) more frequently then for the SLD (probability of 22.78%).  This is 
another indication that the religious cleavage was present and perhaps stronger 
then the class voting in 2001 election.
Now the question becomes whether or not the same set of rules of cleavage 
voting is applicable for 2005 elections.  The simulated probabilities in last four 
columns of Table 6 point out the realignment of the educated business groups. 
They are more likely to vote for the liberal PO then the right-of-center PiS and 
much less likely for leftist SLD.  Further, this study confirms that some business 
owners had slightly conservative sympathies in 2005 elections by casting their 
ballot for the PiS. This is rather surprising, since the ‘Polish conventional 
wisdom’ pronounces that this group of voters supported Civic Platform (PO). In 
particular, Table 6 shows that the class voting became more apparent 
82
irrespectively of the church attendance.  If the white-collar voters attended 
church the probability that they vote for the PO is 63%, while for the PiS and 
the SLD 21.95% and 5.38% respectively.  For non-attendees the probabilities are 
70.45% for the PO, 13.56% for the PiS, and 11.15% for the SLD. This is not to 
argue that religious voting disappeared during 2005 elections.  For instance, the 
business men and women who are practicing Catholics are more likely to support 
PiS then the others.  Similarly, the supporters of SLD are more likely to be the 
secular white-collar workers.
If class voting truly holds, we would expect the blue-collar workers as well 
as those who are unemployed would vote for the leftist SLD or the SRP.  Table 6 
(probability 1 and 2 in 2005 elections) indicates that the SLD electorate does not 
belong to this group.  It might be quite surprising for scholars of voting behavior 
in Poland that the SLD did not attracted the traditional left-wing voters.120 
They rather supported the winner of 2005 election (PiS) as well as the party that 
just before elections manifested its program as leftist (SRP).  In other words, 
blue-collar workers were more likely than white-collar workers to cast vote in 
2005 elections for the SRP and PiS relative to leftist SLD.  It must be noticed 
that the PiS being conservative on the socio-cultural issues is very leftist on the 
socio-economic issues.  This might be one of the explanations why the predicted 
83
120Other predicted probabilities that support this conclusion area available upon 
request.
probabilities indicate the PiS picked up the traditional leftist electorate.  The 
other justification might be associated with the fact that losers from the 
economic transition would vote for non-incumbent party to punish the former 
government that did not provide them the economic well-being.  While it might 
be concluded with confidence that class voting holds for the upper middle class, 
there is not enough empirical evidence to be so obvious in relation to the lower 
class of the Polish society.  Other models of voting have to be tested before we 
are able to make a decisive conclusion about the unprivileged.  Starting with 
2005 elections, there is definitely a crystallization of party politics in respect to 
the issues they emphasized and ideology they pronounced.
Now the question becomes whether cleavage voting is declining or staying 
about the same. 121  Comparing the odds ratios of church attendance across time 
and space we can conclude with certainty that religious voting is not intensifying 
or staying at the same level but rather getting much weaker.  To be more specific, 
let us focus on the LPR (a party that is strongly associated with Catholicism, 
family values, nationalism) voters in 2001 and 2005 elections.  The odds ratios for 
2001 and 2005 are 10.314 and 7.46 respectively.  All the political parties elected 
to the parliament between 1997 and 2005 except one (SLD – former communist 
party) had a significant number of voters who attended church more then twice a 
84
121All the findings below are confirmed by comparing the odds ratio as well as 
plotting the odds ratio.  Detailed graphs and figures are available upon request. 
month.  As we would expect, if a voter perceives a party on the left spectrum, 
the party is less associated with religious cleavage.  It is interesting to see that 
the negative effect of church-going becomes less strong over time for the SDL. 
Specifically, comparing the marginal effects for the SLD with respect to the 
church attendance the predicted probability of voting for the SLD in 1997 is .33 
lower for church goers than none attendees.122  In the 2001 and 2005 elections the 
predicted probabilities are .21 and .12, respectively (Table 7). It appears that 
those who do not attend church regularly picked up by the PO in 2005; 
specifically, it is true for the business community (Table 6).  Somewhat 
interesting is the association between most of the leftist parties and manual 
85
122The marginal effects, sometimes called marginal changes or partial effects, are 
calculated after the multinomial logit estimation and are based on the predicted 
probabilities of choosing political party 'j'. As the predicted probability after the 
multinomial logit estimation is calculated separately for each outcome, so the 
marginal effects are also calculated separately for each political party. The 
marginal effects demonstrate how the probabilities of each outcome (here the vote 
for each political party) change with respect to change in the independent 
variables.  In other words, by calculating the marginal effects we can determine 
the effect of regressors for the probability of voting for each political party at 
certain values of independent variables. Since all the independent variables in the 
estimated model are binary except age, Table 7 presents the discrete changes as 
the dummy variables change from 0 to 1. The explanatory variable age is set up 
to its mean.
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workers over time.123   As it was discussed above there is no obvious path that 
could strictly relate voters to leftist political parties and indicate class voting for 
this group of voters.  In the 1997 elections the manual workers supported the 
right-of-center AWS, while in the 2001 elections workers supported post-
Solidarity right-wing as well as radical populist organization (Self-Defense-SRP). 
In 2005 the support for LPR diminished and the majority of workers appear to 
cast the ballot for the SRP (Table 7).124  The vote of white-collar workers, on the 
other hand, tends to be somewhat equally distributed along left-right political 
spectrum over time with some preference for the post-solidarity parties.
In terms of labor unions, this study indicates that members of the 
Solidarity union voted for post-Solidarity party AWS in 1997 and their 
significance disappeared in the 2001 elections for the PO and the PiS (post-
solidarity parties that were formed by leaders who left the AWS).  This might be 
due to the dissatisfaction with the reforms performed by the post-solidarity 
coalition government after 1997 elections as well as declining number of 
membership. Interestingly enough, the members of solidarity labor union 
supported the post-solidarity party LPR in the 2001 elections and the PiS in the 
87
123Leftist Parties in 1997: SLD; Leftist Parties in 2001: SLD, SRP, UP; Leftist 
Parties in 2005: SRP, SLD
124Note that form the simulated probabilities (Table 6) we also learned that 
manual workers who were also likely to support the PiS.
2005 elections (Table 7). A relatively similar story might be told when looking at 
former communist OPZZ labor union whose members stopped to be loyal to the 
former communist party SLD, and strongly opposing the former solidarity parties 
as well as left-wing SRP.  It is clear that the role of the solidarity labor union in 
electoral politics has weaken in 2001 but came back to live in the 2005 elections. 
The findings about the role of the labor unions in electoral politics might also 
indicate the historical divide between supporters of the old regime and those who 
opposed it. 
The other evident cleavage is a rural/urban cleavage. Political parties, 
such as PSL and SRP tend to be supported by the residents of villages in all 
three elections.  This analysis indicates the rural/urban conflict of interest exists 
in Polish politics.  The marginal effects for the PSL increased from 0.15 in 1997 
to 0.19 in 2001 and decreased to .1 in 2005 (Table 7).  The similar situation can 
be observed for the SRP. In 2001 there was a positive relationship between 
support of the SRP by voters from rural areas with the marginal effect of 0.05. 
In 2005 elections SRP lost support from their former voters (insignificant 
relationship) but gained more voters from small towns and blue-collar workers by 
being recognized as a leftist party.
4. Conclusion
 This chapter took into consideration only social cleavages. A definite 
conclusion on what drives a Polish citizen to cast a vote in a particular way 
88
cannot be reached through analyzing only one model of voting behavior. 
Although social cleavages play a role in the process of voting, they are not the 
only factors.  As indicated by the results, the sociological model of voting turned 
out to have less explanatory and predictive power than expected.  This makes it 
possible to discuss different approaches to study voting behavior in Poland to 
understand voter’s choice in new democratic setting. In other words, other 
important factors, such as issues and political party attachments should be 
tested.  This is done in next chapters.  There are several possibilities here. 
Specifically, in the context of rational choice theory, the task of this project is to 
compare the relative contributions of directional and proximity models, both of 
specific issue preferences and left–right ideological positions, on political party 
preferences in the Polish electorate. Going further with the rational choice 
explanation of voting behavior, the concept of economic voting is of particular 
importance.  Specifically, testing retrospective and prospective egotropic and 
sociotropic economic model of voting could bring the conclusion that Polish voter 
is homo economicus.  Finally, the Michigan School of voting behavior argues that 
a rational calculus is insufficient to explain voting behavior, but the attachment 
to a particular political party or a family of parties is best single advance 
predictor of the vote.  The explanatory power of this model is tested in next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE MICHIGAN MODEL OF VOTING
This chapter focuses on the Michigan model of voting (also referred to as 
the socio-psychological model) first introduced by Campbell et al. (1960) in The 
American Voter and consequently developed and tested specifically in the western 
democracies.  According to this model there are many factors that influence 
electoral choices such as issue opinions, candidate images, political ideology, and 
party attachment as well as the political and socioeconomic conditions.  All these 
elements are portrayed by so-called funnel of causality (Figure 1).  As pointed out 
by Dalton, the Michigan model of voting “can predict voting decisions more 
accurately than individuals can predict their own behavior in the months before 
the election.”125 Yet the main factor that determines a voting choice, according to 
this model, is the concept of partisan attachment.126
90
125Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), 
172.  Compare also Campbell et al., The American Voter, 74.
126Green et al. point out that “party identification is by no means the sole 
determinant of vote preference.” Donald P. Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric 
Schickler, Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of 
Voters, Yale Isps Series (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 17.
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 Scholars affiliated with the Michigan model of voting point out that if 
voters feel some psychological affiliation to a party, then their party identification 
strongly shapes their political behavior.127   As noted by Campbell et al. in The 
Voter Decides “parties serve as standard-setting groups for a significant 
proportion of the people … it is assumed that many people associate themselves 
psychologically with one or the other of the parties, and that this identification 
has predictable relationships with their perceptions, evaluations, and actions.”128 
The recent literature on voting behavior in East-Central Europe in general 
and Poland in particular casts doubt on whether or not the voters can identify 
themselves with political parties at all in the political surroundings were parties 
come and go.  Scholars often ask whether the party identification is even relevant 
in new democracies like Poland.129 Others argue that “fluid and fragmented party 
systems do not provide adequate and meaningful referents for the formation of 
political identities and preferences.”130  
92
127Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al., The American Voter Revisited (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2008), 305.
128Angus Campbell, The Voter Decides (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 
1954), 90.
129Richard Rose and William Mishler, "Negative and Positive Party Identification 
in Post-Communist Countries," Electoral Studies 17, no. 2 (1998).
130Shabad and Slomczynski, "Political Identities in the Initial Phase of Systemic 
Transformation in Poland: A Test of the Tabula Rasa Hypothesis," 691.
In order to test the socio-psychological model of voting, first we need to 
find out to what extent party ties are present in the Polish public.  Therefore, I 
analyze the distribution of votes comparing the answers of respondents regarding 
their previous vote and current vote available in each analyzed survey controlling 
for the strength of party identification to assess the stability of party attachment. 
Second, I categorize the voters into four groups based on their party attachment 
and cognitive resources they hold to assess the nature of partisanship and 
partisan independence. This groundwork analysis reveals that while the party ties 
are not entirely stable over time and partisan types change from election to 
election, they are indeed present among the Polish electorate.  Thus, I analyze 
the party identification and votes casted in each parliamentary election utilizing 
descriptive statistics.  Subsequently, I utilize probit estimation to assess the 
relationship between party attachment and voting for post-communist and post 
solidarity parties distinguishing between the levels of partisan attachment. 
Finally, I employ multinomial logit to evaluate the impact of party attachment 
and ideology on voting for party families (social conservatives, liberal 
conservatives, and social democrats) controlling for the social and political 
characteristics of voters.  All the analyses are conducted based on the Polish 
National Elections survey from 1997, 2001, and 2005. 
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1.  Theoretical and Empirical Debates and Their Applications to the Polish          
Elections
The importance of party attachment in the socio-psychological model of 
voting was extended by Shively (1979) who developed the functional model of 
party identification.131 Shively argued that if social cleavages that are traditional 
short-cut devices are weakening, then the party identification becomes a short-
cut.  The functionalist theory of political party as information short-cut to all 
kinds of political decisions (even which party to vote for) became controversial 
when scholars started to find out that more citizens become independents. 
Scholars started to argue that party attachment is declining as voters become 
more educated.  Well-informed citizens do not need partisan attachment to orient 
themselves in politics; they can do it on their own.  The implication of this was a 
development of cognitive mobilization theory that accepted “the importance 
partisanship as a heuristic that helps citizens orient themselves to politics” but 
also argued that “because the voters’ political awareness and sophistication are 
growing, more people can deal with the complexities of politics without passive 
reliance on external cues or heuristics.”132
94
131W. Phillips Shively, "The Development of Party Identification among Adults," 
American Political Science Review 73, no. 4 (1979).
132Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies, 187.
The cognitive mobilization theory added to the already exiting debate 
concerning the impact of party identification on voting behavior.  One set of 
scholars point out that partisan attachments are getting weaker as compared to 
1950s and 1960s, not only in the U.S. but also in Europe.133  The other group of 
scholars argues that the partisanship (understood as a psychological attachment 
to a particular party) had declined in 1970s but it is ever since growing, 
especially in the U.S.134   European scholarship came to similar and debatable 
conclusions regarding party attachment and voting choice, but it also added the 
special twist into the entire debate by pointing out that a political party 
represents a social group, which in turn is a base for party preference. 135
Further, some researchers have expressed doubt whether or not the 
concept of party identification can be transformed into different political settings 
95
133Russell J. Dalton, "Partisan Mobilization, Cognitive Mobilization and the 
Changing American Electorate," Electoral Studies 26, no. 2 (2007).
134  Bartels, "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996." As pointed out by 
Green et al. “despite the outpouring of scholarship on declining influence of party 
identification, party attachments remain powerful predictors of vote choice.” See 
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties 
and the Social Identities of Voters, 206.
135See specifically Chapter 5 in Jacques Thomassen, ed., The European Voter: A 
Comparative Study of Modern Democracies (New York: ECPR Oxford University 
Press, 2005).
other then the U.S.136  Most of all these scholars argue that “party identities are 
overshadowed or encompassed by other identities, such as social class, religion or 
language.”137  Others defended the applicability of party identification.138   To 
summarize, the concept of party attachment and identity has been called into 
question not only as one of the best predictors of vote, but also as a concept that 
can be transferred to other polities beside the U.S.  
Now the question becomes how these theoretical and empirical debates 
relate to the Polish electoral politics in general and a test of socio-psychological 
model in particular.  Experts on voting behavior agree that public at large needs 
short-cuts to be able to perceive and evaluate public affairs.  The previous chapter 
on the sociological model of voting confirmed that it would be hard to predict 
96
136Jacques  Thomassen, "Party Identification as a Cross-National Concept: Its 
Meaning in the Netherlands," in Party Identification and Beyond: Representation 
of  Voting and Party Competition, ed. I. Budge, I. Crewe, and D. Farlie (London: 
Wiley, 1976).  Lawrence LeDuc et al., "Partisan Instability in Canada: Evidence 
from a New Panel Study," American Political Science Review 78, no. 2 (1984).
137Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties 
and the Social Identities of Voters, 164.
138A. F. Heath and Roy Pierce, "It Was Party Identification All Along - Question 
Order Effects on Reports of Party Identification in Britain," Electoral Studies 11, 
no. 2 (1992).  Richard Johnston, "Party Identification Measures in the Anglo-
American Democracies: A National Survey Experiment," American Journal of 
Political Science 36, no. 2 (1992).
with high level of certainty the vote in Poland based on the social characteristics 
of voters or social cleavages.  This finding might suggest that political parties 
might play a role of short-cuts to orient some citizens in politics.  Further, 
Shively pointed out that “if the social or economic conflicts in which a voter is 
involved are sufficiently clear; and if the position of parties or groups of parties 
with regard to these conflicts is sufficiently clear; then there is no need for the 
voter to develop lasting ties to any party per se, and he will no do so.”139  Since 
Polish politics seems to be in turmoil and traditional short-cuts are weak, it 
would seem that the Polish electorate needs political parties (parties give cues).
The debates between functionalism and mobilization theory are also 
explored in this chapter.  Specifically, this chapter follows Dalton (2007) and 
Bartels (2000) to assess the impact of partisanship on voting preferences.  Both 
scholars built their work on the Michigan model of voting developed in American 
Voter.  Dalton extends his theoretical framework to the functional theory of party 
identification developed by Shively (1979) and Petersson (1978) and distinguishes 
between party mobilization and cognitive mobilization while testing the electoral 
choices.  Bartels, on the other hand, tests the socio-psychological model focusing 
on the strength of partisanship over time in the U.S. Bartels and Dalton come to 
distinct conclusions about the party attachment as a predictor of vote.  Bartels 
97
139W. Phillips Shively, "Party Identification, Party Choice, and Voting Stability: 
The Weimar Case," American Political Science Review 66, no. 4 (1972): 1222.
claims that there is no clear evidence of partisan decline in the American 
electorate and the party identification is a still a good predictor of vote.  Dalton 
agrees that “party identification remains a key element in our understanding of 
electoral behavior,” but the American electorate is changing from ritual partisans 
to more sophisticated and cognitive society with a growing number of 
independents and cognitive partisans who make “independent judgments on 
candidates and issues of the day, rather than voting on the basis of habitual party 
loyalties inherited from one’s parents.”140   This chapter utilizes the methods and 
findings of Dalton and Bartels and examines the composition of Polish electorate 
in terms of party attachment and the cognitive mobilization as well as tests the 
predictability of voting choice utilizing the variation in loyalty rates among 
strong, medium, and weak identifiers and non-partisans. This chapter also tests 
the applicability of party attachment in the Polish political setting, by examining 
the stability in the distribution of votes controlled for the party identification for 
the same set of respondents in each survey.
2.  Previous Findings
Informed by the literature, it could be expected that the socio-
psychological model that emphasizes party ID as the most accurate indicator of 
the vote will be the least explanatory in Polish setting.  Specifically, Mishler and 
98
140Dalton, "Partisan Mobilization, Cognitive Mobilization and the Changing 
American Electorate," 284-85.
Rose claim that citizens in post-communist countries have a skeptical attitude 
toward political parties due to their dissatisfaction with the current economic 
situation and low expectations for its improvement.141 The most recent European 
Values Survey also shows that citizens place little trust in political parties.142 
Converse contends that it takes three generations before the electorate will 
psychologically identify itself (or form attachment) with a party under new 
political regimes.143  In the beginning of its democratic transition, political parties 
in Poland frequently changed their names and merged with other parties, a 
practice that was not conducive to building a loyal base and which engendered 
confusion among ordinary voters.  One would argue that the Michigan model of 
voting might be a useful predictor of voting in future elections, because the 
practical dynamics on which the theory rests have not had enough durability in 
present-day Poland. As noted by Beck, a single generation that is sufficiently 
99
141Richard Rose and William Mishler, "Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular 
Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies," 
Journal of Politics 59, no. 2 (1997).
142 "European and World Values Surveys Four-Wave Integrated Data 
File,"  (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association, 
2006).
143Philip E. Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," Comparative Political 
Studies 2, no. 2 (1969). Cited in Harrop and Miller, Elections and Voters: A 
Comparative Introduction.
partisan is able to pass on its loyalties to the next generation.144  On the other 
hand, the generation of voters active in political life during communism might 
show long-term partisan attachments, especially towards the ex-communist 
parties.  Furthermore, if there is weak attachment to a specific political party, 
perhaps loyalty is attached instead to a particular family of parties.145   This 
chapter tests all these speculations and doubts. 
One of the prominent Polish scholars of voting behavior, Radoslaw 
Markowski, noticed that “there is no party system in Poland” as we know it in 
the Western democracies or even newly democratized states in Latin America 
(e.g. Brazil, Bolivia or Peru).146  The only party that has existed in Poland since 
1991 and did not change its name is PSL. He also points out that none of the 
governments that were created since 1991 consisted of the same party 
configuration, even though party leaders appeared several times in different 
100
144Paul Beck, "Socialization Theory of Partisan Realignment," in Controversies in 
American Voting Behavior, ed. Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg (San 
Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976). Cited in Harrop and Miller, Elections and 
Voters: A Comparative Introduction. 
145Compare conclusion by Shabad and Slomczynski, "Political Identities in the 
Initial Phase of Systemic Transformation in Poland: A Test of the Tabula Rasa 
Hypothesis."
146Radoslaw Markowski, "Polska Zdradza Za Kotara " Polityka, September 7 2007. 
Accessed on September 22, 2007, available at http://www.polityka.pl/polak-
zdradza-za-kotara/Lead33,1602,228311,18
political parties throughout this entire period.  As argued by Markowski, the very 
remarkable phenomenon is that voters change their party preferences not only 
from one election to the other (which would be understandable due to the fact 
that parties come and go), but also right after or before an election.   This fact 
indicates (at least from the sociological perspective) the weak link between 
specific social groups and political parties.  As Markowski puts it, “political 
parties lack the social roots…this is evident from indicators of swing voters… 
there are also weak links between political parties and social groups.”147 
Markowski claims that the Polish General Election Studies survey data for 2001 
and 2005 elections shows that around 28% of voters changed their political 
preference: those who cast the ballot in 2001 for leftist parties, voted in 2005 for 
the rightist parties.148  For this scholar, this is an indication of very weak ties 
between the public and the political parties.  Further, Markowski portrays the 
durability of partisan attachment in the form of party switching rates, but we 
need to be cautious when drawing conclusions from finding like this. It depends 
how we treat, for instance, independents or those voters who switch to and from 
101
147Ibid.
148Ibid.
minor parties.149  Unfortunately, it seems that Markowski does not take into 
account which voters changed political parties.  Are they attached partisans or 
independents?  This is one of the subjects of this chapter.  Finally, Markowski’s 
opinion about weak party attachment within the Polish public is not entirely new 
– similar comments and suggestions appear in scholarly research of past decade or 
so indicating the weakness of political identity formation not only in Poland but 
also in other Eastern European countries.  Specifically, previous research pointed 
out that “ordinary citizens, lacking clear partisan referents, found it difficult to 
construct distinct political identities of their own.”150  The justification of such 
assertions is given by referring to the low party membership since the collapse of 
communism, distrust for the political parties as well as the high electoral 
volatility. All of these statements are true, but an important point has to be 
emphasized here: the widespread belief that Polish voters (perhaps the Eastern 
European voters, too) did not develop party ties seems to evolve from research 
which did not focus exclusively on voters.  This chapter, on the other hand, takes 
into account only electors.
102
149A great discussion of this kind of analysis and dangers of misleading 
interpretation that party attachment is subject to frequent change see Green, 
Palmquist, and Schickler, Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the 
Social Identities of Voters, 166-68. 
150Shabad and Slomczynski, "Political Identities in the Initial Phase of Systemic 
Transformation in Poland: A Test of the Tabula Rasa Hypothesis," 692.
If political parties in Poland lack social roots, the question remains what 
factor would create psychological attachment to political parties?  This research 
shows that some voters are attached to political parties; therefore, the social 
roots of political parties seem to exist.  These roots go back to the communist 
past.  On one side, there are political parties that have roots in communism, and 
on the other, there are political parties that arose from opposition to the 
communism.  Further, opposition to communism, first concentrated around the 
Catholic Church, split in the beginning of the 1990s into different fractions 
representing somewhat different ideological perspectives on new polity. This 
divide is less clear as time passes and the polity becomes fully democratized.  The 
divisions within electorate based on the historical past are taken into account 
while estimating the socio-psychological model of voting.
3.  Operationalization, Methods, and Findings
3.1 Party Identification and Stability of Vote
Before I test the socio-psychological model of voting, I need to assess 
whether political identities are stable in the Polish electorate.  As argued by 
Shabad and Slomczynski, the term political identity is “usually operationalized as 
attachment to or identification with or preference for a particular political party 
or alternatively, as a self-placement on the Left-Right continuum.”151   At this 
stage, I utilize party preference over time as a test for political identity. 
103
151Ibid.: 695.
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Analyzing the stability of party preference gives as also a chance to 
(approximately) appraise whether or not voters are attached to political parties 
under the following, although very broad, assumption: if voters are 
psychologically attached to a political party or family of parties, some of them 
should cast their votes for the preferred party in the same way in consecutive 
elections.152  
Tables 8-10 present the cross-tabulation of the distribution of votes for the 
previous and current elections.  Specifically, respondents were asked for which 
political party they voted in the current and previous elections.  The numbers in 
italic font portray the percentage of voters a party lost to other party in current 
comparing to previous elections.  The numbers in regular font show the 
percentage of voters a party gained from other party in current election.  The 
numbers in gray boxes have two numbers: the number in lower right corner 
(bold) illustrates the percentage of voters who stayed loyal to a political party 
from previous election to current election; the numbers in upper left corner (bold-
italic) demonstrate the loyal voters as a percentage of total votes received in 
current elections. 
Looking at Table 8, approximately 80% of voters stayed loyal to the SLD 
and voted again for this party in 1997 election.  Table 9 illustrates very similar 
105
152The best way to investigate the party attachment would be to analyze panel 
data.  Unfortunately, such data is not available for the Polish elections.  
number for SLD/UP supporters where 82.6% of respondents indicated that they 
voted for the SLD/UP in 1997 and again in the 2001 elections.  This pattern is 
broken when we analyze the responses from 2005 survey.  Only 40.4% voters 
declared that they cast a ballot for SLD in 2001 but not in 2005.  Around 82% of 
those who stay with the SLD in 2005 expressed their partisan identification with 
SLD (see Table 14).  Around 40% the voters who supported SLD in 2001 
switched post-solidarity parties such as the Civic Platform (PO) and the Law & 
Justice (PiS).  The reason for such a change might be associated with the 
economic and political scandals and corruption within circles of SLD.  Of course 
such findings can put into question the central claim of the Michigan model, 
namely the psychological attachment to this specific post-communist party.  
These results confirm what has been argued regarding the development of 
party attachment some 20 years ago by Morris P. Fiorina (1981) in Retrospective 
Voting in American National Elections. “When citizens first encounter politics, 
they may inherit the partisan identities of their family and friends, but as they 
accumulate experience, their attachment comes to reflect their assessment of how 
parties have performed in the office”153  This explanation of partisanship by 
referencing to the utility maximizing voters seems to fit the case of 2001 
elections.  
106
153Cited in Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political 
Parties and the Social Identities of Voters, 112. 
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Similar to the SLD, around 80% of voters trusted again parties that 
formed AWS coalition in 1997.  Swing voters for these two political parties 
constitute about 20%.  Further 52% were loyal to UW and 31% moved to AWS, 
3% switched to ROP, 7% to SLD and 4% to PSL.  If we consider UW, AWS, and 
ROP as post-solidarity parties, we can conclude that 86% of voters who voted in 
1993 for UW were loyal to the post-solidarity group of parties.   Similar pattern 
can be seen for other parties.  Comparing 1993 and 1997 election, every 10th 
person out of 100 shifted their vote from SLD to UW and approximately every 
15th person switched from SLD to AWS.  Further, it seems that every 3rd 
supporter of UW in 1993 reallocated its vote to AWS in 1997.
Looking at Table 9 a reader might get the impression that the 
psychological attachment to political parties measured by comparison of votes 
casted by respondents in 1997 and 2001 elections is very weak.  On the other 
hand, it could be argued that voters are psychologically attached to families of 
parties, at least in the framework of post-communist and post-solidarity parties. 
Specifically, in the elections of 2001 many leaders left AWS and formed the LPR, 
the PO, and the PiS.  If we combine the percentages of votes received by these 
political parties (11.2 + 16.6 + 20.6 + 19.3) we end up with 67.7% of votes that 
have been cast in 2001 for the ‘same’ political party, namely ‘old’ AWS. 
The interpretation of Table 10 is very similar to that of Table 9. 
Particularly, 2001 the percentage of voters who stay loyal to a political party 
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from the elections to the 2005 elections ranges from 40.4. to 76.6 (excluding the 
PD/UW).  The vote for the SLD in 2005 diminished significantly and voters 
spread over to the opposition parties that happened to have post-solidarity roots. 
Around 40 % of supporters of the SLD allocated their vote in 2005 to the PiS or 
the PO.  There was also quite significant reallocation of votes within post-
solidarity parties.  For instance, the PO lost 20.9% of voters to the PiS in 2005, 
and the PiS lost about 12% of votes to the PO.  Both of these post-solidarity 
parties gained votes in 2005 from the LPR and the former supporters of AWS. 
Overall, the 2005 survey reveals that more than three-quarters of voters who 
supported post-solidarity parties in 2001 elections did it again in 2005 elections. 
The same cannot be really claimed about the post-communist parties, unless we 
consider the SRP as a New Leftist party (as it proclaimed itself in 2005 electoral 
campaign) which gained 33% of its votes from previous supporters of the SLD/
UP.  To sum up, these groundwork analyses disclose that the political identities 
are present in the Polish electorate at least with the respect to the party families.
Tabulating the previous and current votes by party identification for each 
analyzed election reveals what has not been previously acknowledged by 
researchers.  The responses of those who voted in 1993 and in 1997 elections for 
the same political party as well as expressed the attachment to this party are 
recoded in the first column of Table 11.  Specifically, 78% of respondents who 
voted for the SLD in 1993 and 1997 declared that they feel close to this political 
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party.  The distribution of stability of vote by party identification for these years 
ranges from 64.5% to 81.5%.  This distribution is much lower for the years of 
1997 and 2001, ranging from 46.6% for the AWS to 71% for the PSL.  There 
seems to be a large stability in partisan votes while looking at the last column in 
Table 11.  The distribution ranges from 63% for the SLD to the 89% for the PO. 
On average, around 71% of respondents who voted for the same political party or 
party family in previous and current elections expressed a partisan attachment to 
the same party or party family.154  Such findings might already suggest that the 
Polish voters have developed psychological attachment to political parties in very 
short period of democratic experience.
Table 11. Distribution (%) of Vote for Previous and Current Elections by 
 Declared Party Identification in Current Elections 
1993/1997 1997/2001 2001/2005
SLD 78 64 63
PSL 64.5 71 82.6
AWS 70 46.6 -
UW 81.5 57.9 -
PIS - - 85
PO - - 89
SRP - - 80
LPR - - 76
Mean 73.5 59.9 79.3
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154This average was calculated based on means reported in Table 11.  
Tables 12-14 display the cross-tabulation of party identification with the 
party vote for each election.  In the 1997 elections (Table 12) the larger amount 
of voters who identify themselves being close to a political party are supporters of 
the SLD (95%).  From those who voted for the UW, approximately 68% 
articulated their attachment to this party while the rest cast their votes mostly 
for the AWS (18.25%).  A very similar pattern is evident for the ROP supporters; 
29% of the respondents casted votes for the AWS while expressing their 
proximity to the ROP.  It is worth noting that these three political parties 
emerged from the Solidarity movement.  Further, these parties had very similar 
ideologies in terms of socio-cultural aspects.  Yet, the UW had a more liberal 
stand on economic issues than the AWS and the ROP which were rather 
supporters of welfare state economics. 
Table 12. The distribution (%) of Votes in 1997 by the Party Identification 
Party ID                Party Vote for  Sejm in 1997
UW AWS SLD PSL ROP Others Total
UW 67.88 18.25 5.84 2.92 0.73 4.38 100.00
AWS 1.67 87.50 0.83 2.50 2.92 4.58 100.00
SLD 0.54 1.62 95.14 0.00 0.00 2.70 100.00
PSL 3.85 7.69 1.92 78.85 0.00 7.69 100.00
ROP 0.00 29.03 0.00 0.00 67.74 3.23 100.00
Others 7.41 9.26 22.22 5.56 3.70 51.85 100.00
No Party ID 12.66 40.94 20.10 6.20 5.96 14.14 100.00
Total
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Table 13. The distribution (%) of Votes in 2001 by the Party Identification
Party ID Party Vote for  Sejm in 2001
SLD AWS UW SRP PiS PSL PO LPR Others Total
SLD
AWS
UW
SRP
PiS
PSL
PO
LPR
Others
No Party ID
91.30
6.06
5.88
14.29
8.33
7.55
0.00
0.00
22.22
40.65
0.43
54.55
0.00
0.00
2.78
0.00
2.38
7.41
11.11
2.71
0.00
3.03
64.71
2.38
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.74
3.04
3.03
0.00
73.81
5.56
3.77
2.38
14.29
0.00
13.01
1.74
9.09
0.00
0.00
75.00
1.89
0.00
3.57
22.22
11.18
1.30
0.00
0.00
4.76
0.00
79.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
7.93
1.30
21.21
29.41
4.76
0.00
1.89
95.24
3.57
22.22
13.21
0.87
3.03
0.00
0.00
5.56
3.77
0.00
71.43
11.11
7.93
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.78
1.89
0.00
0.00
11.11
1.65
   100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
Total 43.58 3.78 2.19 11.41 9.47 8.76 12.83 6.82 7.13 100.00
    
Table 14. The distribution (%) of Votes in 2005 by the Party Identification
Party ID       Party Vote for Sejm in 2005
LPR PiS SLD PO PSL SRP Others Total
LPR 84.31 9.80 0.00 0.00 1.96 1.96 1.96 100.00
PiS 2.97 87.24 0.59 3.86 1.19 2.08 2.08 100.00
SLD 0.00 2.60 81.82 3.90 2.60 2.60 6.49 100.00
PO 0.00 7.48 1.18 89.37 0.39 0.39 1.18 100.00
PSL 1.96 3.92 1.96 1.96 82.35 7.84 0.00 100.00
SRP 4.04 7.07 3.03 3.03 4.04 75.76 3.03 100.00
Others 1.49 5.97 8.96 4.48 5.97 2.99 70.15 100.00
No Party ID 8.61 34.02 11.48 21.72 6.56 9.43 8.20 100.00
Total 6.78 35.25 8.98 25.68 6.27 9.75 7.29 100.00
 Table 13 reflects similar results to Table 12 in respect to the SLD.   Again, 
the 2001 elections reflect the similar pattern for the same group of political 
parties.  Particularly, around 21% of the AWS partisans cast the ballot for the 
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PO and 9% for the PiS.  The UW partisans split mostly between the UW and its 
successor the PO. In 2005 elections (Table 14) on average over 80% of 
respondents who expressed partisanship for a particular party, voted for the same 
party.  Again, there is evidence of swing voters within the same group of political 
parties.  An average less than 6% claimed to be close to post-solidarity parties, 
but voted for the post-communist parties during the analyzed elections.  These 
results do not confirm what Markowski claimed in his work discussed above. 
These tables reveal that nothing in the definition of party identification precludes 
voters who identify themselves with one party from voting for another party. As 
put by Dalton “party attachments are distinct from voting preferences…[and] the 
conceptual independence of voting and party identification initially gives the 
latter its significance.”155
 The last issue that needs to be exposed from Tables 12-14 is the 
percentage of independents and their support for the winning party in each 
election.  In the 1997 and 2001 elections they constituted around 40 % and in 
2005 around 34%.  They definitely constitute a large force that determines the 
outcome of elections.  Now the question remains, who are these independents: are 
they disconnected from the political world and change their votes from election to 
election depending were the wind blows or are they truly evaluating partisan 
114
155Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies, 173.
performance?  A similar question should be asked about those who proclaimed 
that they are attached to a political party.
3.2 Cognitive Mobilization and the Polish Electorate
Following Dalton (2007) and cognitive mobilization theory, I constructed 
four groups of voters: ritual partisans, cognitive partisans, apartisans, and 
apoliticals. The ritual partisans are those voters who habitually support a 
political party in the election without much understanding or involvement in 
politics.  The cognitive partisans represent the sophisticated group of partisans 
who “possess the cognitive resources to be involved in politics even when party 
cues are lacking.”156  The apartisans are a group of voters who possess the same 
cognitive skills and resources as cognitive partisans, but they are not attached to 
any of the political parties.  Finally, the apoliticals are those who are “neither 
attached to a political party nor cognitively involved in politics.” 157   Dalton 
argues that distinguishing between apartisans and apoliticals who are usually put 
together into group of independents, clarifies “our understanding of contemporary 
electoral behavior.”158  Again following Dalton, I constructed this typology using 
three variables available in the analyzed surveys.  Specifically, I distinguished 
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156Dalton, "Partisan Mobilization, Cognitive Mobilization and the Changing 
American Electorate," 277.
157Ibid.
158Ibid.
between those respondents who articulated their partisan attachment on the 
initial party identification question, and those who do not.159   The cognitive 
aspect of this typology was operationalized by combining education with the 
interest in politics.160 
     Table 15.  The distribution (%) of mobilization types over time, 1997-2005
Mobilization Type 1997 2001 2005
Voters All Voters All Voters All
Ritual Partisan 31.0 27.2 22.1 17.9 26.5 24.2
Cognitive Partisan 33.2 22.6 27.8 19.7 37.2 25.0
Apartisan 11.1 10.0 20.1 17.8 16.8 17.0
Apolitical 24.7 40.2 30.0 44.6 19.5 33.8
Total 100 100 100
 Table 15 presents the mobilization types over three elections. The 
distribution of partisan types changed substantially from 1997 to 2005.  The 
number of ritual partisans is lower in the 2005 as compared to 1997, but higher 
than in 2001. The percentage of cognitive partisans is higher than ritual partisans 
for these three elections and reached the highest point in 2005 comprising of 
37.2%.  The 2001 electoral studies survey recorded the relatively low number of 
partisans as compared to 1997 and 2005.  In the 2001 elections around 50 % of 
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159Ibid.
160For further description how to create this typology see Ibid., specifically 
footnote 4. 
voters claimed no party attachment at all while in 1997 and 2005 independents 
constituted around 35 %.161 
 Among independents, most voters are apoliticals, but there seems to be a 
growing number of apartisans.  Note that the 2001 elections do not follow the 
pattern predicted by the cognitive mobilization theory which claims that the 
number of apartisans and cognitive partisans should grow from election to 
election while the percentage of ritual partisans and apoliticals ought to decline 
as the educational level of the public expands.  In this sense, more election points 
need to be analyzed to state with confidence that cognitive mobilization is really 
present in the Polish public and there is a decline in the number of the ritual 
partisanship and apoliticals.  Nevertheless, the results in Table 15 disclose 
something interesting about the Polish electorate if compared to the results 
reported by Dalton (2007) about the American voters.  Perhaps surprisingly for 
some, the numbers for these four groups of voters are almost identical for the 
2004 presidential elections in the U.S. as for the 2005 parliamentary elections in 
Poland.162  Does this mean that the Polish voters (similar to the American voters 
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161A very interesting is the number of apolitical voters in 2001 and 2005.  The 
media reports after 2005 electoral victory of PiS proclaimed that this political 
party won elections thanks to uneducated middle and lower class as well as older 
population of church goers. The results presented here put this ‘conventional 
wisdom’ into question.  
162Ibid.: 278.
as portrayed by Dalton) become more sophisticated electors who do not need 
political parties or social cleavages to give them cues?  Again, more data points 
over time is necessary to answer this question, but one point is clear from Table 
15: the Polish electorate is not much different (as claimed by some scholars) from 
at least the U.S. electorate and perhaps other electorates in the developed 
democracies.  Last, but not least, this finding confirms again that the party 
identification is applicable to the Polish political setting.  The rest of the chapter 
focuses on assessing the impact of party identification on the vote choice.
3.3 Impact of Different Levels of Partisan Attachment on Vote 
Choice: Model 1
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are several possibilities to test the 
Michigan Model of voting.  First, instead of tracing the votes for a particular 
party, I analyze the vote for the same group of parties, namely the former 
communists and the post-solidarity.  The justification for such a decision is 
supported by the recent literature on voting behavior in Poland.  For instance, 
Tucker found that Polish voters cast a ballot either for Old Regime or New 
Regime parties with the respect to retrospective economic voting.163
Further, it is reasonable to believe that it is easer for voters to distinguish 
as well as attach to a political party based on the party’s historical root, or, even 
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163Joshua A. Tucker, Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Czech Republic, 1990-1999 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006).
more convincing, to associate a particular party with its leader who was present 
in the opposition or supported the communist system.   As we know from chapter 
one, some political parties disappeared from political arena and new ones were 
created.  Of course this does not mean that leaders of these political parties truly 
disappeared. On the contrary, these “new” political parties were formed by the 
same politicians who advertised or promoted similar or even the same party 
programs.  Usually, the split took place as a result of an ambition of leaders or 
the prediction that an “old” political party would not have a chance to win votes 
in the upcoming elections, for instance, because of the corruption scandals.  Thus, 
I constructed the matrices of “old” and “new” political parties for particular 
elections to test whether voters would vote for the “same” political party.  In 
other words, if party X dissolved before an election and as a result two other 
parties Y and Z emerged, I treated the votes for parties Y and Z as a vote for X 
to examine the trend in psychological attachment. Such an approach allows me to 
test the impact of partisanship on dichotomous dependent variable that 
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represents the votes for post-communist and post-solidarity parties using probit 
regression.164 
Closely following Bartels’ analysis of partisan voting for the U.S. elections 
from 1952 to 1996, I replicated his logic to analyze the recent Polish elections.165 
Particularly, I estimated the influence of partisanship on voting behavior 
employing probit model in which the dependent variable is a vote choice for 
either post-solidarity parties (coded 1) or post-communist parties (coded 0).166 
The covariates represent the three levels of partisan attachment “strong”, 
“medium”, and “weak”. These three categories were created from three survey 
questions.  First, respondents were asked to identify whether or not they feel 
close to any political party.  If the answer was positive, the respondent was asked 
120
164The probit estimation is widely used by econometricians and it has an 
advantage over the logit estimation that “the coefficients may be transformed 
directly into probabilities at particular levels of the independent variables simply 
by using values from a standard normal distribution” John P. Hoffmann, 
Generalized Linear Models (Boston: Pearson: Allyn & Bacon, 2004), 55.  Further, 
the choice between logit and probit estimation seem not to make a much 
difference even though both estimations follow different distribution functions 
William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: 
Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2008), 774.  
165Bartels, "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996."
166The classification of political parties into the post-communist and the post-
solidarity parties is available upon request. 
to name the political party to which he or she feels close to.  The respondent’s 
identification with a political party was then recoded to indicate a group of 
parties, either post-solidarity or post-communist party family.  Further, a 
respondent was asked to identify how close s/he feels to this party with four 
possible answers “very close”, “somewhat close”, “not very close”, and “don’t 
know, hard to say”.167  The category “strong” party attachment includes 
respondents who answer “very close” and was coded 1 for strong identifiers with 
post-solidarity parties, -1 for “strong” identifiers with post-communist parties, 
and 0 for all other voters. The category “medium” identifiers includes 
respondents who answer “somewhat close” and was coded 1 for “medium” 
identifiers with post-solidarity parties, -1 for “medium” identifiers with post-
communist parties, and 0 for all other voters.  The category “weak” includes 
respondents who answer “not very close” and was coded 1 for “weak” identifiers 
with post-solidarity parties, -1 for “weak” identifiers with post-communist 
parties, and 0 for all other voters.  The intercept in probit estimation indicates 
the pro-post-solidarity bias of “pure” independents.  The coefficients for strong, 
medium, and weak attachment, as pointed by Bartels, “reflects the extent to 
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167Category “don’t know/hard to say” was recoded to not very close to a party. 
This category constituted roughly between 3 and 4 percent of respondents 
depending on the dataset. 
which the choices of voters with these various levels of partisan attachment 
departed from the choices of ‘pure’ independents.”168
The results from probit estimation for the parliamentary election of 1997, 
2001, and 2005 are reported in Table 16.  From the coefficients we can simply 
calculate the probabilities at the mean values of covariates using the standard 
normal distribution table.  The calculations reveal that on average we expect 
about 90% of the partisans to vote for the post-solidarity parties in all three 
elections.169  We would expect that the highest probabilities are associated with 
the strong partisans, but this is not true for 1997 and 2001 elections. Surprisingly, 
the highest probability goes to medium partisans, then to weak partisans, and at 
the end to strong partisans in both elections.  Only the 2005 elections follow the 
rationality of partisanship with the hierarchy of probability going from strong to 
weak partisans. The independents were leaning more toward the post-solidarity 
parties in 2005 than in 1997.  The probability that an independent would vote for 
the post-solidarity party in these two elections is 0.7 and 0.6 respectively. There 
is no evidence of any bias of pure independents toward either post-communist or 
post-solidarity parties in 2001 elections. Finally, based on the descriptive 
statistics presented earlier, it is not surprising that the model for 2001 election is 
122
168Ibid.: 38-39.
169Of course there are deviations between elections with the highest percentage 
for 2005 and the lowest for 2001.
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least explanatory and the model for 2005 elections explains the largest portion of 
variance. 
Figure 2.  Estimated Impact of Party Identification on Vote
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 As suggested by Bartels, I computed “the average of the probit estimate, 
each weighted by the proportion of the electorate in the corresponding partisan 
category”.170 The computation of such indicators is “appropriately sensitive both 
to the proportion of party identifiers of various types in the electorate and the 
impact of their partisan attachments in the voting booth”.171  Figure 2 presents 
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170Ibid.: 39.
171Ibid.
these indicators for each election. The noticeable decline of partisanship voting is 
evident in 2001 when compared to previous and subsequent elections.  Both post-
communist and post-solidarity party identifiers discarded their partisan identity 
in 2001. Figure 2 also informs us that the increase in partisan voting from 2001 
to 2005 accounted for 44.6%.  The level of partisan voting decreased from 1997 to 
2001 by 20.5%.  In 2005 a level of partisan voting was 24.1% higher then in 1997 
 To summarize, the analysis reveals that party attachment, operationalized 
in the form of degree of partisanship identification, is an important predictor of 
the vote.  The statistics presented in this model might bring us to the conclusion 
that Polish voters have been developing a psychological attachment to political 
parties. This attachment seems to be associated with the growing number of 
cognitive partisans (Table 15).  As the party volatility diminish and the cognitive 
learning of the partisanship continues (as predicted by the cognitive mobilization 
theory), it could be expected that the party identification would be even better 
predictor of vote in the future elections. It is not to say that there could not be a 
downturn in the partisanship identification as it was in the 2001 elections.172 
Nevertheless, it is evident form these analyses that voters are learning how to be 
partisans. 
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172Again, more time-series data on elections is necessary to evaluate these 
speculations.
3.4 Impact of Party Identification, Ideological Orientations and
    Group Interests on Vote Choice: Model 2
So far, this chapter focused only on the partisanship attachment.  Further 
investigation follows the recommendations of the recent scholarship on the socio-
psychological model of voting.  Specifically, I utilize the same method of 
estimation as above but expand the analysis by including in addition to party 
identification covariates that capture voters’ ideological orientations and their 
groups’ interests.173  As pointed out by Green et al. (2002) “if a sequence or 
regressions reveals that the apparent influence of party disappears after one 
controls for factors that potentially cause party identification, the implication is 
that the correlation between party and the vote is spurious.”174   There is no 
doubt in the literature on voting behavior that people are socialized into 
partisanship by  their  experience  with  group members  broadly  defined.  Social 
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173As pointed out by Green et al., the literature on voting behavior is divided 
between those who argue that either ideology or party identification should be 
included in the estimation models and those who argue that ideology is useless 
predictor of vote because only small fraction of electorate is capable of casting 
the ideological vote. Green et al., on the other hand, argues that it is appropriate 
to include both of this measure into one equation.  As argued in the following, 
this chapter follows this suggestion.  Compare Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 
Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters, 
207. Ibid., 213-14. 
174Ibid., 207.
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groups help people to create stereotypes of the parties and used them as 
information short-cut.175  The Polish electorate could learn partisanship from the 
former communist party (the PZPR) or the Catholic Church and transform it 
into the party preference at least during the first several democratic elections.176 
Therefore, besides the ideological orientations of voters measured by the left-right 
self-placement, I also employ two other covariates that capture the group interest 
and are associated with the process of partisanship learning.177   Particularly, 
church attendance and the membership in the PZPR enter the estimation 
equation as a set of dummy variables coded 1 for the positive responses and 0 
otherwise.  Finally, the party identification variable was coded 1 if a respondent 
identified himself/herself with post-solidarity party and  coded -1 if a respondent 
identified himself/herself with post-communist parties; code 0 was assigned to 
independents.
Table 17 presents the probit estimates on vote share in the examined 
elections.  First, we notice that communist membership and church attendance 
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175Of course people can think outside these stereotypes, by using the incoming 
information to change their minds and update their views, as argued by the 
cognitive mobilization theory. 
176It is obvious that the influence of the membership in the PZPR is going to 
diminish as time passes and older generation dies out.  
177The ten point left-right self-placement coded from -0.5 to 0.5 where negative 
values indicate left and positive values right self placement.
played a role in voting behavior in the 1997 elections, but not in the later 
elections.  In other words, political divisions of the past were present is the 1997 
elections and declined as time passed; similarly, the social cleavage defined as 
religion declined comparing 1997 elections and 2001 elections.  These findings 
confirm what the analysis of sociological model of voting suggested in the 
previous chapter.  On the other hand, controlling for these two covariates this 
model does not improve the accuracy of prediction.  Specifically, the percentage 
correctly predicted goes from 71% to 72%, a one percentage difference.178  These 
group interest variables do not add anything at all to the predictability of the 
model for the 2001 and 2005 elections.179
129
178The percentage predicted correctly for the examined elections without control 
variables is available upon request.
179It is worthy noting here that in order to properly test the influence of these 
two covariates on the formation of partisanship and then the vote choice, the 
structural equations model should be applied.  But the estimation procedure for 
the binary dependent variable and some binary independent variables is not 
available in any available statistical software; it is also quite difficult to program 
this kind of estimation to get the correct standard errors even in the powerful 
open-source software such as R. Thus, the results presented here for the control 
variables need to be interpreted with caution. For the description of such 
estimation see Takeshi Amemiya, Advanced Econometrics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985).
Special attention should also go to the constant, which reflects the pro-
post-solidarity bias of ‘pure’ independents and those who are neutral on the left-
right self-placement and without previous communist party membership and 
without church attendance.  While the constant is only significant for 2005 
elections, the sign reflect the direction of this bias. In particular, the 
independents were more likely to vote for post-solidarity parties in 1997 and 2005 
elections and post-communist parties in 2001.  Note that post–solidarity parties 
won the 1997 and 2005 elections and post-communist parties 2001 elections.  This 
might suggest that the independents, at least in 2005, determine the outcome of 
elections.  Further, Table 17 suggests that the effect of ideological attachment is 
larger than party attachment while predicting or explaining the votes in all but 
the 2005 elections.  For instance, each unit increase in the left-right self-
placement (moving from left to right on the political spectrum) is expected to 
increase on average the probability of voting for post-solidarity parties about 0.8 
in the 1997 election, 0.98 in 2001 elections and 0.27 in 2005 elections.180  The 
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180These numbers represent the marginal effects that were computed at mean 
values for “left-right self-placement” and “party id”; the marginal effects for 
covariates “communist party membership” and “church attendance” are the 
discrete changes from 0 to 1.  Full set of marginal effects is available upon 
request. Please note that party ID has a range of 2 (from -1 to +1), thus the 
coefficient for the ID in Table 17 is multiplied by 2 to be able to compare this 
coefficient with the coefficients of the other variables.
coefficients in Table 17 are interpreted using predicted probabilities presented in 
Figures 3-5.
Figure 3. Probabilities of Voting for the Post-Solidarity Parties in 1997 Elections
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These figures present the probability of voting for post-solidarity parties. 
More specifically, these probabilities are graphed as the function of the left-right 
self-placement. They were calculated for average voter distinguishing between 
those who identified themselves as close to or distanced from post-solidarity 
parties.  The distribution of probabilities for 1997 and 2001 elections look similar 
while the probabilities for 2005 election are noticeably different from previous 
estimates.  In particular, Figures 3-4 demonstrate the likelihood for voting for 
post-solidarity parties for voters who are attached to this family of parties and 
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placed themselves right-of-center is between 0.9 and 1. This likelihood is even 
higher for 2005 elections, ranging from 0.95 to 1.
Figure 4. Probabilities of Voting for the Post-Solidarity Parties in 2001 Elections
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The probability of voting for post-solidarity parties as a function of left-
right self-placement for the independents approximates linear function for all 
three elections.  Figures 3-4 show that those voters who placed themselves in the 
middle of ideological distribution are predicted to vote for the post-communist 
parties almost with the same probabilities as for the post-solidarity parties 
(Pr=0.59 in 1997 and Pr=0.52 in 2001).  This finding suggests that the 
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ideological perspective was a benchmark for independents while casting the vote 
in 1997 and 2001 elections. 
 
Figure 5. Probabilities of Voting for the Post-Solidarity Parties in 2005 Elections
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 Figure 5 presents the independents as lining toward the post-solidarity 
parties while casting the ballot. This finding is also confirmed by the estimated 
constant in Table 17.  Further, independents who placed themselves left-of-center 
on the ideological scale are more likely to vote for the post-solidarity parties in 
2005 election comparing to previous elections.  Figure 5 requires special attention 
in terms of party identification for those who are attached to one of the party 
families.  Specifically, the bottom and top lines are more flat, linear, and further 
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apart from each other, indicating a larger effect of party identification on vote 
share compared to the previous elections.  The calculated probabilities for the 
2005 elections suggest that the left-right self-placement does not have as large 
influence on the probability of vote as in the previous elections if a respondent 
expressed the attachment to one of the post-solidarity parties.  This might mean 
that the left-right spectrum could change its meaning for some voters; instead of 
classification based on the socio-cultural and historical divides, perhaps some of 
the Polish voter started to perceive left-right dimension in the economic terms. 
This speculation is justified on the bases of party programs and the electoral 
campaign during which most of the post-solidarity parties emphasized the welfare 
state.  This issue is further investigated in the last part of the chapter.
3.5 Multinomial Logit Estimation: Model 3
A final step to test the socio-psychological model of voting is to examine whether 
or not the influence of party identification on voting choices holds for the different 
groups of political parties.  Therefore, I constructed the dependent variable to reflect three 
different groups of parties that are associated with the programmatic stands on the socio-
cultural and economic issues.  While classifying the parties into groups, I also referred to 
the European Union party associations to assess parties’ affiliation within the 
parliamentary  structures.  Specifically, I categorized the political parties into social 
conservatives, liberal conservatives and social democrats.  The group of social 
conservatives consists of parties that are pro-welfare state and have conservative views 
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on the socio-cultural issues.  Liberal conservatives have the same stand on the socio-
cultural issues as social conservatives but their view of economic policies differs from 
social conservatives in the way that they are supporting more economic liberalism.  The 
social democrats have similar views on economic policies as social conservatives, but 
they  are very liberal compared to social democrats.  Most  of the post-solidarity  parties 
belong either to the group of social conservatives or liberal conservatives while social 
democrats mostly comprise of post-communist parties.181
The independent variables that represent the party  identification are based on the 
initial question used in the survey “which party  respondents feels close to?” and recoded 
to reflect three groups of parties described above.  In particular, the independents were 
always coded 0 while 1 was assigned to respondents who identify  themselves as close to 
a political party  family  and -1 to others. For example, the social conservative party 
identification variable was coded 1 for those who identify with this group of political 
parties; code 0 was given to independents and code -1 to others.  The same logic was 
applied to two other variables representing party  identification.  The same control 
variables are used in statistical model, namely  church attendance and the communist 
party  membership.  The method of estimation is the multinomial logit extensively 
described in chapter 3.
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181The names of the parties classified into these three groups are available to reader upon 
request.  
Table 18.  Multinomial Logit Estimates – Model 3 
 
Category “Social Democrats” is the base outcome.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *p<0.1, **p<0.05,              
*** p<0.01,  ****p<0.001 two-tailed test.   
 Election of 1997 Election of 2001 Election of 2005 
Coef./S.E. Odds  Ratio Coef/S.E. Odds Ratio Coef/S.E. Odds Ratio 
So
cia
l C
on
ser
va
tiv
es 
 
Left-Right  
Self-Placement 
 
4.766**** 
(.5865) 
117.47 5.312**** 
.6257 
202.6593 4.0720**** 
(.6788) 
58.6755 
Party ID 
Social Democrats 
 
-.8967****  
(.2808) 
.4079 -1.158***  
(.3908) 
.3142 -1.4383**** 
(.3889) 
.2373 
Party ID 
Liberal Conservatives 
 
.716**   
(.2852) 
2.047 -.0315  
(.3073) 
.969 .0836 
(.3707) 
1.0872 
Party ID 
Social Conservatives 
 
1.607****    
(.2649) 
4.9852 .7621**   
(.3787) 
2.1428 1.161*** (.4071) 3.1933 
Communist Party   
Membership 
 
-.593* 
(.3447) 
.55283 -.0823 
(.4341) 
.9209 -.0650 
(.5441) 
.937 
Church Attendance 
 
 
.833**** 
(.2563) 
2.3001 .4458* 
(.2598) 
1.5618 .4409 
(.3582) 
1.5542 
Constant (pro-Social 
Conservatives bias of 
“pure” independents) 
-.3796 
(.2409) 
 -.3487 
(.2279) 
 .3864 
(.3494) 
 
Li
be
ral
 C
on
ser
va
tiv
es 
 
Left-Right  
Self-Placement 
 
3.073**** 
(.5711) 
21.606 4.768**** 
(.6093) 
117.7398 3.6756**** 
(.6606) 
39.4739 
Party ID 
Social Democrats 
 
-1.012***   
(.3804) 
.36358 -1.87****   
(.3665) 
.1539 -1.4625**** 
(.4004) 
.2317 
Party ID 
Liberal Conservatives 
 
1.556****     
(.4303) 
4.7412 .8635**   
(.3748) 
2.3714 1.0849*** 
(.3935) 
2.9592 
Party ID 
Social Conservatives 
 
.1755 
(.3272) 
1.1918 -.7455**   
(.3475) 
.4745 -.2613 
(.3997) 
.77 
Communist Party   
Membership 
 
-1.255*** 
(.4754) 
.28506 -.6844 
(.6227) 
.5044 -.5608 
(.5619) 
.5707 
Church Attendance 
 
 
.3334 
(.2983) 
1.3958 .0874 
(.2833) 
1.0914 -.0313 
(.3538) 
.9691 
Constant(pro-Liberal 
Conservatives bias of 
“pure” independents) 
-1.03**** 
(.2985) 
 -.4741* 
(.2517) 
 .4613 
(.3439) 
 
 N = 1036 
Wald ²(12)  =  380.4 
Pseudo R²  =  0.4720 
Log  pseudolikelihood  =        
-553.68807 
N  =  864 
Wald ²(12) =  257.9 
Pseudo  R²   =  0.4001 
Log  pseudolikelihood  =       
-554.10855 
N =  804 
Wald ²(12)  =  394.4 
Pseudo  R²  =  0.5248 
Log  pseudolikelihood   =         
-379.8602 
136
 Table 18 presents the estimated coefficient and odds ratios.  The effects of party 
identification, ideology  and social groups’ interests on voters’ choice are on average 
strongly moderate.  The pseudo R-squared ranges between 0.4 in the 2001 elections and 
0.52 in the 2007 elections.   The model predicts  40%  of the variance in vote  preferences 
the for the 1997 elections.  The postestimation techniques allow us to calculate the 
predicted probabilities for each group of political parties.  
 The prediction based on the specified model for the 1997 elections works best  for 
social conservatives where 49% is correctly predicted.  For social democrats the 
percentage correctly predicted constitutes 37% and for liberal conservatives only  13%. 
In the 2001 elections the highest prediction of 43.9% goes to social democrats while the 
probability  of voting for liberal conservatives is 23.6% and for social conservatives 
32.4%.  In 2005 elections the predictions are as follows: social conservatives 63%, 
liberal conservatives 29.8%, and social democrats 7.2%.  It seems that probability of 
voting for the specific group of parties is higher if the group won the election.  This could 
indicate the bias in the survey responses, the possibility that cannot be excluded.  
The notable finding is that this model best predicts the vote preference for two 
groups of party  families that are distinct in terms of socio-cultural stands and the political 
histories, namely social conservatives and social democrats.  The reason for this is the 
vast impact of the ideological orientation on the vote choice.  The odds of voting for 
social conservative relative to social democrats are 117.4 (in 1997), 202.6 (in 2001) 58.7 
(in 2005) times greater for those who identify themselves on the right-of-center 
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ideological spectrum, holding party identifications, church attendance and communist 
party  membership  constant.  We can clearly see that  the impact of ideology is immense, 
but also declining over time.  On the other hand, the odds of voting for liberal 
conservative compared to social democrats are 21.6 (in 1997), 117.7 (in 2001) and 39.5 
(in 2005) times greater for those who identify themselves on the right-of-center of the 
ideological spectrum, holding other variables constant.  Adding the substantive meaning 
to these odds ratios, the conclusion is straight forward: those voters who placed 
themselves right-of-center are more likely  to vote for social conservatives or liberal 
conservative than those whose ideological orientation is left-of-center.  In other words, 
when voters identify themselves on the right-of center ideological spectrum, we could be 
confident that out of 100 voters at  least 95 would vote either for social conservatives or 
liberal conservatives parties; to simplify even more, voters with this particular ideological 
orientation would support  post-solidarity  parties rather then post-communist parties. 
Further, our understanding of the left-right dimension of the Polish electorate seems to be 
founded on socio-cultural-historical bases rather then economic ones. This was not very 
clear, at least for 2005 elections, from binary logit estimation presented above. 
Note that the impact of ideology  on voting choice is greater while the impact of 
party  identification is smaller.  This is specifically true for the 2001 elections.  To analyze 
the impact of party identification on vote choice we look again on odds ratios.  The odds 
of voting for social conservative relative to social democrats are 4.9 (in 1997), 2.1(in 
2001), and 3.2 (in 2005) times greater for those who claim to feel close to social 
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conservative parties, holding other independent variables constant.  Further, social 
conservatives’ partisans are not likely to vote for social democrats and vice versa. Again 
there is a pattern indicating the decline of partisan voting in 2001.  To sum up, those 
voters who are attached to a specific group  of parties are more likely to vote for them 
than those who do not hold such affection. 
The previous analysis showed that the independents were more inclined to vote 
for post-solidarity  parties.  This results reported in Table 18 might give us a wrong 
impression of inconsistency.  Specifically, the signs of the coefficients are negative 
indicating the there was a pro-social conservative bias of pure independents.  This 
interpretation is only partially  true.  Estimating the model again with the liberal 
conservatives as a base outcome reveals that the “pure” independents vote rather for 
social democrats or social conservatives than liberal conservatives.  The constant is a 
little larger for the social conservatives than social democrats.  
Finally, this estimation confirms previous findings regarding the communist party 
membership and the church attendance.  Both of these covariates were significant 
determinants of vote for social conservatives in 1997.  To translate the odds ratio for 
church attendance in 1997 for social conservatives, imagine a voter who does not attend 
the church at all and his chance of voting for social conservatives are 50%.  If this voter 
starts to attend the church at least  3 times a month, the probability of voting for social 
democrats would increase to 59.9%, ceteris peribus.  The church goers also supported 
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social conservatives in 2001 but not in 2005.  The communist party membership is not 
significant for the last two elections. 
To sum up, it is apparent that the voting behavior can be explained in part by 
reference to psychological orientations that  form ideology  as well as party  attachments. 
It is also clear that the influence of ideological orientation exceeds the influence of the 
party identification in all but the 2005 elections.
4.  Conclusion
This chapter provided an extensive analysis of various dimensions of the 
Michigan model of voting.  Specifically, it was shown that the previous doubts present in 
the literature on electoral behavior in Poland about the formation of political identities 
might not hold anymore as the democratization process goes on and voters learn how to 
understand the new political and electoral settings.   Partisan attachments and identities 
found in the Polish electorate demonstrate that political identities are in the process of 
formation.  Party attachments seem to serve as heuristics in the electoral process and they 
are fine predictor of vote.  The applicability of the commonly used explanatory 
framework for the voting behavior might lead us to conclude that the Polish electorate 
does not seem to be very  different from other polities.  Even though this study utilized 
only a tiny part of the socio-psychological model of voting, I believe the findings suggest 
the importance of exploring further the various approaches to voting behavior already 
developed and tested on the established democracies.  Thus, the message from this 
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chapter is clear: the Michigan model of voting is applicable to Poland and perhaps to 
other newly emerged democracies. 
The contribution of this chapter to existing research is definitely the addition of 
the neglected concept of party identification and to some extent voters’ ideological 
orientations for prediction and explanation of voting choices.  Classifications of the 
political parties into family groups and the estimation of voting choices based on the 
variation in loyalty rates among partisans and non-partisans and the application of 
cognitive mobilization theory to the Polish electoral behavior brings the remarkable 
possibilities for future investigations of partisan voting. 
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CHAPTER FIVE                                            
ECONOMIC MODELS OF VOTING
Previous chapters indicated the explanatory powers of various models of 
voting behavior.  This chapter focuses on economic voting and examines whether 
rational choice methodology and western-style rational voter perception actually 
fit the case of Poland.  Researchers differ in their evaluations of the economic 
model of voting by employing the aggregate and individual levels of analyses. 
Following this divide, this chapter consists of two parts.  The first part employs 
the regional level data to examine the voter’s reaction to the past economic 
condition (retrospective hypothesis).  In other words, this analysis is based on the 
number of actual votes the political parties/coalitions received in each 
administrative region in last three elections. 
 The second part of this chapter utilizes the survey microdata and tests the 
so called retrospective hypothesis, which states that voters react more to the past 
economic events that relate to their pocketbook finances than to expected ones as 
well as prospective hypothesis, which states that voters’ future perception of the 
economy matters more in their voting decisions than their past economic status. 
To examine these hypotheses, I test the retrospective and prospective model of 
egotropic as well as  the sociotropic  economic  voting.   It is expected that  both
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levels of analysis will confirm the thesis that economically satisfied voters will 
reward the incumbent parties, whereas voters that are unhappy economically will 
punish the incumbent parties by voting for parties in opposition.
1.  Theory of Economic Voting in the Comparative Context
The theory of economic voting, based on the American school of rational 
choice, goes back to the 1960s and 1970s and includes two basic ideas.  First, 
voters are rational.  Because they are rational, they are capable of making 
rational judgments based upon past conditions or events.182 Second, these rational 
voters are knowledgeable about the performance of the economy.183  Further, the 
proponents of economic voting agree in general that there are factors that 
influence the perception of economic voters.  As pointed out by Harrop et al., 
party identification influences economic voters in the U.S. whereas class and 
religious identities persuade voters in Europe to interpret selectively political and 
economic events. The remarkable point in the entire economic voting literature is 
that voters are perceived and analyzed as consumers; they acquire brand loyalties 
(through party identification, class or religion) but they are also willing to change 
a brand if the performance of an incumbent party drops significantly or if fresh 
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182See for instance V. O. Key and Milton C. Cummings, The Responsible 
Electorate; Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960 (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1966), 7-9.
183See for instance Gerald H. Kramer, "Short Term Fluctuations in the U.S. 
Voting Behavior, 1896-1964," American Political Science Review 65, no. 1 (1971).
ideas and new parties emerge.  To some extent, it could be argued from the 
perspective of economic voting that electors choose political parties the same way 
as they choose their washing detergent in the supermarket. If the washing 
detergent is harming the environment and/or it is destroying the consumers’ 
cloths, the clients will change it for a different brand even if they were attached 
to this brand for various reasons and for a long time. In other words, consumers/
voters who believe that the specific brand is harming the environment/economy, 
but not necessarily their clothes/personal finances, will change it to a different 
one.  This corresponds to the sociotropic model of voting.  Those consumers/
voters who blame the specific brand for their own misfortunes will also change 
the brand to a different one.  This corresponds to the egotropic model of voting. 
The literature on economic voting indicates how well these two models 
perform in different countries and relates it to the well known ‘clarity of 
responsibility’ hypothesis proposed by Powell, Whitten and Palmer.184  For 
instance, current research points out that in Denmark the egotropic model is 
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184G. B. Powell and Guy D.  Whitten, "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic 
Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context," American Journal of Political 
Science 37, no. 2 (1993): 408.  Guy D. Whitten and Harvey D. Palmer, "Cross-
National Analyses of Economic Voting," Electoral Studies 18, no. 1 (1999): 59.
stronger than the sociotropic model whereas the opposite is evident in the U.S.185 
One would ask why the citizens of the social welfare state are concerned more 
about their pocketbook finances than the citizens of neo-liberal system.  One of 
the plausible explanations in the literature points out to the cultural values of 
citizens in different states.  In the liberal democracies, like the U.S., citizens are 
responsible for their own fortune or misfortune, not government(s). In the social 
democracies, like Denmark, where governments have higher responsibility for the 
individuals’ welfare, the government(s) is blamed for the decline of personal 
finances.186  Also, basic security provided by the state is greater in Denmark, so 
Danes have more freedom to worry about their personal situation.  Testing the 
sociotropic and egotropic models of voting in Poland would also allow to access 
whether or not the Polish voters behave similarly to the American or Danish 
voters when casting a ballot for their representatives.187
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185Peter Nannestad and Martin Paldam, "The Grievance Asymmetry Revisited: A 
Micro Study of Economic Voting in Denmark, 1986–1992," European Journal of 
Political Economy 13, no. 1 (1997).  David Sanders, "Government Popularity and 
the Next General Election," Political Quarterly 62, no. 2 (1991). 
186Certainly there is a clear link between state of national economy and the 
personal finances.
187The pre-analysis of voters’ responses to the surveys questions (1997, 2001, and 
2005) about the government responsibility of citizen’s welfare and the dependence 
of households’ situation on governmental policies show that the Polish voter acts 
similarly to the American voter.
Further, the theory of economic voting diverges into two groups.  One 
group believes that voters reward governments for good times and punish them 
for bad times.  In other words, voters are perceived as very brutal since they are 
concerned with results, not policies. ‘What have you accomplished in past 4 
years?” is a question for incumbent parties posted by voters.  Further, the reward 
or punishment of political parties in power is closely linked to voters’ evaluations 
of economic problems, such as unemployment.
The other perspective on economic voting portrays citizens as those who 
perform their search for the party based on policy preferences.  The policy 
oriented voters make judgments about the responsibility of political party on 
various aspects of socio-economic spectrum, such as welfare state policies.  This 
chapter implements these two paths within the theory of economic voting by 
employing various independent variables that correspond to the performance 
evaluations and the policies concerns.  
The issue of economic voting was revitalized and improved by the 
numerous scholars interested in this subject in the mid-1980s, such as Michael S. 
Lewis-Beck and his books Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: The 
United States and Western Europe and Economics and Elections.188  The main 
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188Eulau and Lewis-Beck, Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: The 
United States and Western Europe, Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The 
Major Western Democracies.
argument presented by Lewis-Beck is that national economic performance 
(measured by macroeconomic indicators) may be used to predict electorate 
support for the government in power when analyzing Western developed countries 
such as France, Great Britain, and the United States. 
It appears that, when testing the theory of economic voting (in the cases 
of states that have democratic systems), researchers have reached a consensus 
that economic conditions/factors influence voting behavior.  For instance, 
Richard Nadeau et al. found a relationship between governmental responsibility 
for public policy and economic voting.189  Christopher J. Anderson dealt with the 
similar problem of governmental responsibility, but his argument was that it is 
more difficult to assign responsibility to the government in some systems than in 
others.190  As an example of Anderson’s argument, G. D. Whitten et al. pointed 
out that “multiparty governments will concentrate more on improving growth …
[if] incumbent parties cannot agree on whether to focus on reducing inflation or 
unemployment.”191 Scholars from this tradition usually use unemployment, wages, 
taxes, etc. as they key economic variables. The use of these macroeconomic 
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189See Richard Nadeau, Richard G.  Niemi, and Antoine  Yoshinaka, "A Cross-
National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context 
across Time and Nations," Electoral Studies 21, no. 3 (2002).
190See Christopher J.  Anderson, "Economic Voting and Political Context: A 
Comparative Perspective," Electoral Studies 19, no. 2-3 (2000).
191Whitten and Palmer, "Cross-National Analyses of Economic Voting," 52.
variables is based on scholarly suggestions that voters may take the national 
economy into account more than their personal financial circumstances or social 
benefits.192 This chapter tests this statement by analyzing the voter’s behavior by 
focusing on the voters’ subjective perception and evaluation of economy as well 
as objective measures of economic security collected on the regional level. 
The main articles written on economic voting in Poland were discussed in 
chapter 1.  Yet it seems to be appropriate to extend the research on economic 
voting to the literature that focuses on East-Central Europe after 1989 to have a 
broader perspective on the application of the theory in question. There are two 
main articles that examine regional economic voting in the post communist 
countries.193
 First, the article by Jan Fidrmuc “Economics of Voting in Post-
Communist Countries” analyzes elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
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192See for instance Simon Blount, "Unemployment and Economic Voting," 
Electoral Studies 21, no. 1 (2002): 92.
193Besides these two articles there is also article with a case study on elections in 
Poland.  See N. Mikhailov, R. Niemi, and D. Weimer, "Application of Theil 
Group Logit Methods to District-Level Vote Shares: Tests of Prospective and 
Retrospective Voting in the 1991, 1993, and 1997 Polish Elections," Electoral 
Studies 21, no. 4 (2002). The other articles are: Marcus A. G. Harper, "Economic 
Voting in Postcommunist Eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 
9 (2000). and A. C. Pacek, "Conditions and Electoral-Politics in East-Central-
Europe," American Journal of Political Science 38, no. 3 (1994).
Poland, and Slovakia.  Fidrmuc’s findings are consistent with the theory of 
economic voting in that he discovers that voters who benefit from the reforms 
“vote for the right wing pro-reform parties whereas those who have become worse 
off vote for the left wing parties.”194 His findings also indicate that unemployment 
strongly reduces support for parties in power.195   The second article written by 
Joshua A. Tucker (2001) argues that there is empirical evidence that “economic 
conditions help Primary Incumbents more often then Other Incumbents.”196  In 
other words, economic conditions have a strong relationship to the political 
success of parties in power.
2.  Regional Economic Voting 
2.1 Voting Behavior and Regional Analysis
In his book Parties and Politics in Post-1989 Poland, Hubert Tworzecki 
emphasized the importance of region and history in both party system formation 
and voting behavior.197   Based upon Tworzecki’s argument, this paper extends 
the approach of regional analysis of political behavior to the regional analysis of 
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194Fidrmuc, "Economics of Voting in Post-Communist Countries," 199.
195Fidrmuc, "Political Support for Reforms: Economics of Voting in Transition 
Countries," 1498.  Tucker, "Economic Conditions and the Vote for Incumbent 
Parties in Russia, Poland, Hungry, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic from 1990 
to 1996," 318.
196Ibid.: 323.
197Tworzecki, Parties and Politics in Post 1989 Poland, 83.
voting.  If the local context matters because of geographical differences in 
political power and economic wealth, then it is obvious that the regional analysis 
of voting behavior is justified.   It may be argued that every country contains 
both “core” and “peripheral” regions, at least in the context of economic 
prosperity.  The same is true for Poland.  The East, North-East, and South-East 
regions are less developed and therefore represent the periphery while West, 
North-West, and South-West are generally wealthier, with the Central regions 
representing a type of “center ground” on the scale of economic prosperity. 
Further, a continued psychological acceptance of communist norms is more 
evident in some regions then the others.198 
Following Tworzecki’s work, I could divide Poland into geographical 
regions according to cultural and historical contexts.  Yet, such approach would 
eliminate a detailed breakdown available on the level of administrative units 
(wojewodztwo) as well as decrease the number of observations for the analysis 
(the well known small-N problem). Further, due to the fact that Polish 
administrative units changed, the smaller units of analysis applicable to the 1997 
elections had to be aggregated to match administrative division relevant for the 
later elections.  In other words, to create the balanced panel dataset for the 1997, 
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198Compare Wojciech Dziemianowicz et al., Nowe Wojewodztwa. Fakty, Opinie, 
Nastroje (Warszawa: Polska Agencja Rozwoju Gospodarczego i Centrum Badania 
Opini Spolecznej, 2001), 127-41.
2001 and 2005 elections Poland was restructured into administrative units 
according to the new administrative division instituted in 1999.199  The reason to 
create the balanced panel data set is to increase the number of observations for 
analysis and ability to generalize from the broader perspective whether or not the 
Polish voters behave as homo economicus. 
2.2  Independent variables – regional level data
The theory of economic voting and previous research indicate that the state 
of national economy, measured by the growth rate in gross domestic product 
(GDP), unemployment, inflation, income, public health expenditure, and even 
public spending on education explain voting behavior.  Since part of this chapter 
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199As noted by David Jesuit et al., “due to the reform of Poland’s Provinces in 
1999, the regional aggregations for Poland 1999 are not exactly comparable to the 
groupings in 1992 and 1995” David K. Jesuit, Michael Förster, and Timothy 
Smeeding, "Regional Poverty and Income Inequality in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study,"  (Luxembourg: 
Luxembourg Income Study, Working Paper 324, 2002), 5. To overcome this 
obstacle, I collected the actual number of votes on the smallest unit of analysis 
(gmina) and aggregated it into larger wojewodztwo (voivodoship).  In the case of 
income inequality and poverty data from LIS, it was impossible to disaggregate 
the larger units into smaller and reconstruct them into larger based on gmina. 
Similar problem was encounter with other independent variables, such as 
unemployment and GDP growth available only on the voivodoship.  Therefore I 
used approximation to much the old administrative divisions with the new ones 
for all independent variables while employing balanced panel data estimation.
focuses on the regional level votes, it is impossible to collect the data for all these 
economic factors.  Thus, to examine the effects of the national economy on voting 
behavior, I employ the measure of unemployment, GDP growth, poverty, and 
income inequality.  
As argued by many rational choice scholars, unemployment is crucial when 
analyzing the economy of voting.200  High unemployment rates indicate the 
economic problems that are certainly evaluated by the voters. As suggested by 
previous research, higher unemployment would generate the vote against the 
incumbent parties.  Analysis on the regional level utilize the annual percentage of 
the rate of unemployment measured as a percentage of total labor force and 
refers to the share of the labor force that registered as unemployed and available 
for and seeking employment.201  
Usually the measure of economic prosperity is based on the GDP growth 
rate. Since the Statistical Office of Poland provides only data on GDP per capita 
for each administrative region, the approximation of growth had to be calculated. 
Specifically, I computed the percentage change of GDP per capita using the 
figures from the year of election and a preceding year and corrected them for the 
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200See for instance discussion on which variables to choose when analyzing 
economy of voting, and why to choose unemployment in Blount, "Unemployment 
and Economic Voting."
201Glówny Urzad Statystyczny, "Rocznik Statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej," 
in Seria Roczniki Statystyczne (Warszawa: Glówny Urzad Statystyczny, 2001).
inflation that was measured on the national level.  Similar to the unemployment 
rate, the theory of economic voting suggests that the slow or lack of economic 
growth signify some economic difficulty that should is evaluated by the voters at 
the ballot box.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that the higher economic growth on 
the regional level would bring the same or greater number of votes for incumbent 
parties.  
There is almost no evidence of utilizing the income inequality and poverty 
data in analysis of economic voting for one obvious reason: lack of data.202  Yet 
there is a justification for using both measures as indicators of economic voting 
behavior.  It might be argued that voters living in the regions were there is a 
large number of poor people may have inclination to support political parties 
that would maintain “a higher rate of growth of the public sector of the economy, 
larger central government budgets, more income equalization, greater efforts to 
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202For instance, Andrew Leigh employed Gini index in his analysis of economic 
voting in Australia. Yet there is no evidence of income inequality measures 
utilized in the economic voting behavior in Eastern Europe in general and Poland 
in particular. See Andrew Leigh, "Economic Voting and Electoral Behavior: How 
Do Individual, Local, and National Factors Affect the Partisan Choice?," 
Economics & Politics 17, no. 2 (2005). 
reduce unemployment, and more emphasis on education, public health, and social 
welfare spending.”203 
This logic would obviously generate votes for the socio-economic politics of 
“western style” Left-oriented governments.  Interestingly, each political party that 
received the most votes in last several parliamentary elections could be placed on 
the left side of the economic equality spectrum.  Further, a notion of Left-party 
among Polish voters has been associated with parties and institutions prior to 
1989 or its continuity after 1989.  On the Right-side of the political spectrum, 
voters perceived political parties and governments that emerged after 1989 and 
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203Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus 
Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 
132.
were in the opposition to the former communist party.204  Therefore, in case of 
Poland, the votes for the socio-economic politics of “western style” Left-oriented 
governments could be perceived as economic votes for an incumbent party if 
poverty is low.205   Further, if the national economy is not growing as expected 
and poverty is increasing voters are likely to vote for the opposition or alternative 
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204Renata Siemienska, "Zmieniajacy Sie Swiat Ideologicznych Pojec," in Oswajanie 
Rzeczywistosci. Miedzy Realnym Socjalizmem a Realna Demokracja, ed. Miroslaw 
Marod (Warszawa: Instytut Studiow Spolecznych Uniwesytetu Warszawskiego, 
1996).  Aleksandra Jasinska-Kania, "Miedzy Neoliberalizmem a Neosocjalizmem. 
Problemy Krystalizacji Prawicowych I Lewicowych Ideologii I Wartosci W 
Polsce," in Oswajanie Rzeczywistosci. Miedzy Realnym Socjalizmem a Realna 
Demokracja, ed. Miroslaw Marod (Warszawa: Instytut Studiow Spolecznych 
Uniwesytetu Warszawskiego, 1996).  Krzysztof Pankowski, "Lewicowosc-
Prawicowosc. Deklaracje Polityczne Polakow 1990-1997," in Lewicowosc-
Prawicowosc. Deklaracje Polityczne Polakow 1990-1997, ed. Lena  Kolarska-
Bobinska (Warszawa: Instytut Studiow Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 
1997).
205Further, the disposable income that is a base for the calculation of income 
inequality has been previously used in the research on economic voting by Brooks 
and Brady who argued that income is an important indicator how voters chose 
political parties and their leaders.  See Clem Brooks and David Brady, "Income, 
Economic Voting, and Long-Term Political Change in the Us, 1952-1996," Social 
Forces 77, no. 4 (1999).
parties to express their fear that they could ‘join’ the economically 
unprivileged.206 
Similar to poverty, economic inequality might be thought of as a source of 
economic insecurity, but only after it reaches a certain level.  It could be 
speculated that Polish voters, specifically middle class voters, are not concerned 
with economic inequality until the income disparity reaches a point which might 
indicate the danger for their own financial well-being or the community.  In other 
words, the middle income voter (the largest group in the society) wants to bring 
the affluence to the household and is not so concerned with income disproportion, 
specifically in the society where during the time of commended economy a 
manual worker earned very similar amount of money as highly educated white 
collar worker.  Even further, it could be argued that middle and upper middle 
class voters are ‘happy’ that inequalities exist for the objective of economic 
growth, as long as they are not becoming poorer. These voters might be 
perceived as students of Adam Smith’s laissez faire economics, which proclaims 
that income inequality promotes economic growth, which in turn brings a decent 
standard of living. 
Voters’ main concern with material well-being, specifically in a country 
where economic development have not reached a standard of living known to the 
developed states, could be supported by the Maslow’s value hierarchy.  Maslow 
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206Or voters could articulate their displeasure by not voting at all. 
suggests that people first desire to achieve comfortable margin of economic 
security before they start to search for higher order needs.  This speculation can 
be also confirmed by Inglehart’s recent work on material and post-material value 
changes in democratic states. As argued by Inglehart, before citizens achieve the 
sufficient economic standard of living they are concerned with Old Politics 
(material) values, such as economic growth. Once economic security is achieved 
then the New Politics (postmaterial) values such as social equality, social trust, or 
responsibility for community, etc. start to play role in voters’ decision-making 
process during elections.207   If income inequality can be a proxy measure for 
social capital and interpersonal trust, as suggested by recent literature, the 
societies/communities that reached a comfortable margin of economic security 
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207Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and 
Political Change in 43 Societies, Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural 
Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence.
would care to reduce income inequality.208  By doing so, citizens would 
demonstrate their commitment to postmaterial values. As indicated in the World 
Value Surveys (Waves 1995, 2000, 2005), Polish citizens are rather concerned 
with material values than postmaterial values.209  While choosing between 
incumbent and non-incumbent parties, the average Polish rational voter would 
stress the need to improve economic conditions at the expanse of rising income 
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208 Compare for instance a discussion on social capital and income inequality in 
working paper by David K. Jesuit, Won K. Paik, and Piotr R. Paradowski, 
"Domestic Sources of Income Inequality in the Developed and Developing 
Countries: 1970-2002," in Midwest Political Science Conference (Chicago, IL: 
2007).  Compare also Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and 
Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). See also 
E. M. Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). See also David K. Jesuit, Piotr R. Paradowski, and 
Vincent A. Mahler, "Electoral Support for Extreme Right-Wing Parties: A Sub-
National Analysis of Western European Elections," Electoral Studies 28, no. 2 
(2009).
209I analyzed three variables: postmaterial value index, traditional/secular 
rational values, and survival/self-expression values.  Analyses available upon 
request. Data downloaded from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org. See 
"European and World Values Surveys Four-Wave Integrated Data File."
inequality. 210 
Consistent with Inglehart’s theory, economic needs and security take 
precedence over postmaterial goals in Poland at least at a certain point of 
economic transition.  For instance, the simple descriptive statistics (Table 19) of 
those who voted in the 1997 Parliamentary elections and their ideas about the 
income equality being good or bad for economy indicates that around 57% of 
voters definitely or rather agreed that the income equality is bad for economy.211 
The remaining 43% of voters rather disagreed or definitely disagreed with this 
concept.  It is worth to remembering that this question was asked during the 
middle of the economic transition where income inequalities boosted by several 
percentage points.212  Further, analyzing the same question and controlling for the 
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210Even if there is a small shift from middle to lower part of income distribution 
among voters, it is likely that the vote for incumbent political parties will not be 
negatively and significantly affected. Since the majority of voters belong to the 
middle income group, the major economic crisis is required for bulk of middle 
income group voters to swing to the lower class. 
211The National Election Survey of 1997 (PGSW) conducted under the 
supervision of the Institute of Political Studies in Polish Academy of Science. 
212According to Luxembourg Income Study data, on average the inequality in 
Poland (measured by the Gini Index) increased from 0.2743 in 1992 to 0.31695 in 
1995 and decrease by 0.01332 points in 1999. The Gini index increased again 
significantly in 2004 and reached a value of 0.32326. Data accessed on November 
24, 2008.
      Table 19. Average Voter – PGSW Survey 1997.
Q: Income equality is bad for economy Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage
Definitely Agree 23.21
57.45
Rather Agree 34.24
Rather Disagree 33.81
42.55
Definitely Disagree 8.74
Total 100 100
Table 20. High Income Voters – PGSW Survey 1997.
Q: Income equality is bad for economy Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage
Definitely Agree 24.89
62.88
Rather Agree 37.99
Rather Disagree 30.13
37.12
Definitely Disagree 6.99
Total 100 100
Table 21. Middle Income Voters – PGSW Survey 1997.
Q: Income equality is bad for economy Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage
Definitely Agree 20.51
53.21
Rather Agree 32.69
Rather Disagree 37.82
46.79
Definitely Disagree 8.97
Total 100 100
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     Table 22. Low Income Voters – PGSW Survey 1997.
Q: Income equality is bad for economy Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage
Definitely Agree 26.11
57.96
Rather Agree 31.85
Rather Disagree 31.21
42.04
Definitely Disagree 10.83
Total 100 100
levels of voters’ income (low, medium, and high) it is evident that high income 
voters are more prone to support income inequality then middle or low income 
voters (Tables 20-22).213  Specifically, around 63% of high income voters, 
comparing to 53% and 58% of middle and low income voters respectively, 
declared that equally is bad for economy.  It is not surprising for political 
scientists that a higher percentage of high income voters believe that income 
equality is bad for economy, but it might be shocking for some that on average 
low income voters were more supportive of income inequality then the middle 
class voters in 1997.  Last, but not least, the Polish voter might be perceived as a 
true believer of laissez faire economic policies at least until 1997.
Unfortunately, the National Election Surveys of 2001 and 2005 did not ask 
the same question again.  As a remedy, I utilized the European Social Surveys 
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213The high, middle, and low incomes are computed based on the income 
percentiles (25, 50 and 75 percentile). 
(ESS) conducted in 2002, 2004, and 2006 to inspect the trends of voters’ believes 
about the income inequality.  Fortunately, the ESS surveys asked an even more 
precise question about income distribution: “Do you think that government 
should reduce differences in income levels?”  As indicated in Tables 23, 24, and 
25, the opinion of voters changed dramatically comparing to 1997 PGSW survey. 
Approximately 80% of voters responded that governments should reduce income 
gaps.  Why such a dramatic change?  The answer might be associated with the 
fact that income inequality as well as poverty levels increased significantly from 
1999 to 2006.214  Based on this data we could call the Polish voter a true believer 
of the welfare state at least for last several years.
Table 23. Average Voter – ESS Survey 2002.
Q: Governments should reduce differences 
     in income levels 
Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage
Strongly Agree 27.36
80.11
Agree 52.75
Neither Agree or  Disagree 8.10 8.10
Disagree 9.75
11.79
Strongly Disagree 2.04
Total 100 100
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214 As pointed out in footnote 28, the Gini index increased significantly between 
1999 and 2004 (based on the Luxembourg Income Study calculations) reaching a 
even further increase in 2006 (Gini figure for 2006 is based on my own calculation 
using 2006 Budget Survey Data from Central Statistical Office in Warsaw).  
     Table 24. Average Voter – ESS Survey 2004.
Q: Governments should reduce differences 
     in income levels 
Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage
Strongly Agree 38.99
81.41Agree 42.42
Neither Agree or  Disagree 7.49 7.49
Disagree 8.99
11.11Strongly Disagree 2.12
Total 100 100
Table 25. Average Voter – ESS Survey 2006.
Q: Governments should reduce differences 
     in income levels 
Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage
Strongly Agree 31.13
80.27Agree 49.14
Neither Agree or  Disagree 9.39 9.39
Disagree 9.20
10.35Strongly Disagree 1.15
Total 100 100
2.2.1 Measures of Poverty and Income Inequality
One of the measures that is most commonly used to analyze income 
inequality is called Gini index (coefficient).215 The Gini index uses “0” to indicate 
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215The other measures of income inequality include among others share of income 
by quintile and ratio of those shares. Further, Gini coefficient is associated with 
Lorenz curves where in the Descartes’ graph 45° line indicates perfect egalitarian 
society and the gap between this 45° line and the actual line (formed by quintiles 
and cumulative share of income) unequal distribution of income measured by 
Gini coefficient. 
total earnings/income equality, meaning that the perfect economically egalitarian 
society would be given a Gini index rating of “0”.  The Gini index uses “1” to 
indicate total inequality, meaning that one individual within the society receives 
all the earnings/income.  In practice, Gini index ratings usually fall between 0.20 
and 0.45.216  
To fully understand what is measured by the Gini index, it is important to 
refer to the so called ‘Principle of Transfers” which holds that “the change in 
inequality resulting from a transfer between two individuals depends only on the 
individuals’ income share.”217   The principle of transfers, as it relates to Gini 
coefficient, is associated with the rank ordering of two persons.  Assume that 
there are persons A, B, C, D, E, and F.  The incomes of persons A and B are 
close to the mode of the distribution.  The income of persons C and D are close 
to the lower tail and the income of persons E and F are close to the upper tail.  If 
$1000 is transferred from person A to person B, then the change in Gini 
coefficient will be greater then if there was a transfer from person C to person D 
or E to F or any other transfer from upper tail to lower tail.  To put it in 
Jenkins’ words, “the change [of Gini coefficient] will be the larger the closer that 
164
216Certainly there are extremes where Gini index for income per capita might rich 
0.7. For further research on this subject look at World Bank and OECD 
publications on income inequality.  
217  Eugene Smolensky, "Income Distribution," in The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia 
of Economics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 652.
pair is to the more crowded middle of the distribution (more precisely, the mode) 
rather then the sparser upper and lower tails”.218  Essentially, the Gini coefficient 
is sensitive to inequality changes around the middle of the income distribution.219 
Scholars chose from several units to evaluate income inequality based upon 
the specific needs of their research.  The most common units are persons 
(personal income of individuals), families (income of related individuals living 
together), or households (single people living alone and unrelated individuals 
living together).  In general, income might be examined as pre-tax income or 
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218Stephen P. Jenkins, "Measurement of Income Inequality," in Economic 
Inequality and Poverty : International Perspectives, ed. Lars Osberg (Armonk, 
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 18.
219The alternative measures of income inequality differ in their sensitivities to 
income differences in different parts of the distribution.  For instance, the Theil 
inequality index that belongs to the Generalized Entropy Family (GE) is transfer 
sensitive at the top part of the income distribution. Another inequality index 
sometimes used by economist is called Atkinson and is sensitive to inequality 
changes in the lowest part of the income distribution only if the inequality 
aversion parameter ε is larger then 1. Since this measure of inequality measures 
different aspect of inequality then the Gini coefficient, it is not surprising that 
there are often great differences in the magnitudes between these two indices. 
These two measure of inequality are not utilized in this project. Compare R. L. 
Basmann, K. J. Hayes, and Daniel Jonathan Slottje, Some New Methods for 
Measuring and Describing Economic Inequality, Contemporary Studies in 
Economic and Financial Analysis V. 71 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1993), 
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post-tax income, and income is usually divided into several other categories such 
as total earnings, factor income, market income, total gross income, which all 
together create disposable income.  This project uses the distribution of 
disposable income based on distributions from grouped data from household 
budget surveys conducted by the Polish Central Statistical Office (Glowny Urzad 
Statystyczny) and reported to the Luxembourg Income Study project for the so 
called “lissification process” and available in harmonized form from LIS. More 
specifically, calculations of the Gini index are based on the post-tax income 
received from gross wages, salaries, self-employment, and other forms of income 
associated with the government’s social insurance and social assistance (e.g. 
retirement benefits, unemployment benefits, etc).  I choose this particular form of 
income since it is associated with domestic governmental policies, and would 
therefore have a great impact on voting behavior.
The same definitions of income are associated with the measurement of 
poverty levels on the regional level.220  Similarly to the income inequality 
measures, there are several indices to measure poverty levels.  This project 
utilizes the Head Count Ratio (HCR), a measure form the whole family of Foster-
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220Poverty measures were calculated based on LIS datasets mentioned above.
Greer-Thorbecke indicators, which reports the percentage of poor individuals in 
the total population of the region.221 
2.2.2  Descriptive Statistics 
The presentation of box-plots allows us to compare the principal 
characteristics of the distributions of independent variables.  Each box-plot 
represents a specific measure of for each independent variable (indicated on Y-
axis) for all regions by year.  The central box of box-plots encompasses the 
middle half of the measures.  The line in the central box represents the median. 
The whiskers above and below the central box represent the extreme observations 
on upper or lower end of distribution.  In some graphs, the lower whiskers are 
shorter than the upper whiskers or vice versa.  There are also several outside 
observations (represented by the circles) at the upper or lower end of 
distribution, especially in the Gini index in 1997 and 2001as well as poverty, 
unemployment, and GDP growth in 1997.  All of the box-plots indicate that 
there are differences between regions in terms of inequality, poverty, 
unemployment, and GDP growth. 
Looking at the box-plots for the unemployment rates (Figure 6), we can 
clearly see the significant increase of jobs loses over the course of not even a 
decade.  Comparing the income inequality in the middle class (as best reflected   
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221Other possible measures of poverty include, among others, the Sen, Takayama, 
Clark, and Thon indices.
Figure 6.   Box-plots for Independent Variables by Year – Geographical Regions 
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by the Gini index) in 1995 to other years, it is clear that the index declines in 
1999 and increases in 2004. Similar pattern can be noticed by poverty rates. 
Both indicators approximate U-shaped curve.  Yet to grasp a full picture of the 
economic situation in Poland it is necessary to go back to the years preceding the 
1997 election.  As indicated by Figure 6 which portrays, among others, the GDP 
per capita in the current prices, one would assume that there was a steady 
growth of economy with some differences between the regions and one influential 
case – the central (“Warsaw”) region of Poland.  If we take this measure of 
economic prosperity into account, we would assume that voters should support 
the incumbent government, as predicted by the theory of economic voting. Yet we 
know that none of the governing coalition received the same or more numbers of 
votes in the analyzed elections.   Therefore, we would most likely reject the 
hypothesis that a Polish voters behaves similarly to the Western-style rational 
voter while employing the GDP per capita as a predictor of vote.  The box-plots 
of GDP per capita are misleading if we do not control for inflation.222  Looking at 
Figure 4 we notice, on average, a decline in the economic growth from 1996 to 
2002, and a tiny growth from 2003 to 2004.
169
222For the misinterpretation of the economic prosperity and growth based on real 
GDP index see D. Mario Nuti, "Managing Transition Economies," in 
Developments in Central and Eastern European Politics, ed. Stephen White, Judy 
Batt, and Paul G. Lewis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 256-57. 
2.3 Dependent Variable –regional level data
Before I define the dependent variable I must present a method that I used 
to create this variable.  Let us assume that we have parties A, and B that formed 
a coalition after the elections in year X.  Parties A and B, received a certain 
percentage of votes from the elections in year X, yet not necessarily the majority 
of votes.  The next elections are in year Y.  At this time, parties A and B receive 
a certain percentage of votes (not necessarily the same as in elections X) or do 
not get any percentage of votes due to either lack of public support or the 
dissolution of a party.  Thus the percentage of votes might vary from 0% to 
100%.  If a party has electoral support, it would receive the same or a higher 
percentage of votes in year Y than year X.  If it does not have electoral support, 
the percentage of votes from year Y would be smaller then in year X.  Thus, to 
show this arithmetically, I create a ratio of the percentage of votes received by 
party A in year Y to percentage of votes received by party A in year X.  This is 
then done for party B.  If the ratio is smaller than 1, then the party did not gain 
electoral support between elections X and Y.  If the ratio is equal or higher than 
1, then voters have supported an incumbent party giving them the same or more 
amount of votes as they had in election X.
Further, I consolidate the percentage of votes received by the various 
parties.  If between the years X and Y there was more than one coalition, the 
parties that are examined in year Y are those that composed the last coalition, 
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because that coalition appears accountable for socio-economic conditions at the 
time of the election.  Then I take the percentage of votes each party within the 
coalition received in the election of year X. These percentages are then added to 
create the coalition category.  This category reflects the percentage of voters that 
would support a particular coalition.  The category election is formed in the same 
way as that of coalition.  Specifically, it is formed by summing up the percentage 
of votes received by party A, B, and C from election in year Y.  A ratio is then 
formed by these two categories (coalition/election ratio).  Again, the ratio might 
range from 0 to 1 (one excluded) if a coalition did not get the same support from 
voters in year Y as in the elections of the year X. 
There is an advantage to using this method that is applicable to the multi-
party system only.   One could correctly argue that voters usually target a whole 
coalition, a party within the coalition, or even a particular economic policy 
associated with a particular party when judging governmental responsibility for 
economic conditions.  This method helps to eliminate the source of unstable 
results produced by such behavior by first taking into consideration the 
percentage of votes for each particular party, then the percentage for the 
coalition, and finally creating ratios of these two percentages (without averaging 
votes within the coalition, which would create results that might be 
disadvantageous for one or the other party).  Finally, this method of creating a 
dependent variable (coalition/election ratio) seems to be the very first one and 
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has not been employed in any analysis of economic voting.  Since not every voter 
would be dissatisfied with a governing coalition, this method allows analyzing the 
specific distribution of votes for incumbent parties.223  
Since the analyzed elections are described in detail in chapter 2, I will only 
remind a reader which political parties formed coalitions and whether or not they 
lost votes in next elections.  After the 1993 election the SLD and the PSL formed 
the coalition that lasted until 1997 election.  It is worth mentioning that the SLD 
received more votes in 1997 then in 1993, but less than the AWS which had the 
privilege of forming the governing coalition.  The UW joined the AWS and lasted 
in the coalition government until 1999.  It is important to note that when 
creating the coalition/election ratio I included the UW as an incumbent party. 
In 2001 election the SLD/UP run together as coalition and won 41% of seats in 
the Parliament and form a coalition government with the peasant PSL.  Since the 
coalition with the PSL lasted only 16 months, I did not include the PSL as an 
incumbent party while creating the dependent variable. The minority government 
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223Researchers usually analyze the vote for the incumbent party versus the 
combination of all the others what creates the dichotomous dependent variable 
and determents the use of logit or probit model. Some scholars argue that 
dichotomization of the electoral system into “a pseudo-two-party contest” results 
in “bias and information lost”.  See Jonathan N. Katz and Gary King, "A 
Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data," American Political Science 
Review 93, no. 1 (1999): 15-16.
run by SLD/UP coalition lost many votes in 2005 election and the PiS formed 
the coalition with the LPR and the Samoobrona.  
2.4 Statistical Method
Beside the estimation for the analysis of distribution of electoral results 
that are based on the economic conditions in the multi-party system proposed by 
Katz and King and mentioned in the previous section, there are at least two 
other methods of estimation used in the field of economic voting.   For instance, 
Tomz et al. recommend estimating the model for multiparty electoral data by 
means of a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), a methodology that is a multi-
equation version of ordinary least-squares (OLS).224   In other words, if there are 
the same explanatory variables in each equation and error terms from these 
equations are not correlated, than the model can be estimated by each equation 
separately.  However, Tomz et al. argue that error terms are correlated across 
equations because “the dependent variable is constructed from vote shares, such 
that a higher log ratio for one party means a lower log ratio for the others.”225 
This situation justifies using SUR.  
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224Michael Tomz, Joshua A. Tucker, and Jason Wittenberg, "An Easy and 
Accurate Regression Model for Multiparty Electoral Data," Political Analysis 10, 
no. 1 (2002). 
225Ibid.: 68. 
Another group of scholars, Mikhailov et al., apply the Theil group logit 
method to transform the data for the purpose of efficient use of SUR regression 
using a set of logit equations.226 The main advantage of using the method is that 
it transforms the data to make errors homoscedastic and as a result the data can 
be also analyzed by ordinary least squares (OLS) using the logit equations for 
individual parties.227   Further, using SUR after the data transformation by the 
Theil group logit method appears to produce less biased results than without 
such a transformation (error terms are not correlated and variance across 
equations is constant). In summary, using SUR regression and the Theil group 
logit method scholars examine how economic factors influence support for 
particular parties or coalition in each election for every country or district 
creating separate equation for each observation.  Neither one of these two 
methods are used in this paper.  The reason for rejection of SUR regression and 
the Theil group logit method is that this chapter utilizes the dependent variable 
measured as a proportion of the vote share received by each coalition party in 
each election.
The data analyzed in this part of the chapter has cross-sectional and time 
series dimensions, namely the same group of administrative regions over time. 
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226Mikhailov, Niemi, and Weimer, "Application of Theil Group Logit Methods to 
District-Level Vote Shares: Tests of Prospective and Retrospective Voting in the 
1991, 1993, and 1997 Polish Elections."
227 Ibid.: 635. 
There are several methods to estimate the parameters while employing the 
balanced panel data depending on the identification of problem that could create 
biased results, specifically heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous correlation and 
serial correlation.  If one of these problems is detected, scholars are left with at 
least three options: the generalized least squares (GLS); the feasible generalized 
least squares (FGLS), and the panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE).  Since the 
panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) method produces more unbiased 
standard errors and confidence intervals as opposed to feasible generalized least 
squares (FGLS) or ordinary least squares (OLS) methods with robust variance 
estimator, the PCSE estimation might be an excellent choice for researchers who 
deal with large T (points-in-time) dataset.228   Unfortunately, in this analysis 
T=3; therefore, I had to choose between the fixed effects and random effects. The 
Hausman’s specification, based on chi-squared statistics comparison of coefficients 
estimated by various methods, provides a clear choice for the fixed effects 
estimation which was utilized to examine the relationship between socio-economic 
factors and the vote share for the incumbent parties.229   Finally, I tested for 
heteroscedasticity using modified Wald test, rejected the null hypothesis of 
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228Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-
Series Cross-Section Data," American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (1995).
229For further discussion on the subject of proper methodology for panel data 
analysis see Jesuit, Paik, and Paradowski, "Domestic Sources of Income 
Inequality in the Developed and Developing Countries: 1970-2002."  
homoscedasticity, and corrected for the heteroscedastic error structure by 
computing the robust standard errors.  
2.5 Hypotheses
This chapter offers two models to analyze the economic model of voting on 
the regional level. In Model 1, the relationship between voting behavior measure 
as coalition/election ratio ( )ity and four independent variables including GDP 
growth ( ),itx  unemployment measured as percentage of total labor force ( ),itz  
poverty ( ),itq  income inequality ( ),itw  is represented by the equation:
 0 1 2 3 4it it it it it i ity x z q w a uα β β β β= + + + + + +                     (1)
where ia is the fixed (unobserved) effect, itu is time-varying error (idiosyncratic 
error), and the kβ  represents coefficients.  In the above notation i denotes the 
cross sectional observation number and t denotes the time period.
 In Model 2, I added the squared measure of income inequality to examine 
whether or not the rational voters support the incumbent parties while the 
income inequality increases, but stop to do so as the economic inequality reaches 
a certain (unacceptable) point.230  Therefore, the equation (1) is modified as 
follows:
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230In other words, it is assumed that this relationship approximates the quadratic 
function 2it ity c bw aw= + + where the “turning point” can be determined by 
calculating the point W(p, q) where 
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0 1 2 3 4 5it it it it it it i ity x z q w w a uα β β β β β= + + + + + + +            (2)
When testing the theory of economic voting that proposes that better economic 
performance causes voters to vote for the incumbent party, I assume that 
coefficient of itx in the regression equation to have a positive value. The 
justification for such an assertion is dictated by the simple fact that increasing 
GDP growth on regional level pleases voters (a positive relationship). As a 
reverse of this relationship, an increase in the unemployment and poverty rates 
displeases voters so they might vote for parties in opposition (a negative 
relationship). Taking into consideration the inverted U-shape relationship 
between income inequality and the vote share in Model 2, I expect income 
inequality to have a positive value whereas the squared income inequality to have 
a negative value.  If supporters of economic voters are correct in their arguments 
about economic voting then two other basic regression requirements must be met. 
First, the whole regression model must be statistically significant at least at 0.05 
level. Second, the relationship between each independent variable and dependent 
variable must be statistically significant at the level of p< 0.05 in one tailed-test. 
Thus the hypothesis that I am going to test is as follows: increase in economic 
performance will tend to an increase in support for the coalition parties.  
 Assuming that the whole model is statistically significant I will take into 
consideration the effect of each independent variable (separately) on the 
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dependent variable (while other independent variables are constant) and test the 
following hypotheses: 
A. the higher the level of economic growth, the higher the support for the 
incumbent coalition parties;
B. the lower the level of unemployment, the higher the support for the 
incumbent coalition parties;
C. the lower the poverty rates, the higher the support of  for the incumbent 
coalition parties;
D. the higher the level of income inequality, the higher the support for the 
governing party or coalition parties (Models 1);
E. as the income inequality in the regions increases, the support for the 
incumbent coalition parties rises to reach its maximum point at –b/2a, 
and then the support for the incumbent coalition parties decreases as 
income inequality still increases (Models 2).
The above hypothesis is also presented in Table 26 where I formalize those using 
mathematical expressions and illustrate whether or not each of the hypotheses 
was rejected.
2.6 Findings
The statistical analyses, described in Table 27, tell us exactly what was 
hypothesized.  All coefficients associated with all independent variables in both 
models have a noticeable and significant effect on the coalition/party ratio. Using
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statistical language, we are at least 95% confident in our prediction that there is 
a correlation our independent variables and support for the party coalition. 
Overall, the four regressors in Model 1 and the five regressors in Model 2, when 
taken together, explain approximately 74% of the variation in coalition/election 
ratio (the coefficient of determination for Model 1 equals 0.7433 and for Model 2 
equals 0.7484).
 Table 27.  Results: Fixed Effects Estimation for the Regional Level of Economic Voting
 
Independent Variables              Model 1              Model 2
GDP Growth (x)  2.585323***  (0.4127)   2.5288***    (0.3936)
Unemployment Rate (z) -0.0245855**  (0.0114)   -0.0255**    (0.0115)
Poverty Rate (q) -1.785999**   (0.7968)   -1.9111***  (0.571)
Gini Index (w)  4.11649**     (1.5773)  26.1707**  (11.3219)
Gini-squared ( 2w ) -35.0081*   (18.6432)
Constant -3.1146***     (0.4358) -6.4679***   (1.799)
R² = 0.733
N = 48 
R² = 0.748
N = 48
  *p ≤ 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01, ***p ≤ 0.001 one-tailed test.  
  Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in administrative regions are in parenthesis.  
The interpretation of the regression coefficients produced by the fixed 
effects estimation in Model 1 and 2 is as follows. Predicted coalition/election 
ratio increases by 4.12 points with each one-point (here 0.01) increase in Gini 
index, while other regressors are constant.  In other words, if the Gini index 
increases by 0.01, the support for the coalition in elections increases by 4.12%, 
which is a considerable raise.  Comparing the coefficient for Gini index in Model 
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2, it is evident that Gini index increases vote share for the incumbent parties up 
to Gini=0.37 and thereafter decreases them.231  Each percentage point increase in 
GDP growth at the regional level in both models increases the vote share for 
incumbent parties by about 25%; the vote for the coalition parties is reduced by 
2.5% if unemployment rises by one percentage point (both models). Last, but not 
least, each percentage of poor individuals in the regions, decreases the vote for 
the governing parties by 1.78% and 1.91% based on the estimation in Model 1 
and Model 2 respectively.  
We can plug in our election/coalition ratio from each region and all 
economic variables into equation (1) and (2) and see how good are the 
predictions when compared to the actual scores of election/coalition ratio. 
Performing such an analysis would directly show the reader whether the Polish 
citizens are economically minded rational voters when choosing their 
representatives and how well we predict this economic rationality based on our 
model.  One way to present such analysis is to create 48 equations for every 
election (=3) in each region (=16).  Because this kind of analysis is somewhat 
inefficient, I constructed graphs for both models that contain the empirical and 
probability curves for each independent variable.  Further, Table 28 presents the 
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231 See footnote 228 how to calculate the turning point. 
actual coalition/election ratio together with the predicted values for every 
administrative region for Model 1.232  
Looking at Figures 7-8 we can be confident that that we improve our 
estimate of the support for the coalition parties by using the information 
represented by the independent variables.  Therefore, the theory of economic 
voting, specifically the retrospective hypothesis, seems to be applicable to Poland. 
This is not to say that we could predict perfectly the votes using only economic 
indicators. There are some cases where statistical analysis over or under-predicts 
economic voting behavior.  
Specifically, looking at Table 28 we notice that in 2001 election 2 regions 
did not follow the path of economic voting whereas in 2005 election 6 out of 16 
regions.  For instance, according to economic voting predictions, voters in the 
Mazowieckie voivodoship should cast ballots for the incumbent parties in 2005 
elections, but they did not.  This is the region of fastest economic growth and 
larger income inequality and smallest unemployment rate.
The opposite example to Warsaw Region is the Warminsko-Mazurskie 
voivodoship in the North-East part of Poland.  Voters in this administrative 
region, based on the economic voting theory, should have not cast the ballot for  
182
232 Since Model 2 is very similar, I choose not to present it here.
Figure 7.   Predicted Probabilities for the Regional Level of Economic Voting – Model 1 
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Figure 8.  Predicted Probabilities for the Regional Level of Economic Voting – Model 2 
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            Table 28.  Real and Estimated Values for the Regional Level of Economic Voting – Model 1 
 
Region 1997 2001 2005 
Y Y-predicted Y Y-predicted Y Y-predicted 
Dolnoslaskie 
 
1.0531 0.9849 0.2773 0.2158 0.2776 0.2743 
Kujawsko-
pomorskie 
0.9973 0.7884 0.2646 0.2253 0.2639 0.0885* 
Lubelskie 
 
0.8158 1.0361 0.1626 0.4185 0.2395 0.3639 
Lubuskie 
 
1.0449 0.8430 0.2609 0.0799* 0.3020 0.0645* 
Lodzkie 
 
1.0924 0.9735 0.2439 0.3668 0.2823 0.2481 
Malopolskie 
 
0.8206 1.0734 0.1883 0.3319 0.2314 0.3986 
Mazowieckie 
 
0.8816 1.1293 0.3448 0.7678 0.2620 0.8044^ 
Opolskie 
 
0.8989 0.9228 0.2412 0.2238 0.2581 0.2005 
Podkarpackie 
 
0.7261 0.8233 0.1928 0.2578 0.2782 0.0700* 
Podlaskie 
 
0.8183 1.0709 0.3486 0.4315 0.3320 0.3668 
Pomorskie 
 
1.0280 0.9178 0.2229 0.2974 0.2870 0.3724 
Slaskie 
 
1.1340 0.9659 0.2525 0.3136 0.2559 0.1545 
Swietokrzyskie 
 
0.9168 0.9498 0.2706 0.1985 0.2395 0.0991* 
Warminsko-
mazurskie 
1.0112 0.7164 0.2804 -0.067* 0.2572 0.0277* 
Wielkopolskie 
 
1.0609 1.1555 0.2842 0.3850 0.2933 0.3976 
Zachodnio-
pomorskie 
1.1749 0.9064 0.3095 0.2061 0.2893 0.1281 
 
            * indicates these regions that should not vote for incumbent parties and  
            ^ indicates a region that should definitely support the governing parties 
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the incumbent parties, but they did.  This is the region of relatively slow 
economic growth, the high poverty and unemployment level.  What other factors 
could explain such a voting behavior becomes unknown at this stage of research. 
There are certainly many factors that are not directly associated with voter 
perceptions of macro- or micro-economic factors (e.g. corruption, party and 
candidates popularities, media, social class, etc.).  What might help is the 
analysis of voters’ personal perceptions of economy and politics that can be 
performed by using individual level data.   
Utilizing the marginal effects, the postestimation procedure after the fixed 
effects estimation, we can assess under what conditions the incumbent parties 
would receive the lower, same or higher percentage of votes.  For instance, 
employing the mean values for each independent variable in Model 1, we predict 
that the incumbent coalitions gain only 50% of the votes compared to the initial 
election.233  This finding parallels the reality in the past three elections where 
voters switched from one group of parties to the others.  Now the question 
becomes when the incumbents would gain the same or higher number of votes. 
Following the theory of economic voting in general and the hypotheses in this 
part of the chapter in particular, the parties in office should gain support if 
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233The mean values are as follows: GDP growth=1.14%, unemployment=16.1%, 
poverty=12%, Gini index= 0.306.  The full table for marginal effects is available 
to the reader upon request.  
inequality is high, GDP growth is increasing, and unemployment and poverty are 
low. I employed the 10th percentile for unemployment and poverty level and 75th 
percentiles for Gini index and GDP growth and estimated by utilizing the 
marginal effects that under such conditions the departing coalitions would gain 
about 5% more votes than in the previous election.234
The opposite also holds: the lower GDP growth and Gini Index as well as 
higher unemployment and poverty rates on the regional level, the less support for 
the incumbents. Under this condition, the coalition parties would gain only about 
11%. Thus I find support for the notion that higher economic performance tend 
to increase the support for the coalition parties and the lower economic 
performance tend to decrease the support for parties in office. 
2.7 Conclusion
I believe we can conclude with confidence that the Polish voters in most 
administrative regions are rational and economically motivated actors.  Or put it 
differently, economic factors play an important role in shaping the voting 
behavior among Polish voters.  My findings bring an expected result if compared 
to the theory of economic voting.  Further, the empirical analysis provide a 
confirmation of the results presented by scholars supporting the rational choice 
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234The values are I plugged in are as follows: GDP growth=1.26%, 
unemployment=10.8%, poverty=8%, Gini index= 0.3196. The results are given 
for Model 1, but the results are similar for Model 2.   
theory approach to economic voting behavior in developed democracies and the 
post-communist states.  The results presented here are not backed up by the 
previous findings on economic voting in Poland, specifically the research 
presented by Gibson and Cielecka who found that unemployment and the 
economic growth did not influenced voters in 1993 election cast a ballot for 
incumbent parties/coalition.235  Also Power and Cox results indicate the difficulty 
to explain the logic of award or punishment of incumbents in 1993 elections.236 
Yet my findings go in hand with Jenice Bell’s findings from 1993 election that 
indicated significant role of unemployment on voting behavior on the regional 
level.237 It has to be remember that the elections of 1993 could be perceived as a 
last contest for or against new or old regime with issues that reflected only the 
economic conditions improvement (e.g. church-state relation).  It seems that 
starting in the 1997 election the Polish voters became more concern with 
economic performance and policies of incumbent governments.  
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235Gibson and Cielecka, "Economic Influences on the Political Support from 
Market Reform in Postcommunist Transitions - Some Evidence from the 1993 
Polish Parliamentary Elections."
236Powers and Cox, "Echoes from the Past: The Relationship between Satisfaction 
with Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland." 
237Bell, "Unemployment Matters: Voting Patterns During the Economic 
Transition in Poland, 1990–1995."
The analysis of regional economics in Poland contributes to the existing 
literature by employing new independent variables, namely the Gini coefficient 
and the poverty rates.  Based on the finding related to the income disparities we 
can conclude that the economic inequalities are important for voters but not in 
the same way as the quasi-Marxist would predict or would like to see.  Judging 
on the bases of this finding, the Polish voters could be called true supporters of 
neo-liberal economics/policies.  On the other hand, they are also concern with the 
growing poverty levels on the regional level by giving less support to the 
governing coalition if under their ‘rule’ poverty get higher. Rising poverty levels 
might be perceived as stagnation in economy that brings the fear to voters that 
they could fall down to the lower economic class.  If I had to create a billboard 
for the political parties in coalition to be used in the political campaign, I would 
write: No! for poverty, No! for unemployment, No! for economic equality policies, 
Yes! for economic growth. 
3.  Individual Level of Economic Voting 
3.1 Individual Level Data, Variables, and Method
To test the models of economic voting on the individual level, I examine 
survey data from the Polish National Election Study in 1997, 2001 and 2005. 
Interviews for these surveys were carried out shortly after each of the 1997, 2001, 
and 2005 parliamentary elections.  
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Since I am interested in the relationship between the voters’ perceptions of 
economic conditions and vote choice, the dependent variable in the analyses I 
present below is the respondents’ answer to the question “For which political 
party did you vote in the past election”.238  There are at least two choices how to 
utilize the voter’s answer in this analysis.  First, I could take respondents’ vote 
choice for different parties and employ the multinomial logit or probit to estimate 
party utilities.  Second, respondents’ electoral choices might be aggregated to the 
binary discrete choice between incumbent and non-incumbent parties.239   The 
second approach is used in this investigation by employing binary logit 
estimation.240  The outcome is a dummy variable that equal 1 for the incumbent 
parties and equals 0 otherwise.  
The independent variables are the respondents’ evaluations of the 
economic conditions related to the national economy as well as the financial 
situation of their households.  Respondents were asked to give the retrospective 
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238As already mentioned in chapter 3, it is also possible to utilize the respondent’s 
evaluations of the political parties.  This approach is not taken here for the same 
reasons as argued in chapter 3.  
239See the description of party coalitions as described in chapter 2 and in this 
chapter above. 
240Please note that the abstainers were excluded from the analysis and the 
weights provided in the dataset were used while conducting the logit estimation. 
The code 1 was assigned to the incumbent parties and 0 to non-incumbent 
parties.  
and the future evaluations of the economy.241  These questions allow me to rest 
the retrospective and prospective sociotropic model of voting.242  In the similar 
manner, respondents were asked to provide the past and future evaluations of the 
financial situation of their households.243   This set of questions permits to 
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241The question wording in 1997 was as follows: 1. “Would you say that over 
twelve months, the state of the economy in Poland has gotten better, stayed 
about the same, or gotten worse?”; 2. Do you think the condition of our economy 
in the next 12 months will definitely improve, rather improve, will not change, 
rather deteriorate, definitely deteriorate, hard to say?” The question wording in 
2001 and 2005 was as follows: 1. “Do you think that in the last year economic 
situation in Poland strongly improved, rather improved, not changed, rather 
worsened, strongly worsened, hard to say?” 2. Do you think in the next 12 
months economic situation in Poland will strongly improve, will rather improve, 
will not change, will rather worsen, will strongly worsen, hard to say?”  
242Respondents also answer questions about the current financial situation of the 
household and the current state of the economy, but these questions were not 
analyzed.
243The question wording in 1997 was as follows: 1. “And if you compare the 
current financial situation of your household with the situation a year before, 
would you say that: current situation is much better, slightly better, the same, 
slightly worse, current situation is much worse”; 3. And do you think the 
financial situation of your household, in a year from now, compared to the 
current one, will: improve considerably, improve moderately, remain the same, 
worsen moderately, worsen considerably, hard to say.” Questions in 2001 and 
2005 surveys contain the same categories for households’ financial situation as for 
the economic situation (see footnote 239).  
estimate the retrospective and the future egotropic model of voting.  Further, as 
suggested by previous research, I take into account the ‘clarity of responsibility’ 
hypothesis that states that in order to evaluate whether or not the economic 
voting exists, we need to examine whether or not the voters hold governments 
responsible for the economic changes.244  Fortunately, the PGSW surveys in 1997 
and 2001 asked respondents whether or not they believe that the government 
policies have impact on economy and whether or not respondents’ household 
situation depends on governmental policies.245 Unfortunately, the survey in 2005 
asked only the latter question, which makes it impossible to test the sociotropic 
model of voting in the proposed methodological design. Nevertheless, this model 
is estimated, but the findings must be treated with the caution. Further, I 
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244David J. Lanoue, "Retrospective and Prospective Voting in Presidential-Year 
Elections," Political Research Quarterly 47, no. 1 (1994). Powell and Whitten, "A 
Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political 
Context."
245The question wording in 1997 and 2001 was as follows: 1. “Lets focus now on 
our economy. In your opinion, does and if yes to what extant, the condition of 
our economy depend on decisions and policies implemented by the government? 
Answers: considerably, moderately, insignificantly, does not depend at all-
government policies have no impact on economy, hard to say”; The following 
question wording corresponds to 1997, 2001 and 2005: 2. “To what extant-in your 
opinion- does the financial situation of your household depends upon 
governmental policies of the recent period? Answers: depends extremely highly, 
considerably, moderately, is totally independent, hard to say”.
identified those voters who, according to the survey responses, recognized that 
government is responsible for their own finances and estimate the egotropic model 
of voting.  If respondents indicated that the government is responsible for the 
state of national economy, they enter the estimation of the sociotropic model.
Since all the independent variables are categorical, a researcher must 
decide how to incorporate these variables into the right-side of the equation. 
There are two options.  First, all the ordinal variables can enter the equation as a 
set of J – 1 binary (dummy) indicator variables.  Second, the categorical 
variables can be treated as interval variables but there must be a “strong 
assumption that successive categories of the ordinal independent variable are 
equally spaced”.246  I performed the adjusted Wald test, as suggested by Long et 
al, after estimation of each economic model of voting that included J – 2 dummy 
variables as well as the categorical variable treated as an interval variable.247 The 
results indicate that most categorical variables should be recoded to dummy 
variables and only few could be treated in the models as interval variables. Since 
there is no information lost while recoding the categorical variable to dummy 
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246Long and Freese, Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using 
Stata, 421.
247The other test for such testing is the likelihood-ratio test, but because the 
sample weights are utilized, the likelihood-ratio test is no longer valid. STATA, 
Survey Data: Reference Manual, Release 10 (College Station, TX: Stata Press, 
2007), 75.
variables, I decided to recode all independent variables to binary variables for the 
purpose of consistency.248  
I also combined the detailed categories to broader categories, for example 
the categories “very good” and “good” were recoded to the category “good” and 
the categories “bad” and “very bad” were recoded to category “bad”.249  To give 
just another clear example, for instance the retrospective sociotropic performance 
evaluations of the coalition government in 1997 were recoded to four distinct 
dummies: “past economy got better” “past economy stayed the same”, “past 
economy got worst”, and “past economy – hard to say”.  The same logic was 
applied to the answers about the financial situation of the household in all survey 
data.  Respondents that answer “hard to say” enter the estimation as the 
reference category with the exception for 2005 analysis of egotropic model of 
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248Note that it would be easier to analyze the estimated model with the 
categorical independent variables treated as interval variables (and perhaps 
scaled from -1 to 1), but I believe it is more important not to loose information.
249The same logic applies to categories “worse” and “slightly worse”, “strongly 
improved” and “improved”, etc. 
voting where the reference category is “stay the same”.250  Finally, in the set of 
dummy independent variables 1 indicates the positive response to the question 
and 0 indicates otherwise. For instance, the dummy variable “last year financial 
situation of the household improved” equals 1 for those respondents who answer 
that their financial situation in last improved and equal to 0 otherwise.251  
3.2 Hypotheses
The hypotheses for the individual level of analysis correspond to those 
presented in the previous part of this chapter for regional level analysis. 
Generally, the better the state of the  economy or the subjective perception of 
household financial situation, the better voters’ assessment of the incumbent 
parties that ultimately generate the vote for the parties in office and vice versa. 
Particularly, as suggested by the theory of economic voting, I expect to find that 
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250Note that the reference category could be any other category, but in order to 
explain whether or not respondents punished the incumbent parties during 
elections I believe it is better to use “hard to say” category as a reference that 
can be thought of as a neutral point.  In addition, in 2005 dataset only handful 
responses “hard to say” were left in the sample after controlling for the ‘clarity of 
responsibility’ hypothesis. Thus it was necessary to change the reference category 
to “stay the same”. Further, category “hard to say” was excluded from 2005 
analysis.
251A number of variables, aside those proposed here, could be also included in the 
model as control variables (e.g. sociodemographics).  Yet, I decided to keep this 
model ‘pure’ and test for the economic effects alone.
voters who believe that the economic well-being have improved over the previous 
period would support the incumbent parties. If the well-being of the national 
economy and household financial situation has deteriorated, voters would support 
the opposition parties.  
As pointed out in the previous research, the prospective model of economic 
voting predicts that citizens choose their representatives based on the prospect 
for their future well-being.252   Therefore, we would reason that citizens whose 
prospective economic expectations are positive would vote for the parties in 
office.  This, however, might not always be a case.  Voters could believe that 
better times are ahead because they predicted the defeat of the incumbents. If so, 
voters’ positive evaluation of future well-being could hardly be projected to 
positively correlate with the support for the parties in office.253  This is of course 
true for the analysis of the pre-election surveys.  Similar logic applies to post-
election surveys.  Knowing the results of an election, the citizens’ expectation 
about future economic conditions should be positively correlated with the 
winners.  Since the surveys data used in this analysis were collected immediately 
after each election, I expect to find that the negative economic and personal 
financial expectations would be evident among the supporters of the incumbent 
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252Lanoue, "Retrospective and Prospective Voting in Presidential-Year Elections," 
193.
253Ibid.: 194.
parties, and positive ones among those respondents who did not support the 
coalition parties.
3.3 Findings
Table 29 displays the estimation of the relationship between respondents’ 
perceptions of economic conditions/financial situation of their household and 
evaluations of the incumbent political parties. As the table indicates, there are 
some differences between each election, but also clear similarities.  One evident 
finding is that the effects of economic evaluations on voters’ choice are, on 
average, weak.  The pseudo R-squared ranges between 0.022 and 0.146.  The 
independent variables often fail to indicate the impact on voting for the 
representatives.  
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the effects of prospective evaluations 
consistently exceed those of retrospective judgments. Additionally, meaningful 
effects for retrospective voting become visible only for sociotropic model.  There 
is no evidence of significant retrospective voting in egotropic model.  On the 
other hand, the estimations indicate that prospective economic voting was far 
more common then retrospective voting.  For instance, prospective voting takes 
place in all three elections while retrospective judgments have the apparent effect 
on voters’ choices only in 1997 and 2005 elections.254 
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254Reminder: the estimation of sociotropic model for 2005 election was not based 
on the ‘clarity of responsibility’ hypothesis.
Table 29.  Logit Estimation for Economic Model of Voting – Individual Level 
 
 
 
*p  0.1, **p  0.05, ***p  0.01, ****p  0.001 two-tailed test.  Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  All models are significant 
at least at 0.001 level.  Reference category, unless otherwise stated in the table, is “hard to say”. 
 
Model Independent 
Variables 
Elections of 1997 Elections of 2001 Elections of 2005 
Coefficient/S.E. Odds Ratio Coefficient/S.E. Odds Ratio Coefficient/S.E. Odds Ratio 
Re
tro
sp
ec
tiv
e 
so
cio
tro
pic
 
 
got better 
 
0.692 * 
(0.424) 
 
1.998 
(.847) 
 
0.896 
(0.736) 
 
2.451 
(1.803) 
 
1.298* 
(0.73) 
 
3.6624 
(2.673) 
 
stay the same 
 
-0.550 
(0.395) 
 
0.577 
(.228) 
 
0.306 
(0.655) 
 
1.357 
(0.889) 
 
0.7996 
(0.694) 
 
2.2246 
(1.545) 
 
got worst 
 
 
-1.607**** 
(0.469) 
 
0.2005 
(.094) 
 
-0.3929 
(0.625) 
 
0.675 
(0.423) 
 
0.8752 
(0.699) 
 
2.3993 
(1.677) 
Pr
os
pe
cti
ve
  s
oc
iot
rop
ic 
 
 
improve  
 
 
-1.286**** 
(0.298) 
 
0.276 
(.082) 
 
-0.719** 
(.3128) 
 
0.487 
(0.152) 
 
-1.241** 
(0.3961) 
 
0.2892 
(0.1145) 
 
stay the same 
 
 
-0.2287 
(0.275) 
 
0.795 
(.218) 
 
0.237 
(0.291) 
 
1.268 
(0.368) 
 
-0.654* 
(0.348) 
 
0.5195 
(0.1808) 
 
deteriorate  
 
 
1.148**** 
(0.335) 
 
3.154 
(1.057) 
 
0.543* 
(0.323) 
 
1.720 
(0.555) 
 
0.5803 
(0.465) 
 
1.7866 
(0.8298) 
 
constant 
 
 
0.2089 
(0.397) 
 
 
 
-0.375 
(0.620) 
 
 
 
-1.937 
(0.628) 
 
 
 N = 783 
Pseudo R² = 0.146 
N = 886 
Pseudo R² = 0.048 
N = 546 
Pseudo R² = 0.049 
Re
tro
sp
ec
tiv
e  
eg
otr
op
ic 
 
got better  
 
0.128 
(1.438) 
 
1.367 
(1.6342) 
 
0.5618 
(1.058) 
 
1.754 
(1.856) 
 
0.30147 
(0.4761) 
 
1.3519 
(0.6436) 
 
stay the same 
 
 
-0.501 
(1.428) 
 
0.606 
(0.8657) 
 
0.0125 
(1.013) 
 
1.013 
(1.026) 
 
Reference 
category 
 
 
 
got worst 
 
 
-0.809 
(1.436) 
 
0.445 
(.6396) 
 
-0.306 
(1.012) 
 
0.736 
(.745) 
 
0.1659 
(0.256) 
 
1.1805 
(0.3022) 
Pr
os
pe
cti
ve
  e
go
tro
pic
 
 
improve  
 
 
-0.998**** 
(0.261) 
 
0.368 
(0.096) 
 
-0.552* 
(0.3248) 
 
0.576 
(0.187) 
 
-0.8611** 
(0.3868) 
 
0.4227 
(0.1635) 
 
stay the same 
 
-0.022 
(0.230) 
 
0.977 
(0.225) 
 
0.01275 
(0.2637) 
 
1.013 
(0.267) 
 
Reference 
category 
 
 
deteriorate 
 
 
0.3496 
(0.307) 
 
1.418 
(0.436) 
 
0.5526* 
(0.2958) 
 
1.738 
(0.514) 
 
0.35871 
(0.3291) 
 
1.4315 
(0.4711) 
 
constant 
 
 
0.1399 
(1.429) 
 
 
 
-0.4534 
(1.0306) 
 
 
 
-1.6233 
(0.1917) 
 
 N = 843  
Pseudo R² = 0.041 
N = 894  
Pseudo R² = 0.024 
N = 487  
Pseudo R² = 0.022 
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There is evidence here that sociotropic voting is somewhat stronger than 
egotropic voting.  In each election, sociotropic evaluations are present (except in 
the case of 2001 elections, where retrospective voting appears to be insignificant). 
Coming back to the analogy of consumers in the supermarket and the voters’ 
choices at election time, it appears that Polish citizens change the brand of 
political party if they perceive that the previous brand damaged the economy or 
is unable to manage it in the efficient way.
This assertion relates specifically to those voters who believe that the 
condition of Polish economy depend on decisions and policies implemented by the 
government.255  At the same time, voters do not seem to blame the specific 
government for their past own misfortunes, even though they believe that the 
governmental policies impact the condition of their household well-being. 
Nevertheless, they seem to believe that casting a ballot for the incumbents would 
improve their household financial future, a correlation evident from the 
estimation.  
Let’s take a closer look at the estimation results. The signs of the 
coefficients correspond to the prediction advocated by the theory of economic 
voting.  For instance, those respondents who believe that the economy improved 
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255The analysis of respondents economic vote without taking into consideration 
the ‘clarity of responsibility’ hypothesis show slightly weaker findings (estimation 
results available upon request).
voted for incumbent parties in 1997 and 2005 (positive coefficient for the category 
“got better” in retrospective sociotropic model). By the same token, those voters 
who perceived the economy as deteriorating did not voted for the parties in office 
in 1997 (negative coefficient in the same model).  The impact of prospective 
personal and national measures on voting indicates similar relationships.  For 
instance, those voters who believe that the economy and/or their household 
financial situation will improve in the future did not support the incumbents 
compared with those who have hard time to predict the future (“hard to say” 
category of respondents in all models except egotropic model for 2005 where the 
reference category is “stay the same”).  In the prospective models of voting, the 
positive coefficients are associated with the category “deteriorate” for 1997 and 
2001 elections for both sociotropic and egotropic evaluations.  It means that the 
sociotropic and egotropic evaluations of the future by those who voted for the 
incumbent parties are negative.  In other words, knowing that the former 
governing party would not be able to form a coalition government again and 
implement the policies that have effect on personal well-being and national 
economy lead the supporters of the incumbents to believe that that times to 
come will be worse then before. 
Along with the logit estimation, Table 29 displays the odds ratios that 
allow the interpretation of the models in terms of factor changes in odds.  Take, 
for instance, the effect of prospective egotropic evaluations on voting for 
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incumbent parties in 1997.  The odds of supporting the incumbent parties are 
0.368 lower if the voter believes that his or her household financial situation will 
improve in the future compared with the voter who is not sure about the 
financial future of his or her household, holding other variables constant.  To give 
just another example, if a respondent reports an improvement in national 
economic conditions as opposed to a respondent who is not sure whether or not 
the economy improved in 1997, the chance that the former would vote for the 
incumbent parties is 1.998 times higher compared with the later respondent.256 
The same logic applies for analysis of other odds ratios.  Adding the substantive 
meaning to this odds ratio estimation, the conclusion is straightforward: those 
respondents who recognize the improvement in the national economy are more 
likely to vote for the incumbent parties than those whose perception is opposite. 
The same does not hold for egotropic voting at all.  
Comparing the models across elections, it seems that the 2001 election 
could be the hardest to predict in terms of retrospective voting, but during this 
time prospective egotropic and prospective sociotropic voting was far more 
common then in other years. The 1997 election has the most significant effects for 
sociotropic voting, and in 2005 election significant prospective and retrospective 
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256This conclusion is based on the estimations performed using different reference 
categories – they are available upon request. 
voting took place where voters stressed more the condition of national economy 
than the personal finances. 
To sum up, analyzing the sample of voters who consider government 
responsible for economic change, the strongest component of economic voting in 
Polish parliamentary elections was sociotropic and prospective.  Citizens are more 
interested in outcomes than future policies and they find easier to assess 
performance than future plans.  Looking from the comparative perspective at 
these findings, it appears that the Polish voters are similar to American voters 
rather than to Danish voters in their assessments of incumbents.  In other words, 
the statistical estimation presented here might bring into conclusion that the 
Polish voters develops the skills of rational economic voters and citizen under the 
umbrella of liberal rather then social welfare ideology.  This fact might be also 
confirmed by the studies conducted on the regional level analysis in the first part 
of this chapter.  Last, but not least, this finding might be developed and utilized 
further in the further chapters of this work.
4  Conclusions
 The conclusion from this chapter is that the retrospective economic model 
of voting does capture a substantial portion of electoral reality on the regional 
level of analysis (the regressors in the model(s) explain a little over 70% of the 
variation).  To some extent, this finding is supported by sociotropic model at the 
individual level of analysis.  Both analyses confirm that that the national 
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economic conditions are important for the Polish voters, probably more than 
their personal finances while making a choice on the Election Day.  In other 
words, voters seem to be rational actors who evaluate the assessment of the 
governing parties and punish or award them at the ballot box, much as has been 
found to be common in the developed democracies.  Past research until recently 
was not clear whether or not Poland can be put on the list of countries where 
economic model of voting is applicable.257   It was rather assumed that political 
and economic situation in Poland is too fluid to permit for systematic economic 
voting behavior.  Even though this study utilized only a tiny party from the list 
of possibilities to test the economic voting theory, I believe the findings continue 
to suggest the importance of considering old and new factors related to the Polish 
economics and politics in modeling patterns of economic voting. The contribution 
of this chapter to the existing research on economic voting in Poland is definitely 
the inclusion of ‘new’ independent variables related to the economic 
redistribution. The individual level of analysis finds the previously lacking 
evidence of support for the sociotropic and egotropic evaluations (depending on 
election time) and the vote for incumbent parties. 
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257Recent study by Tucker indicated that this is a case for dozen of countries in 
East-Central Europe. See Tucker, Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic, 1990-1999.
CHAPTER SIX                                             
ISSUE-BASED MODELS OF VOTING
 The last substantive chapter of this work presents the analysis of two 
issue-based models of voting, referred in the literature as proximity and 
directional models.  Neither of these models has been tested using elections in 
Poland or in any other countries in Eastern Europe except Hungary.258 
Therefore, this chapter contributes to understand voting behavior in Poland from 
the rational choice perspective using voters’ evaluations of political parties. 
Voters’ assessments of political parties are modeled by specifying the utility 
function that is either a function of policy distance from voters to political parties 
(proximity model) or a function of direction and intensity of policy movement 
desired by voters and espoused by the political parties relative to the status quo 
(directional model).  This study also points out the concerns within the literature 
related to the explanation and prediction of voter behavior while employing these 
two models. The analysis of both models is also extended by utilizing party 
identification and party sympathy as suggested by recent literature on voting 
behavior.  All these analyses are based on the  Polish  National  Election  Studies 
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258Bojan Todosijevic, "Issues and Party Preferences in Hungary – a Comparison of 
Directional and Proximity Models," Party Politics 11, no. 1 (2005). 
(PGSW) surveys conducted around the elections of 1997, 2001, and 2005.
1.  Proximity and Directional Model Defined
The proximity and directional models of voting are described by Iversen in 
terms of ‘reason’ (spatial proximity) and ‘passion’ (directionality) that motivates 
voters to cast a ballot for a specific party. 259  According to the proximity model 
that has roots in the classical spatial theory presented by Downs (1957), voters 
prefer political parties that are closer to them on a specific issue without taking 
into consideration the neutral point or political “side’ on which the political 
parties and voters are located.  In this model voters compare a party’s position 
on policy issues to their own ideal points and support the political party with 
issue position nearest their own preferences.  The proximity theory predicts that 
the centre position of political parties is a winning position for the parties, which 
corresponds to the median voter theorem.  
While testing the proximity model of voting, there are two possible ways 
to calculate the distance between a party’s position and a voter’s position on a 
specific issue.  First, the Euclidean one-dimensional distance z between 1V  and 
party 1P  is calculated in the following way
205
259Torben Iversen, "Political Leadership and Representation in West European 
Democracies: A Test of Three Models of Voting," American Journal of Political 
Science 38, no. 1 (1994): 50-52.
2
1 1( )z V P= −  11 PV −=                                                 (1)     
In the multidimensional (multi-issues) policy space the Euclidean distance 
between the voter and the party is (note: Pythagoras’ Theorem remains valid).260 
2 2 2
1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ... ( )n nz V P V P V P= − + − + + − .                                (2)
Typically, researchers use the squared Euclidean distance (instead of equation 
(2)), and they multiply each distance term with an issue saliency parameter. 
Thus the utility of party P for voter V on n issues can be expressed as
2
1
( )
n
VP i i i
i
U a V P
=
= − −∑                                                      (3)
where the term U is called the voter’s utility function or the voter’s quantitative 
evaluation of a party; U is a declining function of policy distance from voter to 
party and ia denotes the policy-salience parameter for the ith issue estimated 
from the data.261 This study follows the standard practice of previous research on 
proximity model and calculates the quadratic proximity. 
A recent alternative to the proximity theory of voting is directional theory 
proposed first by Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989).  This perspective is not 
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260Evans, Voters & Voting: An Introduction, 67.
261Merrill and Grofman, A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity 
Spatial Models. Adams, Merrill, and Grofman, A Unified Theory of Party 
Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral 
Factors. 
based on the same assumption as proximity theory where voters are solely 
concerned with the distance between their ideal preferences on issues and political 
parties’ position, but rather voters do indeed look for parties with stances that 
are clear and in the same political camp as their own.262   Evans (2004) has 
characterized the directional model in the following way: “Given the assumption 
that voters want a clear stance, the centre position is the losing position, contrary 
to the proximity theory. Thus, the directional theory provides a possible 
explanation as to why parties do not converge on the centre – it would be a vote-
minimising strategy.”263   Kedar, for instance, argues that voters will support 
those parties whose platform is distanced from their views but are more effective 
as far as policy legislation and implementation goes.264   The rationale for 
preferring a party whose positions are distanced from the voter’s views, yet on 
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262Some scholars suggest that both proximity and directional models are 
complementary rather than contradictory. They suggest that inherent in voter 
choice are aspects of both the proximity and directional models. Iversen, 
"Political Leadership and Representation in West European Democracies: A Test 
of Three Models of Voting." Merrill and Grofman, A Unified Theory of Voting: 
Directional and Proximity Spatial Models. 
263Evans, Voters & Voting: An Introduction, 108.
264Orit Kedar, "How Diffusion of Power in Parliaments Affects Voter Choice," 
Political Analysis 13, no. 4 (2005), Orit Kedar, "When Moderate Voters Prefer 
Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections," American 
Political Science Review 99, no. 2 (2005).
the same side of political spectrum defined as a neutral point or status quo, is 
policy oriented; voters endorse parties insofar as the parties pull policy outcomes 
in a desired direction.  Finally, some formulations of the directional theory point 
out that as the distance between the party and the voter preference grows, the 
voter’s support for that party will gradually diminish, which refers in the 
literature to the unclear concept called the ‘region of acceptability’.
Rabinowitz and Macdonald suggest that the utility of a party for an 
individual voter is not defined by proximity but by the scalar product that can 
be reflected in one dimensional or multidimensional space.265  To calculate 
directional product scores in one-dimensional space (one issue) we apply the 
following formula: (voter position – neutral point) x (party position – neutral 
point). The neutral point representing the status quo could be either the 
midpoint on the issue scale or the mean position of the majority party.266 
Instead, this study employs the measurement of the status quo defined as the 
weighted mean of all voters’ position on the specific issues.  The formal utility 
function for the multidimensional directional model is:
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265Rabinowitz and Macdonald, "A Directional Theory of Issue Voting."
266Cho and Endersby, "Issues, the Spatial Theory of Voting, and British General 
Elections: A Comparison of Proximity and Directional Models," 279. Melvin J. 
Hinich and Michael C. Munger, Analytical Politics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 183-90. 
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Again, ia  denotes  the  policy-salience  parameter for the  ith issue.  Further, this
study includes an intercept for each party to model the general support for each 
party besides the support explained by issue stance.  The utility function of the 
directional model for a certain party P then becomes
                                               ∑
=
++=
n
i
VPPiiiVP PVU
1
εαβ                                           (5)
where pα  is the intercept terms for the party, iβ  indicates the  saliency  of  issue
no. i, and VPε is a random term.  The analysis presented in this chapter  enhances 
the rational cost-benefit explanations by including the non-rational factor of 
party identification that influences voter choice. Therefore, the final utility 
functions for proximity and directional models with party identification are 
expressed as
                                            ∑
=
+++−=
n
i
VPVPPiiiVP DPVU
1
2)( εγαβ                             (6)
                                 ∑
=
+++=
n
i
VPVPPiiiVP DPVU
1
εγαβ                           (7)    
where DVP  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if V identifies with P (else equal to 
zero) and γ is a coefficient for the importance of the party ID.
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2.  Debates over the Proximity and Directional Models
There are two ways to calculate the utility function while utilizing spatial 
models, depending on how the issue positions are approached.  Differences in 
measurement of party positions brought to scholarship a debate, which has not 
been solved until now.267  On one side we have scholars who argue that the 
idiosyncratic party placement in the mind of the individual voter corresponds to 
the real politics.  These researchers usually utilize the respondents’ perception of 
a party position to test the proximity model of voting.  In other words, the 
argument goes that each voter has his or her own perception of a political party 
and its issue stance.  One voter might be exposed to a political party during the 
campaign process, let’s say in the industrial unit, and receive a different message 
from that party regarding the issue of privatization than other voters, let’s say in 
the banking sector. Thus the presentation of issue positions to the voters by 
political parties as well as the voter’s perception might diverge.  As noticed by 
Lewis and King (1999) “standard utility theory explicitly assumes that any two 
individuals’ utility functions need not be comparable”.268  In other words, the 
perception of political parties by most of the electorate might not be relevant to 
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267See articles dedicated to the debate between the proximity and directional 
models of voting in Journal of Theoretical Politics (1997), Volume 9, No. 1.
268Lewis and King, "No Evidence on Directional Vs. Proximity Voting," 29.
the specific voter.  Thus to assess the voters’ utility, the argument proceeds, we 
need to focus on their perception of political parties.
Those who oppose the idiosyncratic position and embrace the use of the 
overall sample mean for the party’s positions on specific issues argue that 
“psychological research demonstrates that in fact voters tend to make up their 
minds about party’s positions before elections using short-term information 
rather than previous perceptions, and as such all voters are receiving a common 
picture during the course of a campaign prior to election.”269  The argument 
against the idiosyncratic party placement is based on the assumption that not 
every voter recognizes the  ‘true’ [use double quotes consistently] party stances on 
a specific issue and that party positions should be analyzed from the broader 
perspective that corresponds to the ‘true’ stance of political parties.  In other 
words, a voter who believes that his/her views are conservative might tend to 
think (using some kind of short-cut or heuristic) that the conservative party has 
a similar position to his/her own position on the privatization issue, whereas in 
reality it is a false perception.  The danger of using the idiosyncratic party 
placement becomes even more realistic if researchers utilize the post-election 
surveys.  Respondents asked about a party position on specific issue (let’s say the 
position of party they voted for) could indicated their own position rather than 
the position of political party.  Similarly, they could place a political party they 
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269Evans, Voters & Voting: An Introduction, 98.
did not vote for on the opposite site than their own.  Thus, the party issue 
placement, as measured, “may be endogenous to the feeling thermometer and 
thus may be systematically biased.”270   Therefore, scholars propose to replace 
each respondent’s perception of political party issue position with the mean 
position in the sample for each party.271  Interestingly enough, the use of 
idiosyncratic or average party placement on specific policy issues tends to 
corresponds to the utilization of proximity and directional models.  In other 
words, those who ‘favor’ the directional model tends to argue for utilizing the 
mean of party positions while those who ‘favor’ the proximity model tends to 
defend the use of respondents’ idiosyncratic party placements. This study 
employs both the mean party position and the idiosyncratic party position while 
estimating the directional and proximity models.  Such a decision allows 
comparison of both models without privileging either the proximity model or the 
directional model. 
As much as the proximity and directional theories seem to be plausible in 
explaining the voting behavior, there are some doubts whether or not the utility 
functions, statistical assumptions regarding the issue positions, existing statistical 
methods, and available survey data can falsify empirically the validity of these 
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270Lewis and King, "No Evidence on Directional Vs. Proximity Voting," 26.
271Lewis and King discuss this issue extensively citing scholars who propose this 
transformation and those who oppose it. See Ibid.: 26-30.
two different theories.272   This is why recent scholarship produced opponents, 
supporters, and those who are in the middle regarding the applicability of the 
proximity and directional model of voting. The debate also persists on the 
theoretical and mathematical ground.  Those who oppose the directional model, 
criticize that the ‘region of acceptability’ beyond which parties will be panelized 
is not clear in the directional theory.  Further, they also point out to the 
deficiency of the directional model in measuring the intensity of propensity in the 
issue salience.273   Specifically, consider two issues in the two dimensional space 
when voter and a political party are on the same side of one issue (both agree e.g. 
on privatization) but are on the exactly opposing sides of the other issue (e.g. 
taxes). The directional model does not account for the change in the utility under 
the special circumstance, for instance, when the voter locates herself at +1 and 
the political party on -1 with the respect to tax policy and locates herself and the 
political party at position +1 with the respect to the issue of privatization.274 
There are also scholars, such as Lewis-Beck, who argue that the support for each 
of these models is “marginal at best” due to the untested methodological 
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272For a good discussion about validity of these theories see Ibid.
273See Merrill and Grofman, A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and 
Proximity Spatial Models, 26-29. 
274Mathematically, this special case is presented as follows: U=(1-1)^2 
+(1-1)^2=0. This could be also extended to other positions of the voter and 
political parties in two-dimensional space, for instance U=(4-4)^2 + (4-4)^2=0. 
assumptions the scholars accept, the poor quality of data utilized for these 
models, and small empirical evidence of superiority of one over the other 
model.275 
Other researchers, such as Macdonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug (1998 
and 2001) argue that directional model does a better job in explanation of voting 
behavior than the proximity model, specifically in the multiparty system.276  On 
the same side of the fence is Soren Risbjerg Thomsen (2004 and 2008), but his 
analysis and investigations go even further than demonstrating the superiority of 
directional over proximity model in multiparty systems.277   Thomsen presented 
mathematically and empirically that the estimates for the issue salience in 
directional model are equal to those of the proximity model times -2 under the 
condition that both models are desired to be calculated based on the mean party 
positions rather than the idiosyncratic positions.  In other words, Thomsen 
provided the evidence that there is really no substantive difference in the results 
while estimating these two models using the same measurement of issue 
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275Lewis and King, "No Evidence on Directional Vs. Proximity Voting," 22.
276Stuart Elaine Macdonald, George Rabinowitz, and Ola Listhaug, "On 
Attempting to Rehabilitate the Proximity Model: Sometimes the Patient Just 
Can't Be Helped," Journal of Politics 60, no. 3 (1998).
277Søren R. Thomsen, "Structural and Cultural Effects on Voting Behavior," in 
Unpublished Manuscript (2008). 
positions.278   I also believe that from the mathematical point of view the 
difference between these two models is not as great as it looks from the 
theoretical perspective. Specifically, the squared Euclidian distance (X-Y)2= 
X2-2XY+Y2, contains the scalar product of XY, which is used in calculation of 
directional model of voting, as was demonstrated above.  Therefore, we could 
expect that these models would not differ a lot in their predictions of voting 
behavior.
Further, Thomsen discovered that in many multiparty systems the 
intercept terms are easily interpreted as the mean party sympathy scores after 
estimating the directional model, while this cannot be easily concluded for the 
intercept estimates for the proximity model. Such findings give a clear superiority 
to the directional model of voting.  Thomsen interprets the party constants 
(intercepts) as the cultural effects in voting behavior and they are identified 
“when all voters tend to react in the same way to political events.”279   These 
cultural effects are different from the structural effects in the way that the later 
ones “are identified when voters tend to react differently according to their 
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278Therefore, there is no need to show here the results for both models with the 
utilization of the mean party position, yet as it was already mentioned above, this 
study presents the results for the proximity model based on the idiosyncratic 
party positions to asses its explanatory and predictable power and in some way 
contribute to the existing debate within the literature. 
279Ibid., 2.
special interests.”  In other words, political parties receive votes both because on 
average they have sympathy from the electorate (the specific cultural acceptance) 
and because they represent the specific interest of voters. This chapter follows 
findings of Thomsen and test whether or not the party intercepts correspond to 
the party sympathy in each analyzed Polish parliamentary elections.280 
Specifically, I test the proximity and directional models utilizing the fixed effects 
logit (conditional logit) that is appropriate for the alternative-specific datasets 
and for the simplicity it can be thought of as an estimation of the panel data 
with the discrete/nominal dependent variable that varies over groups. In other 
words, the conditional logit can estimate the effect on voting behavior of the 
distance between a voter and a political party on a political issue where the 
distance from each party to each voter varies across voters.  The alternative 
specific variables are the distances between voters and parties on specific issues. 
After the estimation of utility functions, following Thomsen’s (2008) suggestion, I 
compute the mean of all the party coefficients (intercepts) including the one that 
was set to zero during the conditional logit estimation and subtract this mean 
216
280Note that the “hardliners” of rational choice would argue against including the 
intercepts while testing the spatial models. 
from each estimated party intercept.281 Finally, the computed intercept values are 
regressed with the party sympathy. The results are presented graphically in 
Figures 15-17 for proximity and directional models without party identification 
and are discussed below.
How do all these theoretical and mathematical debates relate to the 
substantive electoral political realm in general and to Poland in particular? Both 
theories agree that support from the median voter is vital to electoral triumph of 
political parties.282  Yet the difference between these two theories is how to win 
the support of the median voter.  Morris and Rabinowitz state that “in 
directional theory the median voter will support the candidate who takes a strong 
stand on the side of the issues that she favors, provided she perceives the 
candidate as responsible.  In proximity theory, she will prefer the candidate 
whose set of policy positions most closely matches her own.283  Under the 
directional theory voters “decide only what side they are on and how intense they 
217
281As pointed out by Thomsen, the transformation of party intercepts is purely 
arbitrary but it becomes attractive when one wants to compare these party 
intercepts over time. Note also that the true intercept is not estimated in the 
conditional logit because it does not play any role in determining the conditional 
probabilities of positive outcomes. Further, in each estimation the intercept for 
PSL party is set to zero.
282Irwin L. Morris and George Rabinowitz, "On the Coexistence of Directional 
and Proximity Voters," Journal of Theoretical Politics 9, no. 1 (1997): 76.
283Ibid.
feel.”284   Under the proximity theory there is no need to take sides.  As was 
already demonstrated in the previous chapters, the Polish electorate seems to be 
divided, to some extent, in terms of post-communist and post-solidarity party 
preferences. This could suggest that the directional theory would be more 
applicable to the Polish setting, because the side of the political fence matters to 
voters.  Further, during the political and economic transition the strong and 
definite positions of responsible political parties might have a strong effect on 
voters’ choice.  The growing support among Polish voters for populist political 
parties in the parliamentary elections of 2001 and 2005 could indicate the 
deficiencies in the proximity theory of voting compared to the directional theory. 
This is not to disregard the proximity model.  Polish electors could as well 
behave as true rational voters and choose a political party that is closer to their 
own idiosyncratic ideal stance.  Yet, the crucial point here is to assess whether or 
not there is a significant statistical difference while testing both theories as well 
as which model explains and predicts better the electoral outcomes.
3.  Variables and Descriptive Statistics
While testing these two models of issue-based voting this project employs 
the announced vote for a particular party as the dependent variable and the set 
of covariates that represent both parties and voters positions on issues of political 
salience at election time.  These include de-communization of public offices, 
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284Lewis and King, "No Evidence on Directional Vs. Proximity Voting," 23.
privatization, European integration, economic foreign policy, the role of the 
Catholic Church in state politics, and taxation.285   Also, self-placement of the 
voter and the voter’s perception of where the political party is located on the left-
right scale are used in these models as the independent variable. Since recent 
scholarship suggests including party identification in issue-based models and it 
was shown in chapter 4 that the voters’ party identification has a significant 
impact on voting behavior, I decided to estimate each model for each election 
twice, with and without party ID.  This procedure allows a better assessment of 
the impact of issues on voting preferences.  In other words, after controlling for 
party identification in each model, the significant influence of issue(s) on voter 
choice might disappear, most likely indicating that, on average, the party 
attachment is more important indicator of vote than the issue(s). 
Figures 9-14 present the mean positions of voters and political parties on 
analyzed issues and left-right placement of the parties and voters.  Specifically, 
the average voter moved in his or her left-right ideological position between -0.6 
in 2001 elections and 1.7 in 2005 elections on the scale ranging from -5 to 5.  In 
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285Note that at each election the respondents were not asked to place political 
parties on all the issues. Therefore, this analysis focuses only on the issues 
positions of political parties that were asked in the surveys.  One way to omit 
this inconvenience would be to replace the party positions on the specific issues 
with a voter position on this specific issue. Yet this would create a slight bias in 
the analysis. 
Figure 9. Left-Right Placement of the Parties and Voter
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Figure 10. Issue Dimension: Role of Church
Figure 11. Issue Dimension: Lustration/Decomunization
221
Figure 12. Issue Dimension: Tax 
222
Figure 13. Issue Dimension: Privatization
223
Figure 14. Issue Dimension: Economic Foreign Policy
the 1997 elections the mean voter’s left-right placement was at 0.8. It is 
interesting to see how the median voter changes the position from right to left 
were searching between best possible policies.286 Such an explanation is supported 
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286Compare Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies, 199. Compare also Downs, An Economic 
Theory of Democracy, 98. cited in Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and 
Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 216.
by analyzing the specific issues presented in each table.  For instance, the issue of 
taxation presented for each election in Figure 12 indicates that voters changed 
their views in each during election time, which corresponds to the voters’ moves 
on the left-right dimension.  This is evident for almost all the issue dimensions 
presented in these figures.
As perceived by the voters, the positions of the post-solidarity parties on 
the left-right dimension changed very slightly.  The only party that was placed at 
the same left-right position in last three elections was the post-communist SLD. 
If we consider the AWS as the ancestor of the PO and the PiS, and the LPR as 
the successor of ROP we clearly see that the offspring parties moved toward the 
center on the left-right dimension.  I believe that these party placements are 
fairly accurate portrayals of actual party positions.287  The examination of each 
issue dimension reveals that most of the parties have a clear stands on the 
specific issues and their positions are fairly stretched over the political spectrum, 
except the taxation issue in 1997 where all the parties are very closed to the voter 
position on taxation issue.
225
287Note that the populist parties such as the LPR and the SRP are sometimes 
placed closer to the center than it would be expected by the most political 
observers.  Yet I believe that the radicalism of the LPR and the SRP is well 
represented on the issue of EU integration as well as the role of the church for the 
LPR alone.
Finally, analyzing Figures 9-14 we could roughly guess how the voter could 
cast her vote.  For instance, Figure 13 presents the voters and parties’ positions 
on the issue of privatization.  Note that the average voter in 2001 supported less 
privatization than any political party.  Specifically, the median voter is spaced at 
point 2.2 on the scale ranging from -5 to 5 while the SRP is located at point 2.  If 
privatization was the only issue important for the voter during the elections of 
2001, by the crude estimate based on the proximity theory we could assume that 
the voter would cast the ballot for the SRP since both have has a vary similar 
view on privatization.  Since there is no political party on the left of side of the 
voter and the status quo is roughly at -.8, the directional theory would predict 
that the voter would not for sure choose the PO because they are on the other 
side of the fence. Surprisingly to some, obvious to others, the voter’s choice would 
be the same under both theories.   Just to give one more example, take the issue 
of the EU integration from 2005.  According to proximity theory, the vote would 
go to the PiS and under the directional theory to the SRP if we assume that the 
LPR is outside of the ‘region of acceptability’.  If EU integration was the only 
important issue, the SLD as well as the PO would be the losers in the elections 
under the assumptions of both theories.  Now the question becomes how these 
issue positions affect the voting preferences after we place them into 
multidimensional space. 
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4.  Results and Discussions
 This section assesses how issue positions affect the vote by studying the 
relationship between specific policy attitudes and party preferences by estimating 
the proximity and directional models of voting with both the idiosyncratic and   
the average party placements.  Table 30 displays the estimates of both models 
without the party identification covariate.  As the table indicates, there are clear 
similarities between each estimated model, but also some differences.  One 
apparent finding is that by employing the mean party position while calculating 
the voters’ utility, the issue saliency estimates in the directional models are twice 
as large as the estimates of issue saliency in the proximity models.288   Further, 
the explanatory power of proximity and directional models is always the same 
under the condition that we utilize the mean party position in both models. 
Only the estimates of party intercepts differ.289
 The other notable finding is there is no significant difference in the 
explanatory power of proximity and directional models while employing the 
idiosyncratic party placement. The differences of the pseudo R-squared range 
between 0.069 and 0.021, although on average, the directional model is slightly 
better at explaining vote choice than the proximity model in each election 
228
288As mentioned previously, Thomsen proved mathematically that this will always 
be the case if we employ mean party position.   
289Note that the same is true for Model 2 with the party ID (Table 32). 
irrespective of the utilization of idiosyncratic or mean party positions.290   This 
result comes rather as a surprise, since we would expect (based on the previous 
empirical tests of issue-based models) that the proximity model would perform 
better than the directional model if the idiosyncratic party positions are utilized 
in the analysis.  This discovery only confirms the superiority of the directional 
model while testing the issue-based voting.  In addition, similar to the models 
estimated with the mean party position, the issue saliency in the directional 
models is nearly twice as large as the issue saliency in the proximity models. 
These minor differences in the empirical estimates of issue saliency confirm what 
has been argued by Lewis and King (1999) that there is no substantive difference 
in the understanding of voting behavior when comparing results from the 
directional and proximity models.  The empirical findings in this study go even 
further and demonstrate that there is no substantive difference in the 
understanding the electoral choice of the Polish voter when comparing the results 
of issue saliency in models estimated with the idiosyncratic and mean party 
position.  Again, only the party intercept estimates fluctuate from model to 
model and unfortunately the party intercepts are very often not reported by 
researchers.
 The effect of issue positions on voters’ choice is on average moderate.  The 
pseudo Rsquared estimated by the directional and proximity models with mean 
229
290Again, the same is true for Model 2 presented in Table 32.
party position for 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections are 0.405, 0.303, and 0.254 
respectively.  These findings indicate that issue-based voting declined over time 
and is also supported by the R-squared figures estimated by both directional and 
proximity models with the idiosyncratic party positions.  The coefficients for all 
the issues are significant at 0.05 levels or higher, except the coefficient on the 
privatization in 2001 estimated by the proximity model using the idiosyncratic 
party position.  The strongest impact on voting for the political parties goes to 
the left-right self placement across all elections and utilized models. It is not 
surprising since left-right attitudes probably summarize the voters’ positions on 
all the issues.291  This finding also confirms what has been found in chapter 4, 
namely that the ideology is an important predictor of vote.  Note that all 
coefficients are positive for both models, indicating the utility of voting for a 
political party that is either close to the voter’s position (proximity) or is on the 
same “side” of the status quo (directional). The positive coefficients for the 
proximity model mean that the closer the political party is to a voter on specific 
issue, the more likely this party is going to be chosen.  Larger coefficients in the 
directional model would suggest that the political party that is more intense on 
the issue would be more attractive to the voter.  Positive coefficients in this 
230
291One would argue that if the left-right is a “super issue” then it should not be 
included in the model to avoid the over estimation of issue-based voting. Even 
though this argument is valid I follow the commonly accepted practice in the 
research on issue-based voting and include this covariate in all the models.
model indicate that voters choose political parties from the same side of the 
political spectrum. 
More specific interpretations of coefficients are possible by transforming 
the estimates into the odd ratios by employing the mathematical constant e and 
coefficients b as power (e^b).  For instance, the interpretation of the coefficient 
for joining the EU estimated by the proximity model in 2001 elections is as 
follows: if a political party moves closer to the voter by one unit (lets say from -3 
to -2 while a voter is located at value -1) that odds that voter will chose this 
party increase by 1%, ceteris paribus.  The interpretation of the party intercept 
for the victorious SLD in the same proximity model for the same year of elections 
would be as follows: if issues were weighted equally by voters, voters would be 
6.96 times more likely to choose the SLD than the PSL.292   Why would voters 
choose the SLD over the PSL if all the issues are weighted equally?  Based on 
what factors? In other words, what is the interpretation of this party intercept 
and what are these intercepts estimating? The difficulty of answering these 
questions forced the “hard core” rational choice scholars to omit them from 
analysis of issue-based voting or estimating them but not reporting them and 
interpreting them.  As already mentioned, Soren Thomsen is the first scholar, to 
my knowledge, who discovered that these intercepts measure the popularity or 
sympathy of political parties. Figures 15-17 present the relationship between the 
231
292Note that the PSL is a base party in each model.
Figure 15.  Relationship between Mean Party Sympathy and Party Intercepts –1997 Elections 
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Figure 16.  Relationship between Mean Party Sympathy and Party Intercepts – 2001 Elections 
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Figure 17.  Relationship between Mean Party Sympathy and Party Intercepts – 2005 elections 
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mean party sympathy and the party intercepts for proximity and directional 
models calculated with mean party positions and idiosyncratic party positions for 
each election.  These correlations are much stronger for the party intercepts 
estimated by the directional models than the proximity models.  For instance, the 
adjusted R-squared for “directional model intercepts over party sympathy” in 
2005 elections is 0.95 while for the regression using the intercepts estimated by 
the proximity model with mean party position and idiosyncratic party positions 
is only 0.42 and 0.22 respectively.  The difference between ‘directional intercepts’ 
and ‘proximity intercepts’ in 1997 is even more devastating for the proximity 
model – the adjusted R-squared is 0.91 and 0.017 in favor of the intercepts 
estimated by the directional model (both models estimated with mean party 
sympathy).  These findings give a clear priority to the directional models at least 
for the 1997 and 2001 elections.
The differences in correlations between the mean party sympathy and 
intercepts estimated for the 2001 elections are less evident, yet the adjusted R-
squared is still higher for ‘directional intercepts’.  One also would wonder what 
would be the explanation of the estimated intercept for the PO in 2001 since it 
has a higher value than the mean party sympathy (Figure 16).  The explanation 
of this intercept is quite difficult at this stage of research – we can only declare 
that other factor(s) influenced voters to cast ballot for the PO besides the issues 
235
and the party sympathy.  On the other hand, we can speculate why the average 
party sympathy for the PO was low in 2001 elections.
Looking at the mean party sympathy scores presented in Table 31, we 
noticed that the PO, on average, was not very popular in 2001, but it became 
quite popular in 2005.  In order to explain this turn in general sympathy for the 
PO, it is necessary to go back in time and recall the political roots of PO.  As it 
was already mentioned in chapter 2 of this work, the Civic Platform (PO) was 
formed 8 months before the 2001 elections by the politicians who represented a 
liberal wing of the UW.  Some key figures left the UW (such as Donald Tusk, 
who became a popular as a presidential candidate in 2004) and together with 
some other members of AWS created the PO.  The important fact that need not 
be  overlooked is that the  UW  was in the governmental coalition with the AWS 
until mid-2000. Notice that the AWS lost its credibility due to inefficient 
         
         Table 31. Mean Party Sympathy
1997 Elections 2001 Elections 2005 Elections
AWS  0.79 N/A  N/A
UW  0.49 N/A  N/A
ROP -0.86 N/A  N/A
SLD -1.01 0.65 -2.82
PSL -1.44          -0.77 -1.22
PiS  N/A          -0.42  1.19
PO  N/A          -1.43  0.34
LPR  N/A          -1.59 -1.64
SRP  N/A          -1.17 -1.74
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governance and even failed to achieve the 5% threshold in 2001 elections.  I 
believe that the low sympathy for the PO in 2001 is due to the fact that their 
leaders were in the coalition with the AWS.  As we can see from Table 32, which 
presents the mean party sympathy for all major parties across time, all of the 
post-solidarity parties (including the PO) were, on average, not voters’ favorites 
in the 2001 elections.  When the post-communist SLD came to power for a 
second time after the fall of communism in 2001, they almost immediately 
marked their political actions with the corruption.  More specifically, SLD 
politicians as well as the representatives on the national and local level were 
involved in several economic corruptions including the allegations for the top SLD 
figures such as the Prime Minister Leszek Miller and the President Aleksander 
Kwasniewski. The Orlen affair, just to mention the largest corruption associated 
with the SLD, involved the privatization of state-owned largest fuel corporation. 
To investigate the Orlen case the special parliamentary investigation commission 
was set up and the parliamentary hearings of top SLD figure benefited the 
politicians of the Civic Platform (PO) and the Law and Justice (PiS) and 
seriously hurt the SLD.  To sum up, the relatively high party sympathy for the 
UW in 1997 and low sympathy for the PO in 2001 is most likely due to the AWS-
UW governmental coalition.  The gain of popularity by the PO in 2005 could be 
237
easily explained by the fact that its politicians played a very visible and positive 
role during the parliamentary hearing of the top members of SLD. 293  
The model 2 is displayed in Table 32.  One evident finding from this 
model that incorporates the party identification as an additional independent 
variable is that significance of some issue fail to indicate the impact on voting 
preference.  For instance, in 1997 elections only two issues out of five remain 
significant after including the party identification and estimating the models with 
the idiosyncratic party position.  These are the role of church in political life as 
well as communist nomenclature.  These results confirm what has been found in 
the previous chapters.  In the estimation with the mean party position, the issue 
of privatization stays marginally significant.  In the 2001 elections the issue of 
privatization becomes irrelevant to the electorate and in 2005 the issue of 
lustration and decommunization loses its significance in the models estimated 
with idiosyncratic party position but remains important in both the directional 
and proximity models estimated with the mean party position.  This could be 
explained by the  fact that  the  wining party, the PiS,  had a strong  position on 
238
293Similar explanation for low sympathy in 2001 and high popularity in 2005 
could be given for the PiS.  Further, notice that the SLD had low sympathy in 
1997, high sympathy in 2001, and again low sympathy in 2005.  The low 
popularity in 1997 elections is most likely due to the SLD governance from 1993 
to 1997 and by the same token, there is a clear evidence of large decline in the 
SLD general popularity between 2001 and 2005.  
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lustration and decommunization advocating that there is a need to take out from 
public offices and politics the former secret police officers that served under the 
communist regime.  It also seems that the PiS stand on the issue of lustration 
and decommunization was supported by the general public.
Let us focus again on the party intercepts. We notice that in model 1 and 
2 some party intercepts are negative in directional model while they are positive 
in the proximity model.  This indicates that parties such as the LPR in 2001 and 
the SLD in 2005 in the logic of the directional model received a ‘penalty’ for 
being extreme and falling outside of the ‘region of acceptability’.  Further, the 
comparison of the intercepts over elections in the directional model allows us to 
access the change in the overall support for each political party.  For instance, 
comparing the intercept for the SLD throughout these three elections we can see 
how the party gained the support of voters from 1997 to 2001 and lost drastically 
in the 2005.  Last but not least, if the party intercepts closely correspond to the 
average sympathy for each party (as in the 1997 and 2005 elections), we can 
conclude that the insignificant party intercepts demonstrate that some political 
parties did not gain the general popularity in the public as compared to the other 
parties.  For instance, the populist SRP and LPR in 2005 elections had less 
sympathy in the public than the PSL, and their votes can be explain by their 
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positions on the political issue rather than their popularity (compared to PSL).294 
Finally, calculating the differences in pseudo R-square between models with and 
without party identifications as well as comparing the coefficients for each 
election together with party sympathy (party intercepts) estimated by the 
directional models, the substantive conclusions are as follows.  Voters’ electoral 
decisions in 1997 elections were undertaken based on the mixture of issues, party 
sympathy and party identifications.  The verdicts for the 2001 elections were 
based on party sympathy but also on issues.  In the 2005 elections voters cast the 
ballots based on the party identification and party sympathy more than issues.
In sum, the proximity and directional model are very similar in their 
explanatory power even when estimating the proximity model with the 
idiosyncratic party placement, which according to the literature should give the 
privilege to the proximity model over the directional model.  The issue-based 
voting is evident in the Polish electorate irrespectively of the utilized model, yet 
it seems to be diminishing over time and somewhat replaced by the party 
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294In addition to utilization of the PSL as a base party in the conditional logit 
estimation for all models, it is also possible to change a base in the estimation. 
For instance, estimating each model with the winning party in the election as a 
base (AWS in 1997, SLD in 2001, and PiS in 2005) we could compare the party 
intercepts across parties with the reference to the winning party. We could also 
re-run each model with each political party as a base producing 64 estimated 
models which appears to be infeasible at least for this study. The results for such 
estimations are available upon request.
identification.  The cultural factor of party popularity appears to play a 
significant role during the elections and could be estimated within the directional 
model. Looking from the comparative perspective at these findings, it appears 
again that the Polish voter is not much different from the other voters in the 
western democracies.  
5.  Conclusions
 This chapter provided the analysis of issue-based voting by utilizing the 
proximity and directional models.  The study could be considered to some extent 
as a ground breaking analysis since there is no prior research conducted on the 
Polish electoral microdata using the spatial models of voting.  This study also 
pointed out the existing statistical and theoretical debates regarding the 
applicability and usefulness of rational choice models.  From the substantive side 
of this research, it was demonstrated that in the Polish setting the directional 
model of voting has superiority to the proximity model due to the predictability 
of party popularity represented by the party intercepts.  It was also shown that 
the issues determine the voters’ choice, even though other non-policy factors, such 
as party identification and party popularity might indicate stronger influence on 
electoral preferences in some elections.  Finally, the results in this chapter confirm 
the findings from previous chapters bringing the comprehensive picture of voting 
behavior in Poland.  Even though this study utilized only two models of issue 
based voting, I believe these findings suggest the importance of exploring further 
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these rational choice models.  In other words, the estimation of voting choices 
based on issue positions brings the remarkable possibilities for future 
investigations, for instance combining the party competition with the issue-based 
voting or including the political sophistication with the two models of issue 
voting.
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CHAPTER SEVEN                                          
CONCLUSION
This dissertation presented a systematic empirical study of the Polish 
parliamentary elections in 1997, 2001 and 2005. The analyses were performed in 
the framework of behavioralism and rational choice.  Under these two broad 
academic schools of thought various theories of voting behavior have been 
developed over last 50 years.  I presented the main theoretical elements of 
sociological, socio-psychological, economic, and issue-based models of voting, 
examined the relative weight of the major variables in each model, and tested 
their statistical significance. 
1.  What Has Been Learned?
This research started with an ambition to find something new that applies 
explicitly to Poland; I also thought (perhaps naively) that the empirical findings 
would lead me to develop novel theoretical underpinnings.  After the empirical 
analysis conducted in this study, I can declare that my original ambition was 
deeply flawed.  I fooled myself that Polish voters, given the structural aspect of 
the democratic transition, would behave really differently from other voters in the 
developed democracies.  My motivation to make a new discovery,  brought  me 
to  the  point where this  research  confirmed existing results not just for Poland,
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but for other polities as well.  Yet a ‘non-discovery’ is also a discovery.  Notably, I 
found that the existing theoretical principles of voting behavior are applicable to 
Poland.  As in other democracies, variables such as social class and religion help 
the Polish voters to decide which party to choose on the election day, attachment 
to the political parties provides an incentive to vote for this party, economic 
conditions on the national level appear to have an impact on voting, and finally 
the prominent issues matter to voters while casting a ballot. Such findings should 
certainly help future research to look at Polish society from the perspective of 
other democratic states while analyzing voting behavior.  Perhaps the divide 
between old and new Europe is no longer a valid assumption in the analysis of 
voters’ choice. 
Besides ‘no discovery’ of new theoretical foundations, I must say that this 
dissertation contains ‘small empirical discoveries’ that were not realized by the 
community of scholars who investigate the electoral behavior in Poland.  Most 
importantly, I discovered that the party identification is applicable to the Polish 
political setting and it plays a significant role in the Polish electoral politics. 
Even though this finding contradicts the ‘scientific’ stereotype presented in the 
literature on Polish voting behavior, I believe this is a significant contribution to 
scientific studies of electoral politics.  
Specifically, this study suggests that even though Polish voters are still 
learning how to be partisans, they have already developed some psychological 
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attachment to political parties in a very short period of democratic experience. 
In other words, the Polish voters identify with a political party, or at least 
consider themselves closer to one party or the other.  Voters are psychologically 
attached to family of parties in the framework of post-communist and post-
solidarity parties as well as in the narrower perspective that identifies party 
families in terms of their programmatic stands on socio-cultural and economic 
issues. Party attachment was also operationalized in the form of the degree of 
partisan identification and the findings imply that parties are used by voters as 
short-cuts or heuristics, which help them to decide in a complex electoral 
environment.  In terms of the influence of party identification on voters’ choice, 
this study demonstrated that the party identification was the strongest predictor 
of the vote in the 2005 elections and weakest in the 2001 elections.  Further, the 
influence of party identification on voting exceeded the influence of ideological 
orientation in the 2005 elections, but not in the 1997 and 2001 elections.295
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295A reader might be puzzled why ideology measured as left-right self placement 
seems to be a better predictor of vote than party identification in the socio-
psychological model but the opposite is true in the estimation of the issue-based 
model of voting. In other words, one would ask why the coefficient of 
determination representing the party identification is larger (has a bigger effect) 
in the issue model of voting than in the socio-psychological model.  In the 
Michigan model of voting the measurement of party identification was ‘split‘ 
between different groups of parties either according to historical divide (post-
solidarity and post-communist) or party families (social democrats, liberal conser- 
There is no doubt that other earlier and later elections need to be taken 
into consideration, other available electoral data need to be tested (e.g. the 
International Social Survey Program Data), and perhaps other methods need to 
be employed, but the message from my finding is very clear: party identification 
cannot be neglected while studying the voting behavior in Poland.
While testing the Michigan model of voting the attention was given not 
only to partisans but also to independents.  It was estimated that non-partisans 
cast their vote based on the ideological orientations in 1997 and 2001.  Further, 
based on the political sophistication, independents were categorized as apoliticals 
or apartisans.  This study revealed that among voters the number of apartisans 
seems to be steadily increasing, suggesting that party identification might become 
a weaker prediction of vote in the future elections, as prophesied by the cognitive 
mobilization theory.  There is no doubt that the analysis of future elections is 
247
vatives, and social conservatives) whereas in the issue voting model the party 
identification was measured and utilized as a dummy variable indicating whether 
or not a respondent identify with any political party. This clearly implies that 
while comparing different models we cannot blindly rely on the magnitude of 
coefficient.  Also the left –right self placement in the directional model of voting 
was differently operationalized than in the socio-psychological model.  In other 
words, this only confirms how careful the researchers and readers have to be in 
order to interpret these findings properly.
necessary to further test the theory of party functionalism as well as cognitive 
mobilization.
The issue-based voting model presented in this dissertation is also a ‘small 
empirical discovery’ which definitely contributes to existing research.  First, it is 
the first approach to test the highly debatable rational choice models on the 
Polish elections.  Second, it was shown that the issues are important factors while 
determining the voters’ choice irrespective of the type of model (directional or 
proximity) we employ in the analysis.  Third, the estimates from the directional 
model of voting as compared with the proximity model estimates suggest that the 
Polish voter is more likely to choose a political party that has more intense 
stands on issues rather than the political party with an issue position near the 
status quo.  Further, it seems to matter to voter whether or not the political 
party is on the same side of the fence (here the status quo) – if it is, then the 
party will gain the voter’s support, if it is not, it will loose votes.  Fourth, by the 
utilization of the directional model of voting, we are able to interpret the 
estimated party intercepts as overall party sympathy within the polity.  Overall, 
the rational choice models of issue-based voting predict very well the electoral 
results and seem to provide, together with party identification, the best 
explanatory power compared to other models of voting.
This work also demonstrated that the electoral politics is influenced by the 
economic performance.  Besides the analysis of individual perceptions of economic 
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performance I also included regional effects into the voting behavior introducing 
the aggregate/national level data in economic model.  The general perception of 
economic growth in Poland would suggest that the incumbent parties should 
retain at least the same number of seats in the parliament. Yet, incumbents lost 
in every single election.  By utilizing the various economic indicators in the 
economic model of voting, the puzzle seems to be solved.   Specifically, what has 
been shown by conducting the aggregate (regional) level of analysis is that the 
economic growth per se helps incumbents, but it is not enough to win the 
majority of votes in the polity when unemployment and poverty rates are 
increasing.  On the other hand, the growth of economic inequality seems to 
facilitate votes for incumbents, but only to a certain point and then it turns 
against the governing party or coalition.  The utilization of Gini index and the 
poverty rates as predictors of vote seems to be a definitive innovation in the 
analysis of Polish elections.  Both indicators seem to suggest that the majority of 
Poles who vote could be classified as supporters of economic neo-liberalism, and 
in consequence, they choose political parties that support the neo-liberal 
economic policies.
A very clear message from this work is that economic conditions affect 
election results but they do not completely determine them.  In other words, 
economy is not the only factor that matters.  The analysis of economic voting on 
the individual level revealed that pocket book voting is inferior to the sociotropic 
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voting.  Further, the aggregate level of analysis showed a stronger support for the 
economic theory of voting behavior than the individual level study.  The 
divergence between macro- and micro-level analyses has been seen in the previous 
research.  Yet the individual and aggregate level analysis are not mutually 
exclusive: the findings in this work complement each other demonstrating that 
national economic conditions affect individual voting decisions and the election 
results. Future research on this subject should implement both individual level 
data and aggregate level data at the same time and perform multilevel 
(hierarchical) analysis.298   Unfortunately, such a study has not been conducted 
yet on any of the Polish elections.  
This study also confirmed what has been found in previous research 
conducted on first few democratic elections, namely that societal cleavages exist. 
What distinguishes this study from previous investigations is that this research 
determined the changes in social cleavages, clearly pointed out their location and 
revealed that on average they have weak direct effect on electoral outcomes. 
Specifically, in the 1997 elections voters’ decisions were based to some extent on 
the religious cleavage; there was a clear split between those voters who attended 
church and those who did not.  Church-goers voted for post-solidarity parties 
while others for post-communist parties. In the 2001 elections, the religious 
practices of voters still influenced their political decisions, but the votes were split 
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more or less evenly between post-communist and post-solidarity parties. Religious 
cleavages played a less significant role in the elections of 2005 than in the 
previous elections, though it was still evident specifically in votes for the populist 
LPR.  In general, in the 1997 elections the religious voting exceeded any other 
type of cleavage voting, but it subsequently declined. The influence of religion on 
voting most likely means that the traditional values in the family and the respect 
for authority have had the political relevance.  Yet as the secularization of society 
proceeds, political parties associated with the Catholic Church must work harder 
to gain votes and appeal to voters on other than the religious subjects.  This is 
evident at least in the LPR stances on the European enlargement and 
privatization in the 2005 elections.
My analysis suggests that the influence of class cleavage on voter’s 
behavior increased from the 1997 to 2005 elections.  Specifically, in the 2005 
elections class cleavage exceeded the influence of religious cleavage.  The other 
cleavage that influenced the voter’s choice in analyzed elections is the urban-rural 
divide; the residents of villages tended to vote for rural parties more than others. 
Further, the political divisions of the past were present in the 1997 elections and 
declined as time passed.  The overall weak explanatory power of cleavage voting 
is probably associated with the fact that the social characteristics of voters are 
quite far away from the actual vote in the funnel of causality proposed in The 
American Voter. In other words, there are other intermediate and closer factors 
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that dictate the final choice on the Election Day.   Last, but not least, the 
presence of cleavages constitutes an important finding because social cleavages 
contribute to the development of party system, but we need to realize that most 
likely they do not take an immediate role of short-cuts or heuristics in the 
electoral decisions.
So far, I summarized what determined the voters’ choice at the ballot box 
from the perspective of various models of voting. Clearly, each model portrayed 
the Polish voter somewhat differently. So, which model should be trusted?  I 
believe that behavioralism as well as rational choice theory are complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive.  Rational voters need social bases to make their 
choices to learn how to calculate their utility.  By the same token, sociological 
voters do not only have the motives that are the same as the motives of the social 
group. In other words, voters combine elements of social identities and rationality 
while casting the ballot. Therefore, all the models should be taken seriously even 
though they have different explanatory and predictive power.  On average and 
across elections, the sociological model and the economic egotropic model seem to 
have the weakest explanatory and predictive power.  Models that seem to explain 
and predict best voting and electoral outcomes are issue-based and socio-
psychological models.  The macro-level analysis of economic voting appears to 
have strong explanatory power as well.
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Finally, to stress the robustness of the findings in this work, it is necessary 
to point out that the dependent variable was operationalized in various ways.  In 
addition to the analysis of voters’ choice for specific parties, I also grouped 
political parties into families.  Such groupings allowed me to assess the 
importance of political parties social and historical roots as well as ideologies 
associated with the old and new regime.  I also operationalized the dependent 
variable as the dichotomous variable in the economic and the socio-psychological 
models of voting. This allowed me to examine the voters’ choice of the 
incumbents and non-incumbents parties as well as the post-communist and the 
post-solidarity parties.
2.  Directions for Future Research
Although I believe that I have made some important advances by 
examining how voters decide by testing competing models, I make no claim that I 
have incorporated all of the possible variables or employed all available statistical 
methods.  Future research is full of opportunities to perform further 
investigations on the Polish elections. In general terms, future research should 
focus on, but not be limited to, testing how political campaigns determine voters’ 
choice as well as how the characteristics of party leaders influence voting.  The 
influence of the media also needs special attention as a determinant of voting. To 
the best of my knowledge, none of these aspects has been taken into 
consideration in recent research on the Polish elections. This work focused only 
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on parliamentary elections, but there is very little research done on the 
presidential elections as well as European Union elections.  This definitely should 
be a subject of future research.
This work demonstrated that issue voting does occur. Further research 
could extend this finding and investigate how much of the electorate meets the 
set of preconditions that are necessary in order to cast ballots with respect to the 
specific issue.  Incorporating the level of cognitive mobilization into the model of 
issue voting could possibly bring the improvement to the model.  In other words, 
it could be expected, according to mobilization theory, that the politically 
informed and educated voters account for a higher amount of issue voting; I 
believe this speculation is worthy to be tested. 
While studying economic voting, attention was given to dichotomized 
categories of political parties, namely incumbents and non-incumbents.  Future 
research on the economic voting might categorize parties another way and 
examine how economic conditions affect different groups of parties.  Attention to 
categories other than incumbents has been already given in the existing 
literature, but what might prove useful for testing further the economic model of 
voting in Poland is to focus on the categories of political parties as presented in 
chapter 4, namely social democrats, social conservatives, and liberal 
conservatives.  Since such a categorization of parties has not been employed in 
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previous research on Polish elections, it would be desirable to examine how 
national economic conditions affect these groups of parties.299
The vast majority of empirical research on voting behavior examines the 
direct effect of various independent variables on voters’ choice.  In doing so, 
researchers ignore the fact that, for instance, social cleavages perhaps modify how 
voters’ preferences are translated into voting decisions.  In other words, what has 
been lacking in the analysis of voting behavior, at least while examining the 
Polish elections, is that the conditional effects of social cleavages on the other 
determinants of voting behavior (e.g. party identification) are not taken into 
consideration.  More specifically, by employing conditional effects in the analysis 
of various models of voting, a researcher could spot, for instance, whether or not 
religious practices modify the effect of party identification on individual voting 
choices.  Thus, the message for the future research is clear: besides utilizing linear 
additive models, researchers should also employ the multiplicative interaction 
models.
Last, but not least, this study briefly touched on the subject of 
comparative voting behavior, but the findings seem to suggest that there are 
some similarities in Poles’ electoral behavior as compared to voters in other 
established democracies.  It is not to say that voters in all democratic polities 
behave the same way.  There are differences between the Anglo-Saxon tradition 
255
299This is a task that I am currently pursuing.
of voting and the continental European voter.  At first glance we would think 
that the Polish voter behaves similarly to the European voter because of the 
similar culture, the geographic proximity, and the institutional settings of 
electoral politics, to name just a few factors.  Nevertheless, this study uncovered 
that the Polish voter seems to behave more like an American than a European 
voter, specifically in terms of the influence of party attachment on voting 
decisions, but also in the aspect of the sociotropic economic voting.  On the other 
hand, the electoral system of proportional representation seems to bring the 
Polish voter closer to the European voter in terms of the predictability of voting 
behavior based on the party sympathy.  This findings would suggest that the 
further electoral research should focus more on the comparative analysis of 
Poland and other developed democracies rather than being only attached to the 
‘old’ practice of comparing Poland with the other post-communist states and 
trying to detect there the similar patterns of voting behavior.
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